Categorising anew the semantic potential of *qōl* from a cognitive linguistics perspective

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Abstract

This thesis aims to provide a recategorisation of the semantic potential of the polysemous lexeme *qōl* with the input of notable theoretical insights from cognitive linguistics. The extant body of knowledge regarding the lexeme's semantic potential, comprising Biblical Hebrew lexicons and theological dictionaries of the Old Testament, is thoroughly detailed; however, there is a clear lack of consensus around how to categorise the specific senses comprising the semantic potential. Cognitive linguistics presents a guiding theoretical framework for linguistics research that prioritises empirical study and the growing understanding of what is generally known about the brain's functional processes. This thesis argues that with relevant insights from cognitive linguistics the Biblical Hebrew corpus can be analysed and described more systematically in terms of a lexeme's semantic potential. More specifically, this thesis argues for the practical benefit of three tools from cognitive linguistics that have been proven to be productive for the study of meaning in Biblical Hebrew: 1) prototype theory, 2) frame theory, and 3) conceptual metonym and metaphor theory and conceptual blending. After a discussion of the extant body of literature and the productivity of partnering with cognitive linguistics for lexical semantics research, a working hypothesis is formulated with the help of insights from the three cognitive linguistics instruments mentioned. In the main body of the thesis, an account of the lexeme's sense categories is offered that attempts, on the one hand, to describe the semantic potential of *qōl* while, on the other hand, offer an analysis and description of the sense extensions that explain the various uses of the lexeme.

Opsomming

Die doel van hierdie verhandeling is ’n herkategorisering van die semantiese potensiaal van die polisemiese lekseem *qōl* deur gebruik te maak van ter sake teoretiese insigte vanuit kognitiewe taalkunde. Bestaande kennis aangaande die semantiese potensiaal van die lekseem word in detail in Bybels-Hebreeuse leksika and teologiese woordeboeke van die Ou Testament weergegee. Daar is egter geen konsensus oor die wyse waarop die verskillende betekenisonderskeidings wat die semantiese potensiaal van die lekseem verwoord, gekategoriseer moet word nie. Kognitiewe taalkunde bied ’n rigtinggewende teoretiese raamwerk vir taalkundige navorsing wat ’n hoë premie plaas op empiriese studie en die al hoe groterwordende insig in die brein se rol in menslike kommunikasie. Hierdie tesis redeneer dat met ter sake insigte vanuit kognitiewe taalkunde die semantiese potensiaal van ’n lekseem in die Bybels-Hebreeuse korpus meer sistematies ontleed en beskryf kan word. Daar word geargumenteer dat daar drie instrumente is wat al getoon het dat hulle van groot waarde is vir die bestudering van betekenis in Bybelse Hebreeus: 1) prototipe-teorie, 2) raamteorie, en 3) konseptuele metonomie- en metafoorteorie en konseptuele vermenging (“conceptual blending”). Die tesis skop af met ’n bespreking van die voorhande literatuur oor qōl, en die waarde van kognitiewe taalkunde vir leksikale semantiek. Daarna word ’n werkshipotese geformuleer met behulp van die insigte van die drie kognitieftaalkundige instrumente wat genoem is. In the hoofafdeling van die tesis, word die lekseem se betekenisonderskeiding op so manier beskryf, om aan die een kant, uitdrukking te gee aan die semantiese potensiaal van *qōl*, terwyl aan die ander kant, ’n analise en beskrywing van betekenisuitbreidings gebied word wat die verskillende gebruike van die lekseem verklaar.

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Table of contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

The meanings of many Biblical Hebrew lexemes can often be taken for granted due to the availability of numerous resources such as lexicons, theological dictionaries, and commentaries. As such, a simple gloss could, at first glance, be considered definitive. For example, the meaning of the lexeme *qōl* can easily be taken for granted as existing simply on the basis of a translation of either "voice" or "sound". The semantic potential of this lexeme is, to a large degree, well-understood and ably explained by available lexicons and theological dictionaries. However, while the academic attention afforded Biblical Hebrew and the exegesis of the biblical texts is almost endless, there is a need to consistently review what has come before in light of new theoretical advances – in the case of lexical semantics, this (as this work argues) entails partnering Biblical Hebrew semantics with the field of cognitive linguistics. One major problem with lexical entries for *qōl*, however, is the lack of a definitive, or at least consistent, categorisation of the semantic potential. Entries suffer from, as will be discussed, a troubling vagueness that leaves much of the lexeme's use unexplained. This problem of categorisation it is hypothesised can be eased with the help of insights from cognitive linguistics in delineating the senses which comprise a lexeme or lexical expression's use throughout the Biblical Hebrew corpus. The research problem is thus, how can the application of a cognitive linguistics approach to categorisation and sense mapping help one to better construe the senses of *qōl* as well as the relationships between them in a principled manner?

This study first explores the range of available lexical entries for the lexeme *qōl*. As mentioned, there is a wealth of existing research that ably covers the use of this lexeme. By reviewing our available sources, this study hopes to prove the inconsistency with which the lexeme is described and, as a result, the need for a recategorisation of the lexeme's semantic potential. Second, it introduces linguistics and, in particular, the emergence of cognitive linguistics as a potential dialogue partner for Biblical Hebrew semanticists. Third, based on the theoretical discussion of cognitive linguistics in Chapter 3, a working-hypothesis will be described for semantics research. The working-hypothesis expresses the theoretical foundation needed to prove the hypothesised benefit of cognitive linguistics for Biblical Hebrew. In practical terms, this working-

hypothesis is translated into a methodology which defines how this specific study's corpus-based analysis was undertaken. The results of this analysis are then delineated in the final chapter, which also functions as an overview of the newly categorised semantic potential of *qōl*. A conclusion will summarise the results of this study and offer some final remarks on the usefulness of cognitive linguistics for semantics research and the future of lexical analysis and dictionary entries.

Chapter 2: A survey of existing lexical entries

2.1. Introduction

Chapter 1 introduced and outlined the background to this study, highlighting the problem that while there is a general agreement regarding the semantic potential of the lexeme *qōl*, there is no consensus regarding the categorisation of the individual senses. Partially, the difficulty arises from the challenge of understanding the conceptual knowledge upon which a native language use, in this case Biblical Hebrew, is founded. One viable solution to this problem, it was noted, entails drawing on advances of cognitive linguistics for a more justifiable categorisation of the senses of *qōl*. This is the hypothesis put forward by the current study. However, the first step is to establish the extent of our problem. For this purpose, I will consider what available resources of Biblical Hebrew propose regarding the meaning and use of *qōl*.

I will chronologically examine lexical entries for *qōl* from Wilhelm Gesenius' *Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament* (1810–1812) through to David Clines' *The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew* (1993–2011) as well as the 18th edition of Gesenius' *Handwörterbuch*, edited by Rudolf Meyer and Herbert Donner, completed in 2013[1]. Additionally, three theological dictionaries are discussed, as a wealth of semantic analysis regarding Biblical Hebrew can be found in more theologically oriented resources. The theological dictionaries are discussed separately for the sake of clarity. Lexicons and theological dictionaries have divergent foundational principles, which is clear from the difference in how entries are structured, what semantic material is given precedence, and importantly, which lexemes are considered worth analysing. In this survey I attempt to answer the following questions: How does each source describe the lexeme's senses, and are there areas of well-attested agreement? What existing points

[1] Two lexicons will not be consulted for this study: Franciscus Zorell's *Lexicon Hebraicum et Aramicum Veteris Testamenti* (1954) and Luis Alonso Schökel's *Diccionario bíblico hebreo-español* (1994). As Michael O'Connor (2002:188-189) notes regarding their lack of prominence, neither is accessible in English and I am unable to read either Latin or Spanish.

of semantic analysis can be said to align with the perspective offered by cognitive linguistics? Which problem areas of sense categorisation would need to be addressed?

2.2. Lexicons of Biblical and Classical Hebrew

2.2.1. Gesenius

Wilhelm Gesenius' *Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament* remains a vital resource for Biblical Hebrew lexical analysis (Schorch and Waschke, 2013:xi). It functions as a point of departure for this study's exploration of Biblical Hebrew lexicology. While there are earlier lexicographical reference works – for example, Johannes Reuchlin's *De Rudimentis Hebraicis* (1506) – with Gesenius one finds a "modern, scientific Hebrew lexicography" (Muraoka, 2013:3). First, we turn to Samuel Prideaux Tregelle's 1857 translation, *Gesenius's Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon to the Old Testament Scriptures*.

Gesenius identifies the foundational concept of the lexeme to be voice. Three major sense categories are here distinguished by Gesenius: 1) *voice*, 2) *rumour*, and 3) *sound*. The first sense of *voice* comprises all sound which is conveyed through vocalisation. This includes the basic sounds produced by animals as well as the broader range of articulation which the human voice is capable of communicating. By virtue of anthropomorphism, supernatural persons too communicate as humans do. The human voice is complex in that this type of *qōl* can refer to both speech and a range of non-speech vocal sounds. Speech and such non-speech vocal sounds are interpretable by other humans, in that they are attributed meaning. For example, the sound of crying can communicate sadness and a sudden shout signal surprise or fear.

Gesenius' second major sense, *rumour*, refers to occurrences where *qōl* expresses not the sound of someone's voice but, rather, the speech content that has been conveyed. The limited account Gesenius gives here is problematic in that it offers neither a compelling range of exemplar texts (we could, for example, consider Exodus 36.6 where *qōl* is used for reported speech, or Ezra 1.1 and 10.7 where it seems *qōl* has further lexicalised to reference a formal proclamation). Furthermore, in naming this sense *rumour*, Gesenius does not attend to the underlying semantic function – that *qōl*

seemingly indicates reported speech, of which *rumour* is but one example (see Chapter 5 Section 6 for the recategorisation under which this sense of *rumour* falls).

Lastly, the third sense denotes all *sound* and *noise* that originates with "inanimate things" (Gesenius, 2003/1857). This includes various non-vocal sounds resulting from natural phenomena or human activity. Ezekiel 1.24, noted by Gesenius, is a prime example, mentioning the *qōl* of rushing waters, a tumultuous army, and the flapping wings of Ezekiel's visionary creatures. Gesenius (2003/1857) concludes his discussion of this third sense by saying *qōl* is used "of *speech*, *words*". However, Gesenius' interpretation of Ecclesiastes 5.2 and 5.5 in terms of his explanation "of *speech*, *words*" is unclear. As such, the relationship between these two verses and the third sense category is unexplained.

The early edition of Gesenius' *Handwörterbuch* features a concise and useful, although somewhat haphazard, categorisation of the lexical senses. Firstly, the second sense of *rumour* cannot be considered a major sense on par with the other two, because it is only one contextual expression of a broader sense. Secondly, the organisation of the sub-senses offers little more than identified patterns. For example, under the first sense Gesenius notes the phrases *ntn qōl*, *ntn b^{e}qōl*, and *šm' b^{e}qōl*. There is little joining these phrases beyond the fact that each deals, on a literal level, with *qōl* as *voice*. In all fairness, this offers the reader a summary of syntactic constructions wherein *qōl* expresses *voice*, but it fails to organise the cases of use beyond the literal (See Sections 5.4.1 and 5.5.3).

2.2.2. Brown–Driver–Briggs (BDB)

First published in 1906, *A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament* by Francis Brown, S.R. Driver, and Charles A. Briggs was intended to be a revision of Gesenius' *Handwörterbuch* and, furthermore, a re-examination of Biblical Hebrew lexicology at the turn of the 20th century (O'Connor, 2002:187). The entry on *qōl* is similar to the early Gesenius in its threefold organisation of the lexeme's senses (Brown, Driver and Briggs, 2000/1906:876).

The first sense category BDB provides, is described as the *sound* of a *voice*: human acts, such as singing or weeping; the speech of Yahweh[2], seraphs, and angels; and vocalised sounds of animals. Additionally, this category includes the interjectional function: *qōl* – literally "a sound of …!" as BDB (2000/1906:876) puts it – is explained as drawing attention to the presence of a sound (in other words, "hark!").

The second sense is also labelled as *sound* but concerns examples which we can term non-vocal. Sources of such non-vocal sounds are varied, but include musical instruments, thunder, footsteps, the stamping of hoofs, chariots, the sea or other bodies of water, an earthquake, a fall, a multitude, the din of war, wings, flames or other elemental sounds (air and wind, for example), and the sound of millstones. This sense, expressed in the construct state, is infinitely malleable – sound is a characteristic that can be attributed to any source.

Lastly, in its most specialised sense, *qōl* is used to refer to *articulate speech* – things said, or even written down. These articulations can be found in various forms: "advice, command, entreaty", "report", "proclamation", and an "utterance of adjuration". Furthermore, it has already been mentioned with regard to the first sense that speech is a capability conferred to Yahweh and other supernatural agents. The communication of God is a vital theme throughout the Hebrew Bible. With regard to *qōl*, BDB specifically mentions the *words of Yahweh* and the speech of *the angel of Yahweh*.

BDB follows Gesenius in beginning its entry with the sense of *voice.* However, it uses a slightly revised wording that emphasises the *sound* by which voice is produced. The categorisation has also diverged from Gesenius and, in some ways, provides a more nuanced account of the major sense categories. For example, BDB separates voice into

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[2] In the Hebrew Bible, there is the overarching presence of the character of God – "character" precisely in the sense that this figure takes part in the texts in a manner that is functionally indistinguishable from human beings. However, the character of God – or Elohim, as first introduced in Genesis 1.1 – is complex precisely because it is an amalgamation of characters: Elohim, Yahweh, El, and so on. The difference in name is of vital importance for many analyses of the Hebrew Bible (e.g. the fact that Yahweh and El have complex and dynamic theological or cultic histories as originally separate deities), but for the sake of clarity and simplicity the name "Yahweh" will be used throughout this study to refer to the amalgamated character, God.

an object that is heard (the first sense) and a container for communication (the third sense), which allows for a more nuanced discussion of the more complex speech-related uses of *qōl* (furthermore, which Gesenius failed to capture under his second sense label of "rumour"). Moreover, BDB regards the interjectional use as an extension of the first sense, whereas this was left unmentioned by Gesenius.

2.2.3. Koehler and Baumgartner

Ludwig Koehler and Walter Baumgartner's *The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament* (HALOT) was first published in 1953, with an English translation of the second edition by M.E.J. Richardson first published in 1994 and the series completed in 2000. In contrast to the generalised major sense categories of Gesenius and BDB, Koehler and Baumgartner (1994-2000:1083-1085) make eight distinctions, each either describing a specific sense (1 to 6) or acting as a group (7–8) to simplify the lexicographic task:

1. *Noise*;
2. *Din*;
3. Either (1) or (2) in reference to *musical instruments*;
4. A *noise made by animals* or the *human voice*;
5. The *voice* of God;
6. Reported speech, in the form of *messages*, *tidings*, and *proclamations*;
7. Common *expressions* involving (4) or (5); and
8. *Particular instances* not categorized as belonging to any of the senses distinguished in (1) through (6).

The first four categories concern various forms of auditory phenomena which are conceptually similar. With the first, *noise*, Koehler and Baumgartner mention sources such as thunder and storm clouds, along with various other sources such as, for example, the sound of walking, fire, and millstones. Also included here is the "windless silence" mentioned in 1 Kings 19.12. The first category can be summarised as referring to individuated noises: a sound produced by a specific, or identifiable, source. The second category deals with a noticeably more complex relationship between *qōl* – as *din* – and source: the sound produced by cities, armies, crowds, and turmoil.

The third category refers to *qōl* produced by *musical instruments* which can be either specified, as with the first sense (for example, the sounding of the ram's horn), or complex, as in the second sense (such as the raucous songs of Ezekiel 26:13). Admittedly, there is some ambiguity in deciding whether an example of this third category aligns with the sense of the first or the second category. Within the framework of Koehler and Baumgartner, this sense possibly exists as a bridging category between the *environmental* nature of the first two categories and the *intentional* or *volitional* nature of *qōl* as voice in the fourth and fifth categories. In other words, while staying firmly within the conceptual frame of *sound*, the use of musical instruments conveys an element of intent. Whereas walking, for example, produces sound as a natural by-product, to blow a horn (commonly a ram's horn, or shofar) communicates some context-bound meaning. Examples provided by Koehler and Baumgartner include the aforementioned shofar, bells decorating the high priest's garment, and the merrymaking of musicians and singers. It is questionable, however, whether this sense deserves to be considered a main semantic category. The idea of volition is complex: the priestly bells may communicate something of conceptual significance, but it remains a by-product of movement, the same as with the sound of footsteps, an example Koehler and Baumgartner relegate to the first category. This is, as such, a fuzzy semantic category that is here presented as a major sense.

The fourth category covers *noise made by animals* and the *human voice*. Koehler and Baumgartner diverge from Gesenius and BDB in not separating the basic idea of animal and human communication. However, there is a difference between the simple expressions afforded to animals and the variety available to human vocalisation. As such, Koehler and Baumgartner describe the various examples of animal sounds one finds in the corpus. Turning to the human voice, Koehler and Baumgartner provide several subcategories: a) the individual's voice; b) a voice of prayer, lament, or praise before God; c) audible speech, such as through the phrase *qōl dbrym*; and d) use of a descriptor to further specify (e.g. a *qōl* of weeping).

The *voice* of God is treated with a separate, fifth, category. Two subcategories explore the conceptual blend between God communicating through thunder and an anthropomorphic voice. Koehler and Baumgartner, in discussing the anthropomorphic voice, also explore the difference in use according to the relevant epithet. The entry

mentions the *qōl* of Yahweh; Shaddai, El Shaddai, and the words of Yahweh; and, in Late Biblical Hebrew, "the voice" as an indirect invocation replacing Yahweh.

With the sixth category, Koehler and Baumgartner (1994-2000:1085) refer to an expression where *qōl* equates reported speech – in their words, "message, tidings, proclamation". Its origin is most likely in listening to someone's voice as adhering to their words (i.e., acknowledging that one's *qōl* acts as a container for what is communicated). Only one example, Exodus 36.6, lies outside of Late Biblical Hebrew texts. By Late Biblical Hebrew, however, it has lexicalised as a reference to a formal proclamation (see 2 Chronicles 24.9, 30.5, and 36.22; Ezra 1.1[3], 10.7; and Nehemiah 8.15).

The seventh category includes a mixture of common expressions involving *qōl* as (4) or (5). Notable expressions involve the following verbal roots: *'zn*, *bkh*, *nš'*, *qr'*, *qšb*, *r'm*, and *šm'*. Lastly, the eighth category lumps together certain *particular instances*: rumour (Genesis 45.16), teaching or witness (Exodus 4.8), the phrase "to notice the thunderclaps" (Exodus 20.18), a shout introducing a message (Jeremiah 50.46), the negation of sound (1 Kings 18.26-29), and the interjectional function to show or call for focus on something heard.

Koehler and Baumgartner begin the lexical entry not with voice but sound. This choice is not inconsequential. Rather, it provides direction for the entry's categorisation: The movement from environmental sound through volitional sound to complex human communication illustrates a logical mapping of major senses which explores the conceptual world of Biblical Hebrew. However, with the seventh and eighth categories there is a breakdown in the entry's coherence. These final categories are filled by either irregular or syntactically complex occurrences. This is, as such, poor lexicography because the entry offers no reasoning with which to understand the relationship between the more coherent senses of categories one through six and the vaguer categories seven and eight. We can conclude that Koehler and Baumgartner succeed in going beyond both Gesenius and BDB in offering a more comprehensive description of sense

[3] Both Ex. 36.6 and Ez. 1.1 are present in (7), which is most likely an unnoticed error.

extensions. Yet, eventually, Koehler and Baumgartner also encounter this recurring challenge of accounting for more complex and peripheral sense extensions.

2.2.4. Clines

The *Dictionary of Classical Hebrew* (DCH, 1993-2011[4]) edited by David J.A. Clines declares itself to be "an entirely new work" – that is to say, in contrast with most other works which have together "stood in a lexicographical tradition" (Clines, 1993:24). The introduction to the first volume states that two features distinguish the DCH from previous lexicons (Clines, 1993:14-15). Firstly, it accounts for all available sources of Classical Hebrew (all sources before 200 CE) instead of favouring the extant Hebrew Bible[5] (Clines, 1993:31). Secondly, it rejects the philological roots of Hebrew dictionaries in favour of "modern linguistics" Clines, 1993:14). The introduction does not offer an in-depth exploration of what comprises "modern linguistics", but the dictionary does lean towards structuralism in its primary concern for syntax for clarifying semantics. It aims to describe the normal uses of words (O'Connor, 2002:202). Thus, we find a shift in emphasis from the word in and of itself "to the larger units of meaning" (Clines, 1993:25). With regard to *qōl*, the DCH entry differentiates between five major sense categories that each contains numerous subordinate senses. A feature of Clines' lexicon is that it provides all syntactic frames in which qol may occur. It thus contains the most exhaustive syntactic description of *qōl* to date.

The first major sense Clines speaks of is the *voice* of various entities: humans, Yahweh, the heavenly host, seraphs, angels, Ba'al, animals, and personified beings (Clines

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[4] In 2018, the first volume of the *Dictionary of Classical Hebrew Revised* (DCHR) was published. According to Clines (2017), this revision features some 100,000 improvements, 1933 added words in comparison with the DCH, 3500 additional byforms, and many extended definitions. It is yet to be seen how it will compare to the original and, unfortunately, the entry for *qōl* is not yet available.

[5] O'Connor (2002:195) concludes that the DCH has overconfidently "leveled the sources and thereby distorted the evidence." It is not for scientific or linguistic reasons that Biblical Hebrew is situated within a broader tradition of Classical Hebrew. Rather, it is so as not to "privilege" the biblical texts, a decision that ignores the linguistic warnings against doing so in favour of an ideological preference (O'Connor, 2002:198).

2010:213). The second sense is *sound*, of which sources include human activity, Yahweh and other divine beings, military activity, musical instruments, entities of the natural world, and tangible objects.

The third major sense is the metonymic expression of *qōl* as *speech content* (Clines, 2010:221-222). With verbs of hearing *qōl* references the voice which is heard or obeyed. The DCH here also discusses *qōl* as the *sound* of speech, for example in *qōl dbrym* as *the sound of* words. According to the DCH, this sense appears to have been the basis for further extensions, for example, instances where qol is used to reference reported speech in the form of a *proclamation*, *report*, or *message*.

The fourth sense refers to instances where *qōl* – or the feminine plural form, *qōlōt* – alone denotes *thunder* (Clines 2010:222). The DCH notes *qōl* with regard to thunder in two other instances: as a subcategory of (1) concerning the *voice of Yahweh*, and then as a subcategory of (2) indicating the *sound* of *thunder* produced in a natural environment. However, throughout the Hebrew Bible there is a complex interplay between the natural phenomenon of thunder, the voice of God, and some form of conceptual blend such as God answering in or through thunder. The DCH does, nevertheless, conclude that these three readings of *qōl as thunder* are not clearly distinguished. As such, several occurrences are noted as options under multiple readings.

Lastly, *qōl* carries the interjectional sense. Twenty-two occurrences are listed, many of which are suggested as having other possible interpretations (Clines, 2010:222). As with previous entries, this short treatment of the interjectional sense is a consequence of its syntactical ambiguity.

What the DCH has set out to be is linguistic in nature. It lists this purpose over and against other dictionaries. However, the end product, as can be seen with the entry on *qōl*, is little more than a listing of the syntagmatic distribution. The DCH makes no attempt to provide relevant syntactic frames for the semantic categories that are distinguished. A useful outcome of the DCH is its illustration of the variety of syntactic frames in which *qōl* occurs – this is where Clines' dictionary succeeds. As Takamitsu Muraoka has said, the DCH is "often serviceable as a database where deficient as a dictionary" (O'Connor, 2002:200). However, as a dictionary, it offers the reader no real

functionality because it never goes beyond syntax as the defining feature of language use. While it does offer a compelling breakdown of the lexeme's syntactic variation, it does not offer any commentary on the use of these variations or their relationship to one another. In terms of lexicons, it fails where Koehler and Baumgartner succeed, and while the DCH cannot offer the same level of discussion as theological dictionaries can provide, it does not provide a better account of the lexeme's use when compared with Botterweck and Ringgren or Jenni and Westermann.

2.2.5. Meyer–Donner Gesenius

The 17th edition of Gesenius' *Handwörterbuch* was published in 1925 and remained a staple in the study of Biblical Hebrew for decades. Eventually the need for an updated version was evident Now, we consider the Meyer–Donner 18th edition of the *Handwörterbuch*, the latest lexicon provided here. For *qōl*, as with the early edition, the Meyer–Donner Gesenius distinguishes three senses. The first and second senses compare, respectively, to the first and third of the earlier Gesenius. The primary point of divergence is with the second sense, *rumour*. In the Meyer–Donner Gesenius it has been replaced with the *interjectional* sense, which will be discussed momentarily.

The first sense, similarly, deals with the concept of *voice* (Gesenius, 2013:1157). Actors of such vocalisation include 1) human beings, 2) animals, and 3) God. A final sub-sense deals with 4) the audible quality of speech, by means of a range of specific expressions.

Secondly, *qōl* refers to various *sounds* not understood as speech (Gesenius, 2013:1157). In the German, the Meyer–Donner Gesenius (2013:1157) differentiates between four nuanced terms for sound – "Geräuch, Laut, Schall, Klang" – to describe occurrences of this sense. Notable references include the sound of music; speech, through the phrase *qōl dbrym*; footsteps, or walking; a general noisiness ("Lärm"); and thunder.

The third sense is where *qōl* functions as an *interjectional* when found in the construct state form at the beginning of clauses. In contrast to BDB, where the interjectional function of *qōl* is treated as a sense extension of *voice*, here it is given as an independent sense category. Several example texts are given: Gen. 4.10; Isa. 52.8 and 66.6; Jer. 50.28; and Zech. 11.3 (Gesenius, 2013:1157).

The entry, being overtly concise, in no way captures the full semantic potential of the lexeme. Furthermore, although completed in 2013, it fails to take into account any advancements already present a century earlier in Brown–Driver–Briggs. The decision to separate the interjectional use into its own category can also be found in Clines' DCH. However, the choice to offer only two broad categories for *voice* and *sound* in keeping with the early Gesenius is a categorisation choice that should be questioned. Modern lexicons and theological dictionaries have offered much more engaging explorations of the lexeme, which thus leaves this twofold categorisation unreasonably simplistic.

2.3. Theological dictionaries

2.3.1. Jenni and Westermann

Ernst Jenni and Claus Westermann's *Theologisches Handwörterbuch zum Alten Testament* (THAT) was originally published in the 1970s and subsequently translated into English. Labuschagne (1997:1133), the author of the entry, defines the lexeme as "everything that can be perceived acoustically". This generic sense is then split into two major senses – *sound* and *voice* – that each possesses several subcategories or sense extensions.

The first major sense concerns *sound*, with the most prominent sources for sound being phenomena of the natural world, specific animal and human actions, and complex sounds such as those grouped under *din* by Koehler and Baumgartner (1996:1083). Lastly, the negative phrase *'ēn qōl* describes the absence of sound while "the whisper of a light breeze" (1 Kings 19.12) indicates the barest perceivable sound.

An extension of this first sense is the interjectional function. Essentially, Labuschagne argues against BDB, which saw the interjectional as an extension of *voice*. Labuschagne (1997:1134) refers to this use as a "deictic interjection", which means that it is a context-bound lexeme conveying a speaker's awareness of, in this instance, an acoustic phenomenon. This is a particularly astute explanation of how the interjectional function relates to the basic sense. A consequence of the interjection occurring in the construct state is that it is never assuredly identifiable. Importantly, Labuschagne (1997:1134) notes that the LXX and Targums never translate *qōl* with the sense of an interjection.

As *voice*, the second of Labuschagne's (1997:1134-1135) senses, *qōl* refers to the intentional communication of humans, animals, and divine beings. Furthermore, with descriptors – a voice of weeping or of anguish – *qōl* more prominently relays the diverse character of the human voice. Labuschagne also mentions the adverbial use of *qōl* in contexts where two connected verbs are used for more complex phrasal meanings. For example, the phrase *nś' qōl bkh* features prominently as this type of construction (See Chapter 5 Section 5.3.2).

Figuratively, *qōl* is associated with several syntactic frames that each emphasises the speech content imparted by a voice. For example, listeners are called to hear or obey a voice. Through a sense extension, it increasingly communicates concepts such as "report" or "proclamation". The figurative use of *qōl* is also seen in the phrase *qōl dbrym* ("audible words") and the "audibly pronounced curse" of Leviticus 5.1 (Labuschagne, 1997:1134). Also, commonly in the Psalms, *qōlî* (my voice) is used as a metonymic reference for the speaker. Finally, *qōl* can function adverbially, such as when used to support verbs of speaking and calling. Frequently, the phrase *qōl gadol* occurs with the verb *qr'* describing the act of calling as being exceptionally loud. Another example provided by Labuschagne (1997:1134), occurring only once in the biblical corpus, is the phrase *qōl 'eḥād* to describe a unanimous agreement, or literally speaking as "one voice".

In a separate section, Labuschagne (1997:1135-1136) deals with the specifics of "God's voice". God within the Hebrew Bible often conveys speech through thunder or in association with thunder. Labuschagne (1997:1136) notes that the biblical texts developed concurrent with a growing emphasis on the audible speech of God over and against traditions asserting thunder, for example, as a vehicle for speech is also noticeable. In texts such as 1 Kings 19.13 and Daniel 4.28, there is a fine distinction between the speech of God and natural phenomena. Deuteronomy repeatedly stresses that the *qōl* of Yahweh referred to in these contexts is obeyed through adhering to the Mosaic Law.

Labuschagne (1997) offers a sophisticated interpretation of the semantic potential of *qōl*. A distinctive quality of the entry is its preoccupation not only with listing examples (many of which are so similar that an overtly expansive discussion risks redundancy) but rather providing an explanatory account of the relationships between senses and the

shifts in meaning which support sense extensions. Labuschagne presents the most comprehensive starting point for further semantic engagement with *qōl*.

A possible point of critique concerns his decision that *qōl* has only two sense categories: *voice* and *sound*. Labuschagne treats these as broad categories from where sense extensions can be seen as originating. This is a fair appraisal, but when compared to the maximalist categorisation of Koehler and Baumgartner, I believe there is merit in providing more weight to the various uses that Labuschagne distinguishes. Several uses Labuschagne speaks of in only loose terms in relation to his primary categories can themselves be regarded as independent categories. For example, Labuschagne deals with certain figurative usages but treats them as subject to the broader sense of "voice" instead of distinguishing these as independent senses[6].

2.3.2. Botterweck and Ringgren

The *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament* (TWAT), edited by G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren, and Heinz-Josef Fabry, was originally published between 1973 and 2000, with Benjamin Kedar-Kopfstein authoring the entry on *qōl* (the English translation done by Douglas W. Stott). Kedar-Kopfstein (2003/1993:576-588) divides his entry into three sections: First, he introduces the basic understanding of *qōl* as an object of *acoustic perception*. Here, he discusses "*Natural Sounds, Animals*" and the *qōl* produced by the use of "*Utensils, Instruments*". Secondly, Kedar-Kopfstein considers all expressions of *qōl* referencing the sphere of human action and communication: "*Human Sounds*", "*Speaking*", and the "*Interjection*". Thirdly, the entry deals with the significance of *qōl* and God. This is the most theologically prescient section of the entry, but does not hold much value for this study.

First, Kedar-Kopfstein (2003/1993:578) states that as *sound* the semantic potential "extends from the rumbling of a storm (Ps. 77.18[17]) and the chaotic ocean (Ps. 93.4) to the softest rustling of a single leaf (Lev. 26.36)". He continues with sound produced

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[6] See Chapter 5 for the present study's formal sense categorisation in comparison with Labuschagne's (1997:1134) informal discussion of the idiomatic expressions involving the verb *šm'* (corresponding here to Chapter 5 Section 4) and figurative sense of "news, proclamation" (corresponding here with Chapter 5 Section 6).

by animal action and communication, and concludes with the sounds of utensils and instruments. This final group includes sounds produced by proxy of human action. The use of musical instruments requires human action but the sound is produced by the instrument itself; this logic can be extended to the use of weaponry and, interestingly, to the sounding of the trumpet not haphazardly but to *communicate* alarm for settlements or commands in battle.

The second sense comprises *human sounds*, *speech*, and the *interjection*. The human body produces sound through movement, for example. Anthropomorphically, similar activity is afforded to divine beings. More importantly, the human voice communicates a wide range of emotive expressions: weeping, lamenting, merrymaking, singing, and praising. Musical instruments and the human voice more often than not occur in tandem and express a similar acoustic phenomenon. The categorisation here becomes ambiguous. Kedar-Kopfstein speaks so widely of human activity that it includes the noise of weapons and trumpets; the vocal cries of the mob or the battle cries of soldiers; and the complex sounds of battle or a city being sacked.

Kedar-Kopfstein (2003/1993:582-584) provides a thorough overview of *qōl* in terms of speech communication. The voice can be raised, or communicate aloud. It can be described so as to be called "pleasant" or "like a ghost" and be recognised as belonging to a known speaker. The voice communicates speech content. The latter is also expressed as *qōl* but is associated with relevant frames, such as *qōl dbrym* or a call for obedience. As noted elsewhere, this understanding of *qōl* and reported speech extended to the sense of "report" or "decree". Finally, as an interjection, *qōl* is used by a speaker to "express their subsequent attentiveness or solicit that of someone else" (Kedar-Kopfstein, 2003/1993:584).

In conclusion, Kedar-Kopfstein (2003/1993:578) describes the prototypical referent of *qōl* as *acoustic phenomena*. The entry can, however, be unclear. The reason why Kedar-Kopfstein discusses utensils and instruments and then separately human movement and activity is unexplained. The corpus reflects a large amount of overlap between these categories. Regardless, Kedar-Kopfstein does not describe the criteria for his categorisation. Furthermore, the entry does not attempt to explain the sense extensions, although this is a weakness noted across the survey. When compared with Labuschagne (1997), who does offer some complex linguistic comments regarding sense extensions,

this entry complements Kedar-Kopfstein's so that together these two, it can be argued, offer the best and clearest representation of our existing knowledge of the semantic potential of *qōl*.

2.3.3. VanGemeren

The final entry in this analysis, authored by W. R. Domeris, comes from Willem VanGemeren's five-volume *New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology and Exegesis* (1997). In contrast to the other entries discussed here, Domeris' treatment of *qōl* is not organised according to major sense categories but rather according to the patterns of use that can be identified in specific biblical books. This structural decision aligns with the purpose of guiding readers through theological and exegetical concerns. However, for the current study, it does not add to what has already been discussed in this chapter.

2.4. Conclusion

This survey sought to answer three questions. How does each source describe the lexeme's senses, and are there areas of well-attested agreement? The first part of the question has been illustrated throughout this chapter. As for well-attested agreement, the survey has identified several patterns. Each source understands the lexeme as referring to, broadly, acoustic phenomena, which can be further separated into cases of *voice* and *sound*. Also, each source accounts for the role played by the lexeme in describing the complexity of the human voice – importantly, it is how to categorise this complexity about which there is disagreement. There is also the noted ambiguity of thunder as a natural phenomenon and an attribute of divine speech. Several sources, furthermore, offer similar accounts of the metonymic use of *qōl* in referencing reported speech. The early Gesenius offers a limited understanding of this use, but notes it all the same, while Koehler and Baumgartner, for example, present a more exhaustive account. Lastly, there is widespread agreement over the interjectional function of *qōl* and its characteristic ambiguity. Each source offers a list of potential occurrences that should be taken into account, but the disagreement and uncertainty is just as important to note. These patterns also illustrate that the primary inadequacy of our sources is categorisation.

The second question: What existing points of semantic analysis can be said to align with the perspective offered by cognitive linguistics? Firstly, both Koehler and Baumgartner and Labuschagne offer convincing attempts at categorising the lexeme's semantic complexity. The former fails to explain irregular and syntactically complex uses, collecting them in lexicographically weak categories, and consequently, the entire entry's categorisation suffers as a result. The latter suffers from a lack of defined sense categories and instead opts to treat the lexeme in terms of only two major senses. Nevertheless, one can find across the two sources an appreciation for the relationship between the lexeme's more basic sense and the resultant sense extensions. Secondly, in theory Clines helpfully emphasises the role played by syntax in distinguishing individual senses. However, the entry never explains on what syntactic basis senses are identified. It is, thus, a record of semantic categories with potential translation values which the reader is asked to accept at face value.

The final question: Which problem areas of sense categorisation would need to be addressed? This survey identified a general weakness in the struggle to categorise senses. It is not that dictionary entries fail to note particular uses. Rather, many uses are never relegated to useful sense categories. Consequently, as with the two editions of Gesenius and BDB, uses are vaguely attached to one of two broad conceptualisations – *voice* or *sound*. Or, as with Koehler and Baumgartner, peripheral uses are consigned to throwaway categories. Furthermore, apart from Koehler and Baumgartner and Labuschagne, entries lack a reasonable account of the relationships between senses. Our collective knowledge of *qōl* fails to categorize the semantic potential satisfactorily. It is in this regard that we hypothesize that cognitive linguistics provides a promising perspective.

In Chapter 3, we explore the history of linguistics, the introduction of cognitivist perspectives, and the application of certain conceptual tools – namely, prototype theory, semantic frames, and a conceptual view of metaphor and metonymy – to the study of Biblical Hebrew.

Chapter 3: Cognitive semantics and Biblical Hebrew

3.1. Introduction

Semantics, as a subset of linguistics, is the study of meaning within language and the mechanisms through which linguistic expressions convey meanings (Riemer, 2010:2). This chapter explores the development of semantics as a subset of linguistics and the relationship between semantics research and biblical scholarship. Any approach to Biblical Hebrew semantics has to deal with the particular task of researching an ancient language (Shead: 2011:181). It is the argument of this study that cognitive linguistics offers a proven and efficient methodology for semantics research; however, the goal of this chapter is to provide evidence for this argument. Without a well-reasoned methodology, the foundations of any thesis are put in question.

First, this chapter explores the history of semantics research, providing a cursory glance at its origins and formalisation in the 19th century before engaging with the 20th-century tradition of structuralism. Second, the chapter offers an analysis of cognitive linguistics, its history, and its primary theoretical principles. Importantly, this discussion centres on adopting a cognitive approach to semantics for ancient languages. Three tools of the cognitive semantics framework will be discussed as meaningful for Biblical Hebrew research: prototype theory, frame theory, and a conceptual view of metaphor and metonymy. The theoretical exploration of this chapter will be used to present a practical working-hypothesis in Chapter 4 ahead of the data analysis discussion in Chapter 5.

3.2. Historical overview of semantics research

3.2.1. The formalisation of semantics in the 19th century

Throughout the Western tradition of philosophical inquiry, the mechanisms of semantics have been a recurrent topic of discussion (Riemer 2010:4; Allan, 2016:48-51). In Plato's *Cratylus* one clear point of departure for the philosophy of language is given with a discussion of naming (Geeraerts 2010:2). In *Cratylus*, Socrates argues that meaning is a matter of appropriateness; he postulates "that the earliest name-giver selected a name that captures the essence of its denotatum that is in some way iconic"

(Allan, 2016:48). Meaning, as such, relies on essentialism: the linguistic symbol is endowed with certain innate characteristics that relate to its referent. Allan (2016:48) references an example of Socrates: the name for the god Dionysus is a true characterisation that originates in the Greek phrase *diduos ton oinon*, "giving wine".

Well into the 19th century, Dirk Geeraerts (2010:3) notes, semantic essentialism justified "speculative etymology". However, the abandonment of speculative etymologies arose from the scientific methodology of comparative philology[7]. The two innovative principles of the scientific approach are 1) beginning with the comparison of forms and not meanings, and 2) seeking similar forms across languages (Geeraerts, 2010:3).

Formal use of the term *semantics* began with Michel Bréal toward the end of the 19th century (Allan, 2016:51). Geeraerts (2010:10) discusses Bréal and Hermann Paul as foundational theorists in the historical-philological tradition. This tradition rests on two claims: On the one hand, it is diachronically oriented, concerned with the mechanics behind semantic change, and on the other hand, it operates with a conceptualisation of meaning as psychological in nature.

First published in 1897, Bréal's *Essai de sémantique* describes three fundamental qualities of semantic research. Firstly, semantics is *historical* and concerned with etymology. Any consideration of a word's contemporary usage requires historical investigation. Secondly, semantics is essentially psychological. Both meaning – broadly speaking – and the mechanics by which meanings change are mental phenomena (Geeraerts, 2010:11). The *Essai* speaks of language as a product of the whole cognitive system. Lastly, the study of language belongs to the human sciences, which are strongly hermeneutical. Linguistics research interprets the historical record

[7] It is worth noting that semantics was in no way monolithic up to the 19th-century introduction of comparative philology. This thesis does not have the space to offer a full discussion on the topic, but as an example of the diversity of thought on the topic merely a few decades after Plato's *Cratylus* one finds in Aristotle's *On Interpretation* the idea that names are merely symbols (Allan, 2016:48).

of a language in order to extrapolate the "expressive intent" which drives language use (Geeraerts, 2010:13-14).

Bréal ably explained language as a dynamic system psychological in nature, but it was Paul who connected the seemingly individualistic nature of a psychological conceptualisation of language with the collectivist nature of language use. Paul (as quoted in Romanova, 2015:84) argues that "We have, strictly speaking, to differentiate as many languages as there are individuals". Paul distinguished, firstly, between the "usual" and "occasional" meanings of a word or linguistic expression. The former refers to a collective's shared understanding of a word's meaning (what can be thought of as the dictionary meaning); the latter refers to the slight changes in use as practised by individuals in context (Geeraerts, 2010:14-15). It is specifically *context* that allows for words to develop occasional meanings; however, an occasional meaning can itself become usual[8]. This, in short, is the foundation for Paul's usage-based theory of semantic change with which he explains the psychological nature of language as employed by a collective that comprises individual users.

Geeraerts (2010:42) notes two vital contributions of the historical-philological school. Firstly, it emphasises the dynamic nature of language and semantic change. Words accumulate meanings and are, in fact, by nature polysemous. Secondly, it requires linguists to answer for the psychological nature of meaning. In the next section, we shall in part discuss how structuralism rejected the psychological basis of meaning and its resurfacing in cognitive linguistics.

3.2.2. Structuralist semantics

During the 20th century, structuralism advanced semantic theory in vital ways, providing the next step beyond the historical-philological tradition (Geeraerts, 2010:47). Based on the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, structuralist semantics can be seen most prominently in the publications of Leo Weisgerber and Jost Trier in the 1920s and 30s. It was the dominant form of semantic theory, Burton (2017:3) notes, until the

[8] For example, *leaf* as its usual meaning refers to the foliage of a plant; an occasional meaning hinging on context refers to the individual pages of a book, which itself has resulted in the phrasal verb to "leaf through" a book.

end of the 1960s. The most lasting influence of structuralism on the study of biblical languages is Johannes Louw and Eugene Nida's 1988 *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains* (Burton, 2017:3-4).

Weisgerber corrected what he saw as the theoretical errors of the historical-philological tradition, rejecting altogether a psychological foundation of meaning. For Weisgerber, this "is a major mistake, because it blocks an adequate view on language as a symbolic system" (Geeraerts, 2010:47). Based on Weisgerber's "Die Bedeutungslehre: ein Irrweg der Sprachwissenschaft?" (1927), Trier published the first monograph of structuralist semantics, *Der deutsche Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes* (1931), on the development of medieval German vocabulary.

Structuralism advocates three methodological proposals. Firstly, language is analysed as a system in which the meaning of one factor can only be studied in relation to other elements (Geeraerts, 2010:48). The bulk of modern semantic research has adopted this principle (Burton, 2017:4). Secondly, it holds an externalist view of language (Burton, 2017:4). De Saussure himself makes a comparison between a language and the game of chess where "no factors that lie outside of the system of rules itself" should affect the system itself (Geeraerts, 2010:48). Lastly, to study the independent system of a language, linguistics should adopt a synchronic approach (Burton, 2017:4). Diachronic research can, as a result, only be conducted between synchronously comparable systems.

Three methods of analysis are made use of extensively within structuralism: 1) lexical field theory, 2) componential analysis, and 3) relational semantics (Burton, 2017:4). Lexical field theory proposes that reality is organised within a language system according to lexical fields, groupings of related linguistic units. It, therefore, attempts to understand these groupings within the system.

The second method, componential analysis, explores the implications of lexical field theory by analysing the linguistic properties and cultural suppositions that characterise a lexical field. A lexical field can be thought of as a group of words that are related together by virtue of their semantic similarities and use (e.g. "aunt", "uncle", and "cousin" are all included in the lexical field of "family relations"). As such, lexemes are seen as having notable features that, together, create meaning. But for componential

analysis, the way to identify the differences between terms belonging to a lexical field is to chart the differences and similarities in characteristics. For example, the difference between MAN and WOMAN can be described as [+ male], [+ mature] and then [− male], [+ mature], respectively. Native speakers are constantly processing such innate characteristics and assigning the correct linguistic label.

Relational semantics, the third method, is functionally similar to componential analysis, but employs a restricted theoretical apparatus. Whereas componential analysis considers the conceptual content which controls the use of a word, relational semantics is concerned only with "the structure of the language rather than the structure of the world outside of language" (Geeraerts, 2010:52-53). Geeraerts (2010:52) thus notes that for relational semantics the contrast between *black* and *white* is less about this "world outside of language" and more to do with the fact that these terms are antonyms.

One prominent benefit of structuralist linguistics is the consensus that languages exist holistically, each "a network of expressions that are mutually related by all kinds of semantic links" (Geeraerts, 2010:91). However, certain insights from cognitive linguistics led to the questioning of the structuralist approach (Burton, 2017:5-6). Firstly, since language functions under generalised cognitive processes, it becomes difficult to analyse meaning, following structuralism, as part of an independent system. Secondly, on a practical level, structuralism understands language as an orderly conceptual system separate from actual usage. This demands a separation of the system and the encyclopaedic knowledge that supports actual language use, a requirement that is increasingly difficult to justify (Geeraerts, 2010:94). Thirdly, structuralism emphasises onomasiology while simultaneously rejecting semasiology as an unnecessary concern of the historical-philological tradition. This rejection is not upheld by cognitive linguistics in its emphasis on semasiology and necessarily related topics such as polysemy. (Geeraerts, 2010:91-93).

After classical structuralism, semantics research developed in mainly two directions: *neostructuralism* and *cognitive semantics*. Each offers its own critique of structuralism regarding the relationship between language and human cognition (Burton, 2017:9). The neostructuralist affirms its predecessor's distinction between language and psychology. Therefore, language can be studied as an orderly, linguistic system because ambiguity belongs to the pragmatic level (Burton, 2017:9-10). Geeraerts (2010:124)

states that the introduction of componential analysis into generativist linguistics inspired a renewed focus on the "psychological reality" of semantics. This was the origin of the second direction after classical structuralism, cognitive semantics, which will be discussed in the following section. Neostructuralism, for the purposes of this study, will not be discussed further because it diverges too greatly from the hypothesis of this study surrounding the usefulness of cognitive linguistics for Biblical Hebrew.

3.2.3. Cognitive semantics

Cognitive linguistics[9] emerged in the 1980s as a "conscious reaction" to the generative linguistics which followed structuralism (Taylor and Littlemore, 2014:1). More specifically, it was a rejection of the structuralist – and Chomskyan – emphasis on the externalist view of language (Burton, 2017:11). A cognitive approach to semantics, therefore, takes seriously the commitment of the cognitive linguistics framework in studying "the relationship between human language, the mind and socio-physical experience" (Evans, Bergen and Zinken 2007:2). Meaning, it is argued, is a product of the way in which mental concepts become entrenched through social and bodily experience (Lemmens, 2016:92). Simply put, "*meaning is in the mind*" (Shead, 2011:31, emphasis in original).

Within the broad framework of cognitive linguistics, a distinction is made between 1) semantics from a cognitivist perspective and 2) cognitive approaches to grammar (Evans, Bergen and Zinken, 2007:5). The object of study in cognitive linguistics is, of course, language. However, it takes language to be the product of cognitive processes which facilitate interactions with the world. Thus, a language is built as "a repository of world knowledge, a structured collection of meaningful categories that help us deal with new experiences and store information about old ones" (Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007:4-5).

[9] Geeraerts and Cuyckens (2007:4) distinguish between cognitive linguistics ("all approaches in which natural language is studied as a mental phenomenon") and Cognitive Linguistics (CL), a formal approach applied within the relevant volume that is "but one form of cognitive linguistics".

Cognitive linguistics is, however, not a "single theory of language", but rather a guiding framework for research[10] (Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007:4). Nevertheless, all relevant research presupposes two general commitments. This first is the requirement for expressing the principles of language in "accord with what is known about the mind and brain from other disciplines" (Evans, Bergen and Zinken, 2007:4). The second commitment states that linguistics should seek "the broadest generalizations possible" rather than appealing to a specialised mental faculty (Evans, Bergen and Zinken, 2007:3).

In addition to these original two commitments, Geeraerts (2016:528) has more recently proposed a third, *sociosemiotic*, commitment to a "social perspective". Often cognitive linguistics has been criticised as maintaining a reductionist view of language as primarily a mental phenomenon. However, language is social precisely because it is cognitive: it is in the "shared and socially distributed" makeup of the mental world that the individual cannot be separated from the social environment (Geeraerts, 2016:533). Furthermore, cognitive linguistics understands language as usage-based. For these two justifications, one cannot study language without consideration for the social reality.

Cognitive semantics is, again, the study of meaning as a product of general cognitive processes. Binding this research framework together are four principles (Evans, Bergen and Zinken, 2007:6-9). Firstly, human cognition is embodied. It functions within cultural and physical realities that manifest in tension between the universal and embodied experiences of language users (Lemmens, 2016:92). Secondly, language use references of conceptual entities within the mind instead of external realities, but this does not imply that language can exhaust the conceptual structure of either an individual speaker or a language community as a whole (Evans, Bergen and Zinken, 2007:7-8).

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[10] Kövecses (2005:136) argues that "the scope of cognitive linguistics is arguably much broader than language" and the field should therefore be renamed. The two options that Kövecses (2005:169) suggests are *cognitive social science* and *cognitive semiotics*, but as Geeraerts (2016:538-539) notes, the argument over naming is insignificant. He suggests emphasising the social character over the strictly cognitive element. Following Croft (2009:395), linguistic research should thoroughly take into account advances from the fields of pragmatics and sociolinguistics; therefore, involving the study of human behaviour.

Thirdly, lexemes and linguistic expressions prompt encyclopaedic conceptualisation of meanings. Language use involves a vast depository of knowledge, not everything of which might be useful for the construal of the meaning of a linguistic construction in a specific context. Nevertheless, cognitive linguistics argues that semantics (meaning) and pragmatics (contextual language use) cannot be easily separated as they do not function independently[11] (Lemmens, 2016:94-95). Lastly, the conceptual structure behind linguistic expressions extends from logically simple concepts to more complex semantic frames. For example, the concept of *weekday* requires understanding the basic structure of the week as divided between days of rest and days for which you contractually perform work for payment or attend school; and the more complex concept of *weeknight* involves further complexities in addition to the conceptual requirements of *weekday* (Lemmens, 2016:92).

After this summary of cognitive linguistics and a cognitive approach to semantics, the question arises, what comprises applying this framework to the study of Biblical Hebrew? Building on this introductory discussion, the next section investigates the constraints of studying ancient languages, offers a summary of relevant studies concerning cognitive semantics and Biblical Hebrew, and delves into the use of cognitive semantics in further detail. Specifically, it asks the question, how viable is cognitive semantics for the study of Biblical Hebrew?

3.3. Cognitive semantics and ancient languages

3.3.1. Specific methodological constraints of Biblical Hebrew

In summarising *the ancient language problem*, Shead (2011:181) notes that the study of Biblical Hebrew faces critical issues of "a limited corpus, a complex history, and textual uncertainties". Shead (2011:181) further argues that the difficulties inherent to Biblical Hebrew "intensify" when attempting to apply a cognitive semantics approach, which relies heavily on the mental world of native speakers. Furthermore, it is true, as

[11] Lemmens (2016:94) uses the example of "school night", a term which cannot be understood by merely analysing the semantics of the two words independently and their "juxtaposition" on a sentence level, since it involves social knowledge that is more often relegated to pragmatics.

Burton (2017:18-19) states, that the scholar of Biblical Hebrew is not without the input of native speakers; rather, what is missing is access to the "cognitive and communicative processes" of the authors of the Biblical Hebrew corpus.

Realistically, one should recognise that Biblical Hebrew is a fragmentary expression of the culture associated with its speakers. The biblical documents are explicitly religious and, therefore, express an inconsistent worldview structured according to the religious beliefs of certain speakers of the language (Burton, 2017:40-41). Furthermore, the compilation, editorial processes, and transmission history of the Hebrew Bible, our main source of BH data, form part of a long, highly complex, and debated process[12].

James Barr, in his seminal 1961 work *Semantics of Biblical Language*, urged biblical scholars to adopt a rigorous dialogue with linguistics. However, the difficulty of applying modern insights from linguistics to the study of biblical texts pushed scholars in two directions. One group would attempt to understand contemporaneous semantic theory and so apply up-to-date insights onto their own work in studying ancient languages. On the other hand, many scholars grappling with biblical languages would rather rely on a conventional theory, as Burton (2017:3) argues, "without regard to its date of origin – and indeed in many cases its date of expiration" (this being the second

[12] C.f. *How the Bible Became a Book: The Textualization of Ancient Israel* (Schniedewind, 2004).

group). In the context of the biblical languages, convention has come to mean, generally speaking, some form of structuralist semantics[13].

A cognitivist approach to semantics, however, should be taken despite the "*inevitable and unavoidable*" difficulties of the Biblical Hebrew corpus, precisely because these issues arise no matter what semantic theory is adopted (Shead 2011:182, emphasis in original). In fact, the limitations of the corpus do not affect the commitments of the cognitive linguistics. Therefore, what is required of semantic analysis is a "cyclic, inductive approach" (Shead, 2011:183). Research is, naturally, focused on the language itself, but this is then done with reference to "the history of interpretation, comparative philology, and cross-linguistic and cognitive research into the nature of language and conceptualisation" (Shead, 2011:183). The following subsection will provide an overview of Biblical Hebrew research which has employed a cognitive semantics approach.

3.3.2. Literature review of cognitive linguistics for Biblical Hebrew

Several decades have passed since the introduction of cognitive semantics into mainstream linguistics research; however, despite gaining traction, among ancient language scholars it is still somewhat underrepresented. One reason for this slow pace

[13] Structuralism can afford to treat language as an autonomous system, a compelling rationale for those who have only a limited corpus for analysis. One proponent for the viability of structuralism in studying Biblical Hebrew is Francesco Zanella, who argues that "an adequate theory" for the study of Biblical Hebrew must be able to function without the input of native speakers (quoted in Burton, 2017:18). In Zanella's (2010:12-14) words, componential analysis allows the researcher to deal "*directly*" with the vocabulary of the text (without consulting external linguistic or conceptual information) and "*feasibly*" with regard to a limited corpus all the while producing "*concrete results*" (emphasis in original). Zanella (2010:61) does admit that the results of componential analysis "may well be considered inadequate", but argues that "the relationship between the linguistic results of CA [componential analysis] and their cultural analysis can be discovered without casting doubt on the theoretical status of CA, but, rather, *through* CA itself" (emphasis in original). Arguably, the framework of cognitive semantics allows the researcher to avoid the pitfalls of choosing between linguistic analysis and broader questions of culture, interpretation, and semantics.

of adoption is the difficulty of introducing new methodologies into biblical studies. A second reason, as was noted earlier, is the reliance of cognitive linguistics on native speaker intuition, although the implementation of corpus linguistics methods for the study of the Biblical Hebrew corpus helps to overcome this challenge (Burton, 2017:17; Van der Merwe, 2021:10, 13). This section examines several scholars who have adopted elements of a cognitive linguistics framework and successfully integrated these into their Biblical Hebrew research. The selection here is not meant to represent the full engagement occurring between these two fields. Rather, the emphasis is on scholars who have provided a theoretical foundation for the current study's practical application of cognitive linguistics tools.

Ellen van Wolde has engaged with cognitive approaches to linguistics and semantics over a decades-long career. Relevant publications include her edited volume *Job 28: Cognition in Context* (2003), for which she contributed the chapter "Wisdom, Who Can Find It? A Non-Cognitive and Cognitive Study of Job 28:1-11", as well as the monograph, and culmination of her cognitive linguistic approach to biblical studies, *Reframing Biblical Studies: When Language and Text Meet Culture, Cognition, and Context* (2009). In *Reframing Biblical Studies* (2009:2), van Wolde argues that cognitive linguistics allows Biblical Hebrew researchers the opportunity to examine "the dynamic interactions of conceptual, textual, linguistic, material, and historical complexes" (i.e. the encyclopaedic complexity of these interconnected subjects). Apart from these two sources, mention can be made of her chapter, "Cognitive Grammar at Work in Sodom and Gomorrah", in Bonnie Howe and Joel B. Green's *Cognitive Linguistic Explorations in Biblical Studies* (2014). Van Wolde has advocated for the use of Ronald Langacker's Cognitive Grammar in parsing the patterns of language use that express the speaker's mental world. Importantly, van Wolde (2014:193) argues for Langacker's theory because it is "one of the most comprehensive and most fully articulated approaches in cognitive linguistics". Her specific reliance on Langacker's theory can be seen in "Wisdom, Who Can Find It? A Non-Cognitive and Cognitive Study of Job 28:1-11". In trying to clarify the complex text of Job 28, van Wolde points to the ability of cognitive linguistics theory to mine a text for data that can be turned

into information regarding the conceptualiser's worldview or perspective[14]. This is a basic premise of cognitive linguistics, that meaning is both created and housed in the mind, but the originality of applying this theory to an ancient text in order to access, so to speak, the mind behind Job 28 cannot be overstated. More broadly, van Wolde (2014:197-198) argues for applying Langacker's theory at three levels: First, the researcher considers the general "cultural categories and general domains" that define the Ancient Near East; second, moving inward, the focus shifts to the textual world of the Hebrew Bible as the corpus of Biblical Hebrew; and third, the researcher considers a "single biblical textual usage event". Van Wolde, therefore, sees cognitive linguistics (or, more specifically, Langacker's Cognitive Grammar) as practical for understanding a given biblical text as a single piece of the Biblical Hebrew corpus that is itself a reflection, however distorted, of Ancient Near East cultural conceptualisations. According to Van der Merwe (2021), van Wolde "proposes a detailed cognitive method of exegesis of the OT (2009, 204) indicating how to account for (1) the socio-cultural embeddedness of the text the Hebrew Bible; (2) the lexical meaning of usage events; and (3) the meaning structure of Biblical texts".

In 2011, Stephen Shead published *Radical Frame Semantics and Biblical Hebrew*. The book provides a new model for lexical semantics based on William Croft's *Radical Construction Grammar* (2001) and Charles Fillmore's *Frame Semantics* (1982). Shead's model is a synthesis of structural semantics, cognitive semantics, and construction grammar. Practically, the model is explored through an analysis of verbs for "exploring" and "searching" using the HebrewNet software. Noteworthy is the comprehensive theoretical discussion that forms the first part of Shead's text. Shead offers a methodological expertise of immense value. Agreeing with several cognitivist scholars (including Geeraerts [2016:530] and van der Merwe [2006:90; 2017:11; 2019]), Shead (2011:35) argues that meaning is a matter of "dynamic construal in context". Shead also offers an in-depth examination of the reality of applying cognitive linguistics to an ancient language. He concludes this examination by reaffirming the practical necessity of a cognitivist methodology, noting that "[to] pretend that meaning can somehow be detached from conceptualisation is to adopt a dangerously deficient

[14] In making the case for a cognitivist approach, van Wolde (2003:26) refers to a purely linguistics-concerned study as non-cognitive, or an autonomous semantic approach.

methodology" (Shead, 2011:182). Therefore, it is just not good enough to accept a non-cognitivist methodology on the basis of a lack of *living* native speakers. The Biblical Hebrew corpus represents, in essence, access to native speakers (Shead, 2011:182). Lastly, Shead's approach to frame semantics is complex, possibly overly so, and a widespread adoption is questionable. However, Shead (2011:53) also notes that the inevitable "complexity of frame matrices simply mirrors the complexity of human cognition". A simplified version of Shead's radical frame semantics forms the basis for this study's understanding of semantic frames and the practical application of frame theory (one of this study's three chosen cognitivist tools) to the Hebrew Bible.

Wendy L. Widder's *"To Teach" in Ancient Israel: A Cognitive Linguistic Study of a Biblical Hebrew Lexical Set* (2014) attempts to explore the verbal lexical set of "teaching" in the Biblical Hebrew corpus. It is primarily concerned with comparing a universal concept of teaching with this Biblical Hebrew lexical set (she argues for *teaching* as a basic sense concept that is found across human cultures). Widder (2014:19) limits her analysis to four lexemes that fit the criteria of being *verbs* of *active binyanim* that have a total number of occurrences *high enough* for an effective study. In exploring *teaching* in Biblical Hebrew, Widder (2014:20, 23-24) is most interested in how the various senses of a given lexeme are activated. These senses comprise the lexeme's semantic potential. The manner in which a particular sense is activated Widder (2014:22-23) explores in terms of Ronald Langacker's discussion of the "profile/base" relationship[15]. Lastly, the study intends to identify the prototypical senses of the four lexemes so as to clarify "significant nuances of meaning" that accompany specific usages[16] (2014:24). Prototypicality is indeed a major theme in cognitive semantics research and one of the three cognitivist tools used by the current study (see: Section 3.3.3.1).

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[15] For example, the term "arm" is profiled against the base concept "body". This profile/base relationship can then also explain the use of "arm" for one part of an organizational "body" (e.g. "the local arm of the government").

[16] Widder (2014) never broaches the topic of polysemy, which too is a major theme of cognitive linguistics.

Christo H. J. Van der Merwe co-authored *A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar* (2017), which incorporates elements of cognitive linguistics. Arguing for a 21st-century grammar of Biblical Hebrew, van der Merwe, Naudé, and Kroeze (2017:10, quoting Geeraerts and Cuykens, 2017:5) recognise the importance of cognitive linguistics in affirming language as a tool for "organizing, processing, and conveying" information in the human mind. Furthermore, Van der Merwe has written extensively about the practical value of cognitive linguistics for the study of Biblical Hebrew and the task of translation: "Lexical Meaning in Biblical Hebrew and Cognitive Semantics: a Case Study" (2006), "The challenge of better understanding discourse particles: The case of לָכֵן" (2014), and "The polysemous relationships between the senses of the verbal root חזק" (2018) argue for cognitive linguistics in clarifying semantic potential, especially through prototypicality. Lastly, in "Biblical Hebrew and Cognitive Linguistics: A General Orientation" (2021) van der Merwe provides an up-to-date exploration of the dynamic nature of language as well as the value of cognitive linguistics' usage-based thesis, two methodological considerations that underlie the current study. Van der Merwe (2021:15-16) notes that the incorporation of insights from cognitive linguistics into Biblical Hebrew studies still struggles with the lack of a systematic model; however, cognitive linguistics improves engagement with Biblical Hebrew as "a dynamic and complex system", emphasising the interrelated nature of social and individual language use that drives meaning forward.

Marilyn Burton published *The Semantics of Glory: A Cognitive, Corpus-Based Approach to Hebrew Word Meaning* (2017). Important to note, Burton's (2017:34) analysis extends beyond Biblical Hebrew to cover the various strands of Classical Hebrew: "the biblical texts (HB), Hebrew inscriptions belonging to this time period, the Hebrew Dead Sea Scrolls (DSS) and Ben Sira (Sir)". Burton provides a convincing argument for the practical benefit of cognitive linguistics for understanding the uncertain reality of language use. Burton (2017:42, 50) provides an empirical foundation for her corpus-based analysis of the semantic domain for "glory". Focusing on word pairs and parallelism, she justifies the boundaries of the semantic domain. The methodological introduction is a useful overview of practically applying cognitive linguistics for ancient language research. It presents an accessible account of the three most engaging developments from cognitive semantics: prototype theory, frame theory, and conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual blending. Since cognitive linguistics

has no single defined research methodology, and is rather loosely a consortium of research endeavours connected by foundation principles, the three tools discussed by Burton are taken as an efficient expression for how cognitive linguistics and the purposes of Biblical Hebrew semantics form a functional partnership.

This brief overview proves that cognitive linguistics is a viable theoretical foundation for Biblical Hebrew semantics. Furthermore, it is a choice that is growing in popularity among scholars of ancient languages.[17] From these scholars, we can conclude that the usefulness of cognitive linguistics for the study of Biblical Hebrew is its understanding of language as a dynamic system.

3.3.3. A cognitive semantics toolkit for Biblical Hebrew

This section explores three analytical tools from cognitive semantics for the study of Biblical Hebrew: prototype theory, frame theory, and a conceptual view of metaphor and metonymy. This triad of tools is noted by Burton (2017:11) to be "the three most significant developments within the cognitive school". Based on the work of Shead, Widder, and Burton, these three tools are hypothesised as representing an effective toolkit for Biblical Hebrew semantics research. Together, these tools will be used to inform a more practically minded working-hypothesis in Chapter 4.

3.3.3.1. Prototype theory

Prototype theory, which explores mental categorisation of meaning, was preceded by the classical theory of concepts or checklist theory of meaning (Hanks, 2013:86; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2007:144). The classical theory proposes that membership for semantic categories can be understood based on necessary and sufficient criteria

[17] There are several studies worth noting which were not discussed at length: Kristopher Lyle's "A new methodology for ascertaining the semantic potential of Biblical Hebrew prepositions" (2013), Talia Suskover's "The Frame of Sacrificing in Judges" (2014), Christian Locatell's doctoral dissertation "Grammatical Polysemy in the Hebrew Bible: A Cognitive Linguistic Approach to כִּי" (2017), and Nathan John Moser Ringenberg's doctoral dissertation "Divine Wrath in the Prophet Isaiah: A Frame Semantics Approach" (2018). See also "Biblical Hebrew and Cognitive Linguistics: A General Orientation" (Van der Merwe, 2021) for a comprehensive overview of scholarly engagement across these two fields.

(Burton, 2017:11). This is a logic-based analysis of meaning (it can be traced back to Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy) and variants are found in philosophy, psychology, and anthropology (Lewandowska-Tomoszczyk, 2007:144).

The lexeme *bachelor* is raised as a common example to illustrate the inadequacy of the classical theory (Burton, 2017:11; Hanks, 2013:86; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2007:144). According to the classical theory, "bachelor" is demarcated by the criteria "MALE, ADULT, and NOT MARRIED". However, this fails to account for outliers such as celibate priests[18]. As such, the classical theory struggles with the inherently fuzzy nature of word meaning.

Prototype theory, on the other hand, provided an explanation for mental categories which was supported by the psychological research: "linguistic categories may be fuzzy at the edges but clear in the centre" (Geeraerts, 2010:183). The origin of prototype theory rests in Rosch's research into perceptual categories and colour schemas. In the 1980s, it was subsumed into linguistics. Based on Rosch's findings, prototype theory states that linguistic categories are structured hierarchically according to salience; or, member representation within a category. For example, a semantic category (e.g. motor vehicles) centres on the most salient member (e.g. a sedan) which possesses the highest number of shared traits with other members while possessing the fewest number of traits belonging to other categories (Burton, 2017:12, 14). The various members of this example category can be situated on a scale of *gradedness* from the centre outward to the periphery, where category membership may become ambiguous.

Geeraerts (2010:187) lists four characteristics of prototypicality. Firstly, category members can be described according to degrees of typicality. As Geeraerts (2010:191) states, "some birds may be birdier than others". Category membership exists unequally, which defines the category's hierarchy of membership. Certain semantic categories can have rigid boundaries. Consider, for example, the category FISH, where membership is quite simple according to what Geeraerts (2010:189) calls "folk models" (i.e. the

[18] Similarly, Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that *game* cannot be properly defined by the classical theory. Instead of clearly identified criteria, he suggested thinking of categories in terms of "family resemblance" (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2007:146).

categorisation present in common use language). A scientific taxonomy, with its rigid borders, would most likely disagree with the folk model on several category members based on characteristics that are not regarded as salient enough for common consideration (e.g. the fact that a cetacean, such as a whale, gives birth to live young and so is a mammal might not be a salient consideration for the folk model). As such, models of categorisation can become complex. Nevertheless, the categorisation of some phenomena resists rigid boundaries and instead feature graded membership (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2007:145). For example, age can be a subjective consideration when differentiating between members of the categories BOY and MAN, and GIRL and WOMAN.

Secondly, a category's internal form consists of interrelated referents forming a family resemblance structure. The various referents of a word possess commonalities that bind them together – some more concretely and some in abstraction. The family resemblance structure is described by Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk (2007:146) as "A: p, q, r; B: r, s, t; C: t, u, v" where *A*, *B*, and *C* share "overlapping sets of features" by association, but no individual characteristic exists that can define category membership. For example, the lexeme *frame* can reference (a) the literal referent, a support structure such as a photograph or art canvas *frame*; it can be used in abstraction with (b) "the accused claims to have been *framed*" meaning falsely incriminated; and metaphorically one can speak of (c) an interpretative *frame*. These referents differ wildly; however, there is a shared conceptualisation: a containment structure for directed viewing by an external actor. But while the rigid structure is physical and obvious for (a), it is figurative and inconspicuous for (b), and while (b) can be taken as malicious and deceitful, (c) is neutral and implies investigative rigour. Nevertheless, each use of *frame* can be traced back to a family resemblance structure.

Thirdly, the categorical periphery may be ambiguous, lacking exact boundaries. Some category members (such as "motorcycle" in the motor vehicle category) may be so uncommon as to be, for all practical purposes, unrelated to the central member. A practical distinction can be made between common types of cars (sedans, coupes, sports cars, etc.) and motorcycles. Nevertheless, a motorcycle is essentially 1) an automobile 2) reliant on wheels 3) for the purpose of transporting passengers or cargo. In this way, a motorcycle can be identified as an atypical member of the motor vehicle category.

Finally, contrary to the classical theory, membership does not result from necessary and sufficient criterial requirements (Geeraerts, 2010:187). A category is not based on the satisfaction of definitional conditions but on prototype representation. The prototype – in Lemmen's (2016:97) words, "a schematisation over individual usage events" – is itself a complex mental phenomenon, related to, but not identified with any specific category member. Thus, motor vehicles are not graded within their category according to an existing car model but in comparison with the overarching schematic conceptualisation (the prototypical motor vehicle). When presented with a common sedan, the prototype schema can be said to be activated. This can help the viewer to associate a real-world referent more easily with the mental concept, and prototype, of the motor vehicle category.[19] In short, identifying a prototypical member of a category involves the construal of a specific observer.

With polysemous lexemes consisting of sprawling semantic networks typically centred on a prototypical core, how best to illustrate this concept? One answer is radial network modelling, introduced in the research of Claudia Brugman during the early 1980s and further popularised by George Lakoff in his seminal work *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things* (Geeraerts, 2010:193). Radial mapping is a non-linear method for expressing semantic potential that also confirms the notion that cognitive models are formed via personal and cultural experiences (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2007:148). It is based on the notion that central members of a lexeme's semantic potential motivate the existence of peripheral members (Gries, 2015:474).

Radial mapping is arguably advantageous for lexicographical representation. It is a two-dimensional construal of non-linear semantic extensions. The subcategories do not

[19] The "four types of prototypicality effects" function along two axes: 1) non-equality versus non-discreteness and 2) extensional versus intensional perspectives (Geeraerts, 2010:188-189). Non-equality refers to the hierarchical nature of a category's internal structure; non-discreteness expresses the fuzzy boundaries of categories and their flexible applicability. The intensional perspective emphasises the semantic potential of a lexical item; the extensional perspective tracks possible exemplars. The first prototype effect expresses *extensional non-equality*, the second expresses *intensional non-equality*, the third *extensional non-discreteness*, and the fourth *intensional non-discreteness* (Geeraerts, 2010:189).

proceed logically from a core meaning; rather, all categories share characteristics of varying degrees of relation to certain prototypical members. Radial mapping, thus, also illustrates how the prototypical member motivates subcategories in a manner that is neither foreseeable nor a product of chance. In other words, semantic extensions occur sporadically but in ways that can be justified according to the prototypical member. Lastly, a radial map employs a wide range of cognitive models (e.g. metonymy and image schemas) to account for all senses comprising the category (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2007:148). Thus, a lexeme is illustrated holistically, represented in terms of all evidenced uses.

Radial mapping can, arguably, suffer from oversimplification as a result of its two-dimensionality. In this sense it can suffer from the same linearity that traditional dictionary entries illustrate. Furthermore, the complexity of polysemous lexemes can entail the presence of multiple prototypes, which problematises the coherence of illustrating a lexeme's semantic potential[20].

3.3.3.2. Frame theory

Primarily based on the work of Charles J. Fillmore, frame semantics proposes that lexical meaning is accessed through conceptual networks of encyclopaedic knowledge (Lemmens, 2016:94; Shead, 2011:48). Cognitive semantics works with a maximalist account of meaning. In other words, no strict demarcation exists between pragmatics and semantics when describing lexical meaning (Geeraerts, 2010:222). The brain stores information according to a type of complex and interrelated conceptual structure, what Radden and Dirven (2007:9) call a "package of knowledge". For example, *birthday* does not exist mentally as a simple definition – such as "the anniversary of a person's birth" – but rather in terms of broader conceptualisations that are influenced by individual and shared social experiences of family structures, traditions, associations that come with the relevant time of year, etc. Such "schematic representations" are called semantic frames, and help explain how speakers' lexicons function in an organised manner so as to facilitate communication (Burton, 2017:13).

[20] C.f. Van der Merwe (2018).

Context, and a shared personal or cultural understanding of a topic, allow communicants to converse clearly, a task that would otherwise be ambiguous. For example, Radden and Dirven (2010:10, emphasis in original) discuss the frame of *car* as central to understanding the difference between 1) "Can you start the *car*?" and 2) "Can you wash the *car*?" In (1) *car* refers implicitly to the engine, whereas in (2) *car* refers to the body. Geeraerts (2010:225), furthermore, suggests that frames concern not just how we see the world, but impact the way in which we choose to verbalise those mental models through a process of *perspectivisation*.

A cognitive approach to semantics, therefore, aims not to produce linear dictionary entries, but to describe the relationship between a given lexeme or linguistic expression and fully realised mental structures (Burton, 2017:14-15; Cienki, 2007:173). Individual words (for example, *borrow* versus *steal*) do not relate directly to each other in terms of abstract definitions. Rather, words share common conceptual backgrounds. Therefore, the brain functions as a repository of interrelated streams of knowledge of subjective experience and biological realities of human nature. At the core of this system exist basic frames related solely to "directly embodied human experience" – concepts such as *time* or *hunger* that are so primal as to ground all others (Croft and Cruse quoted in Shead, 2011:52). With the given example of *borrow* and *steal*, a conceptual understanding of property, ownership, and criminality is necessitated – one can go further and suggest an understanding of social relationships, trust, consent, time, and so on that together form a network to build the contrast[21] (Hanks, 2013:385-386).

One related and important weakness of frame semantics is worth mentioning: It is not a lexical theory and frames are read into existing linguistic data (Hanks, 2013:385, 388). There is well-founded justification for acknowledging the cognitive reality of frames, and the effects thereof can be identified in linguistic data, but the identification of specific frames, or differentiating between frames, can become primarily the researcher's subjective evaluation.

[21] This necessary conceptual knowledge is, essentially, implied within dictionary entries. However, entries based on fixed criteria can easily ignore the role played by encyclopaedic knowledge.

What benefits does frame theory offer Biblical Hebrew semantics? Firstly, it results in a more thorough description of closely related lexemes by recording all relevant conceptual information (Burton, 2017:15). Traditional lexicography results in linear dictionary entries unable to account for the multifaceted reality of meaning in language use. Secondly, semantic frames allow for a systematic account of polysemous lexemes and differentiating between senses based on contextual use and surrounding frame elements (Shead, 2011:53). Frame theory supports the notion that meaning is an act of dynamic construal and, as such, corpus-based semantic research is tasked with serious consideration for the contextual communicative clues that can be identified (Cienki, 2007:173; Shead, 2011:53-54).

3.3.3.3. Conceptual metaphor and metonymy

Everyday language is a flurry of metaphorical and metonymic exchanges arising from deep-seated cognitive tendencies (Burton, 2017:16). However, metaphor and metonymy are not merely figures of speech; they play vital roles in structuring cognition (Lemmens, 2016:99; Shead, 2011:57). Emphasising the conceptual nature of metaphor and metonymy was central to historical-philological semantics (Geeraerts, 2010:204). Cognitive linguistics has worked towards an empirical approach for better understanding metaphor and metonymy as conceptual phenomena (Grady, 2007:189). Common descriptions of metaphor and metonymy contrast the cognitive mechanisms at play: Metaphor functions according to conceptual similarity across two domains, and metonymy is a contiguous extension within a single domain (Lemmens, 2016:99). Geeraerts (2010:15) questions this neat division based on the number of domains, as "domain" is an inherently vague concept.

Metaphor involves the creative use of "a set of mappings or correspondences" across two domains based on some form of identified similarity (Shead, 2011:58). In cognitive linguistics, the standard model of metaphor is known as conceptual metaphor theory (CMT). The primary tenet of CMT is that metaphor "operates on the level of mental processes" (Shutova, Devereux and Korhonen, 2013:1262-1263). The pervasiveness of metaphor is a result of the foundationally embodied experience of the human mind, or human nature (Geeraerts, 2010:204, 206-207; Tay, 2014:52-53). Metaphoric language is the mapping of a source domain onto a target domain (more often than not an abstract domain is mapped onto a more concrete example). Sensorimotor experiences are an

especially prominent source for metaphorical conceptualisations. For example, Burton (2017:16) explains (via the formula "A is B") that the schema ANGER IS A HOT LIQUID expresses the abstract notion of *anger* (the target domain) through a readily available experience (or source domain) that liquids can boil when heated to account for expressions such as "to make my blood boil".

However, identifying metaphoric patterns encounters two problems. Firstly, metaphoric patterns require constant comparison so as to discern which pattern best relates to individual expressions (Geeraerts, 2010:209). For example, Geeraerts (2010:209) notes that *win*, related to the ARGUMENT IS WAR pattern, could also relate to the ARGUMENT IS GAME-PLAYING pattern. One would, therefore, need to be able to explain why precisely it belongs to the latter and not the former. Secondly, metaphors should not be distinguished solely in opposition to "the basic meaning of a word" (Geeraerts, 2010:209). The radial structure of semantic potential implies that any sense could function as the initiator of a metaphoric extension. Geeraerts (2010:209) notes the importance of "the existence of dead metaphors" for this assertion; a seemingly metaphoric expression can be identified as having transfigured into a basic or literal use. Similarly, in his conclusion, Lemmens (2016:101) argues:

> That a strict demarcation between literal and metaphorical may not always be easy to make follows logically from the prototype-structure of categories where boundaries may not always be very strict.

Blending theory was introduced by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner as an expansion of CMT to incorporate Fauconnier's notion of *mental spaces* (Birdsell, 2014:73; Shead, 2011:59). Mental spaces are dynamic "conceptual pockets" of information for the purpose of specific acts of communication (Fauconnier quoted in Shead, 2011:59). As such, they are under the influence of constant change on the basis of individual use. Blending theory adds a *blend space* and a *generic space* to the conceptual domains of CMT (the source and target domains, which are kept as *input spaces*). The blend space represents the new, or dynamic, interactions of the two input spaces; the generic space

contains the shared characteristics of the input spaces[22] (Geeraerts, 2010:210-211; Shead, 2011:60).

Critics of blending theory indicate that falsifiability is a requirement, "especially when the theory has psychological implications" (Tay, 2014:81). Geeraerts (2010:208-209) explains that one could plausibly generate a metaphoric pattern search for relevant examples; however, so far it is not possible to test blending theory for falsifiability. It has, furthermore, been suggested that proponents of blending theory fail to take other possible interpretations into account, and instead choose a metaphorical interpretation where desired (Tay, 2014:81).

Metonymy, in contrast to metaphor, is a conceptual mapping occurring within a single domain and affecting entities that are perceived as contiguous. Metonymic links, like metaphorical ones, are dynamic associations that "do not exist by conceptual necessity" (Panther and Thornburg, 2007:240).

To avoid the ambiguity inherent in discussions of domains and perceived contiguity, Ruiz de Mendoza (2014:147, 150) argues that metonymy is a type of conceptual mapping where the source domain accesses the target domain through either one of two cognitive operations: domain expansion through *source-in-target* metonymy, with the source as a "subdomain" of the target; or reduction through *target-in-source* metonymy, where the target exists as a "subdomain" of the source. Negro (2019:4-5) identifies "spilling the beans" as an example of ACTION FOR RESULT source-in-target metonymy (the expression has a long history of use, but in essence the act of "spilling the beans", coming from ancient Greek voting systems, stands in for the result, which is unveiling what is secret) and "walking on eggshells" as an example of SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC

[22] CMT (or blending theory) distinguishes between three phenomena: foundational conceptual schemas, which subconsciously exist within a language community (e.g. GOOD IS UP as a conceptual metaphor); novel metaphors, which dynamically emerge from an entrenched sense and require mental effort when mapping the received novel metaphor to "a set of correspondences"; and conventionalised metaphors, which are understood implicitly because they are readily available in the mental lexicon (Shead, 2010:63-65). While it can be difficult to easily distinguish between novel and conventional metaphors, Boeyneams et al (2017:2162) compare "the stock market keeled over" and "the stock market dropped", respectively.

target-in-source metonymy (the highly specific act "walking on eggshells" stands in for the general act of being careful, but the generic or target experience is experienced in the overly specific or source act). However, Ruiz de Mendoza (2014:161) concludes that metonymy, as a deeply conventionalised and wholly entrenched conceptual tool, might require psycholinguistic research to fully understand its functionality.

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter set out to present an overview of semantics research, emphasising the development from the historical-philological tradition through structuralism to the cognitive linguistics framework. Before moving to an expanded discussion on cognitive semantics, the chapter also considered *the ancient language problem* and the general viability of cognitive semantics for Biblical Hebrew. Lastly, the chapter explored the theoretical foundations of a cognitive approach to semantics as seen in three tools of the framework: prototype theory, frame theory, and a conceptual account of metaphor and metonymy. These tools are practically used for the study of Biblical Hebrew, as the literature review illustrated. Yet, they are also noted as useful for this study because they offer a way of engaging with the limited (and sometimes fragmentary) Biblical Hebrew corpus in a way that produces empirically founded results. Next, Chapter 4 offers a practical overview of what the cognitive semantics framework entails for this study in the form of a working-hypothesis so as to introduce and contextualise the data analysis of Chapter 5.

Chapter 4: Working-hypothesis and methodology

4.1. Introduction

The research question for this study rests on the unclear categorisation of the semantic potential of *qōl* (as concluded in Chapter 2) and has been noted as follows: How can the application of a cognitive linguistics approach to categorisation and sense mapping help one to better construe the senses of *qōl* as well as the relationships between them in a principled manner? This chapter then represents the practical manner in which the research question has been addressed on the basis of the theoretical exploration undertaken in Chapter 3.

In Chapter 5, the data for *qōl* in the Hebrew Bible is laid out in terms of this working-hypothesis (i.e. the analysis is presented as already completed). Thus, the necessity of this chapter is in providing a clear account of how the analysis of Chapter 5 was approached. First, this chapter briefly explores the problem of polysemous lexemes, which has been an important theme in cognitive linguistics and also describes the rationale behind the research problem of this study: the inability of currently available lexica and theological dictionaries to define the individual senses for *qōl* because of its polysemous nature. Second, the working-hypothesis is described. This involves the practical value of the cognitivist toolkit outlined in Chapter 3 (prototype theory, frame theory, and a cognitive account of metaphor and metonymy) as well as the steps undertaken in this study's data analysis.

4.2. The nature of polysemous lexemes

As discussed in Chapter 3, Michel Bréal's *Essai* was the first modern linguistics work to define and describe polysemy. However, during the early 20th century with the rise of structuralism and its focus on understanding language as an autonomous system, polysemy was more often than not ignored (Gries, 2015:472; Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk, 2007:139). The theory of generative grammar continued this trend; transformational-generative grammar, for example, typically explained cases of polysemy as homonyms. One theoretical differentiation that distinguished cognitive

linguistics, as a result, was reintroducing the problem of polysemy in earnest (Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk, 2007:139-140).

Polysemy refers to the potential for linguistic expressions to refer to entities that are wholly independent (Bergen, 2015:18). For example, the word *glass* is polysemous in the following examples: (1) *I emptied the glass* and (2) *I drank the glass*. In the first case, the referential entity is the container whereas in the second it is the liquid contents (Gries, 2015:472). The analysis of polysemy requires it to be established on "language-internal grounds" (Wierzbicka quoted in Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk 2007:140). Polysemy diverges from componential analysis which states that meaning is derived on "the basis of necessary and sufficient conditions (or features/markers) without reference to contexts" (Gries, 2015:472).

The question of whether there is a difference between polysemy, vagueness, and ambiguity is addressed in an ongoing debate. Consider the following sentence: *My neighbour is coming over for lunch*. The lexeme *neighbour* is inherently vague because grammatical gender is not necessitated within the sentence, but this vagueness does not result in polysemy because the compounding interpretations (*male* or *female*) merely occur on the pragmatic level (Geeraerts, 2016:234). Polysemy requires interpretative difficulty to fall beyond the utterance meaning; the systemic meaning has to be identified as ambiguous. With *neighbour*, the added qualification of *male* or *female* (on the utterance level) does not change the systemic meaning, which is "person who lives next door" (Geeraerts, 2016:235). Cognitive linguistics treats the utterance meaning, i.e. language use, as a point of access for the systemic meaning. Structuralism concerns itself with the *language system* and generative grammar with the *mental representation*, which Geeraerts (2016:235-236) argues is why both are concerned primarily with systemic meanings. However, the utterance level of analysis is "the primary observational basis of semantics" and cannot be ignored (Geeraerts, 2016:236).

As argued by Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk (2007:140), for cognitive semantics, polysemy is a problem of categorisation. Most lexicons of Biblical Hebrew state that *qōl* can refer to a *sound* or *voice*, but in practice these entities can be distinguished from one another: all voices are mechanically sound, but not all sounds are voices. The problem for lexicology, and the current study, is thus how to present this information (the individuated senses that make up the lexical polysemy) within the lexicon.

Meaning is flexible (a process of dynamic construal in context); Geeraerts (2016:240) further argues that it is not a simplistic matter to differentiate between the utterance level of analysis and systemic meanings.

During the second half of the 20th century, three tests for determining polysemy were developed. The first is the logical test (also referred to as the *truth-theoretical* perspective) which asserts that "*a word is polysemic if an assertion involving that word can be both true and false of the same referent*" (Geeraerts, 2016:236; Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk, 2007:141). An often-quoted example is that of *port* which can refer to either a type of liquor or a docking facility for ships, but it cannot refer to both simultaneously. The English lexeme port developed from Latin *portus* (harbour) for its literal sense, and the second sense, the specific liquor, is the result of a metonymic shift as the wine was a key export of what is today the Portuguese city of Porto. In this example, as with many others, the polysemous term is conceptually related, but the manner in which these incongruous meanings came to be might be diachronically unrelated (Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk, 2007:142).

Secondly, the linguistic ambiguity states that if two occurrences of a lexeme require semantic elaboration to differentiate between senses then it can be described as polysemous (Geeraerts, 2016:236-237; Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk, 2007:142-143). A simple example[23] (Gries, 2015:473; Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk, 2007:142) should suffice for our discussion: "Judy's dissertation is thought-provoking and yellowed with age." In this sentence, *dissertation* is used ambiguously so that the *contents* are thought-provoking, but the *physical copy* of the dissertation is yellowed with age.

Thirdly, the classic definitional test, originating with Aristotle (found in both the *Metaphysics* and the *Posterior Analytics* of the *Organon*), argues that a lexeme is

[23] It should be noted that this example contains a specific form of polysemy. Croft and Cruse (2004:109) give a broad definition of polysemy "variation in the construal of a word on different occasions of use". The sentence in (1) contains what Croft and Cruse (2004:116-117) call a *facet*, which "are not meanings, but pre-meanings, and are both the result of construal processes and at the same time the subject of further construal". This aligns with the example requiring further contextual clarification.

"*considered polysemic if more than a single definition is needed to account for its meaning*" (Geeraerts, 2016:237; Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk, 2007:143).

However, the three tests can in fact produce divergent answers regarding the same lexeme as a result of their various methods for analysing and defining polysemy. One test may describe a lexeme as polysemous, whereas another may answer that it is a case of pragmatic ambiguity. An example given by Geeraerts (2016:237) clarifies this sufficiently: The autohyponymous lexeme *dog* can carry the readings of both "*Canis familiaris*" and "male *Canis familiaris*" depending on contextual usage. Following the logical test, the lexeme as such is polysemous. However, the definitional test cannot distinguish between these two readings because the latter reading is contained within the "encompassing definition" of *dog* as the former reading (Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk, 2007:143-144).

For lexical semantics, polysemy is a necessary component of sense individuation. Firstly, meaning expresses categorisation (Gries, 2015:385). Moreover, to take meaning as an act of dynamic construal in context is to acknowledge the innate reliance on encyclopaedic knowledge in the mind. Thus, polysemy validates the use of frame theory. The specific use of a given lexeme in its frame must be viewed against the wealth of conceptual information that is activated mentally (Hanks, 2013:385-386). Lexical category membership often revolves around comparison with a conceptual prototype (Gries, 2015:474). Frame theory helps, firstly, then to identify a lexeme's patterns of use and, secondly, to relate these various usages to the conceptual prototype. The relationships between the senses of a polysemous lexeme are more often than not the result of two specific sense extensions: metaphor and metonymy, both of which are not merely literary devices but generalised cognitive tools.

While polysemy has been a central topic for cognitive linguistics since the 1980s, it has also been critiqued. The process of identifying a prototype and separating senses related to that category has been called into question as an innately subjective task. The basis for this criticism is a potentially uncritical confidence in believing the conceptual structures are always accessed when doing lexical semantics. Researchers only ever access language-internal data, which is used to make inferences of the conceptual structure (Gries, 2015:476-477). Gries (2015:477-478) discusses some linguistic innovation coming from areas such as the *Principled Polysemy approach* of Andrea

Tyler and Vyvyan Evans[24]. Exploring this approach goes beyond the scope of the current study, especially considering it involves developing support from large-scale corpus linguistic and psycholinguistic research, which are both problematic in lieu of the small corpus available for Biblical Hebrew semantics. We can note however the methodologies used by Shead (2011) and Thompson and Lyle (2019) as potential ways of successfully conducting empirical research of the Hebrew Bible. Nonetheless, the study of polysemy is an area to keep watch for further semantic research[25].

4.3. Working-hypothesis

We now have a better understanding, firstly, of the theoretical foundation of cognitive semantics when taking into account prototype theory, frame theory, and a conceptual account of metaphor and metonymy; and, secondly, the analytic challenges of polysemous lexemes. We are here dealing with language as a complex and dynamic system of meaning construal (Geeraerts, 2016b:530; Shead, 2011:35). Following Geeraerts (2016a:241), we accept that no model of semantic research can produce profitable results without consideration for the variety of contextual senses that occur in actual language use.

Geeraerts (2016a:242) refers to the distributional corpus-based method as "the most influential methodological innovation in linguistic semantics". For the study of Biblical Hebrew, it is not an option to mine new data. The corpus of the Hebrew Bible is to a large degree the entire scope of research (although new inscriptional material is ever-increasing in relevance). Consequently, what we are seeking is a lexicological methodology that can account for the contextual occurrences of a lexeme in terms of its framing, repeated collocations, and other relevant syntagmatic patterns (Geeraerts, 2016a:242). Shead (2011:36-37), furthermore, lists five general factors, adapted from the work of Croft and Cruse (2004), to guide interpretation: 1) human cognition, 2)

[24] Evans (2019) refers to his approach now as Access Semantics, whereas previously it was known as The Theory of Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models (LCCM).

[25] Falkum and Vincente (2015:14) state that further research into the nature of polysemy hinges on the question of whether the mechanism behind polysemy is "(mostly) linguistic, cognitive or communicative".

individual experience of reality that might favour specific lines of interpretation, 3) sociocultural norms, 4) clues born from the internal linguistic context and the external context of the communicant, and 5) the wealth of encyclopaedic knowledge. Corpus-based lexical analysis, therefore, attempts to gather evidence for interpretative rationale based on these five factors through the "linguist's intuition" (Stubbs, 2016:110).

A corpus-based analysis is oriented towards understanding the way encyclopaedic knowledge cements itself in language use (Shead, 2011:39). We distinguish between "decontextualized, coded meanings" and "contextualized readings that are realized in a specific discourse context" (Geeraerts, 2010:230). For the study of Biblical Hebrew, without active native speakers, corpus-based analysis requires paying attention to the "invited inferences" in texts and from there attempt to explicate a possible survey of the semantic potential (Geeraerts, 2010:230). An invited inference is something not explicitly clarified or communicated by a speaker or writer but can be deduced on the part of the hearer or reader. For example, if someone were to say, "I'm moving house," there is a metonymic implication that they are not moving an actual house but rather relocating from one property to another and, in the process, moving their possessions. With the corpus of Biblical Hebrew, we are required to identify such invited inferences (see, for example, the discussion of *qōl* as a metonymic reference to reported speech in Chapter 5 Section 5.7.).

The working-hypothesis of this study is founded on the applicability of prototype theory, frame theory, and a cognitive account of metaphor and metonymy in clarifying the polysemous lexeme *qōl*. Firstly, semasiological change is ably examined by way of **prototype theory** (Geeraerts, 2016:233-234). We are able to account for both the stability of central senses and the inconsistent nature of less salient category members. The lexical category for *qōl* would be hierarchical: more common senses will typically show more stability within the corpus while the periphery is sensitive to shifts in meaning. From Chapter 2, we know that the prototypical meaning of *qōl* is quite firmly agreed upon. We thus have this starting point. The problem is that the representation of individual senses is complex and their interrelationships even more so. This complexity can be seen in terms of the interjectional use of *qōl* (see Chapter 5 Section 5.2.) and identifying clear occurrences (or completely ignoring or rejecting this use, such as in the LXX).

Therefore, secondly, exploring the presence of **semantic frames** is a key analytical task for connecting lexical occurrences with relevant encyclopaedic knowledge (Shead, 2011:48-49). Conceptual frames are broad organisational structures that overlap, as can be expected, within the complex possibilities of natural language. Without native speaker intuition, the textual corpus is the only evidence of actual language use. In delineating frames, it is necessary to consider the interaction of various lexical elements. Collocations are "co-occurring word-forms" that give concrete evidence for separate senses (Stubbs, 2016:113). The relationship between an individual sense and surrounding grammatical information is, furthermore, known as colligation. The benefit of frame theory is its emphasis on the relationship between the lexical level and the conceptual level of meaning. For this study, a simplified methodology of frame-based lexical analysis is taken from Shead (2011:108-118). Each occurrence of a lexeme functions according to an individuated sense which occurs somewhere on the continuum from prototypical to peripheral. The difficulty is arriving at a persuasive argument for each sense. Using corpus-based semantic analysis, this study intends to document plausible independent frames, conceptual units that inflect a generic lexeme with specific semantic weight. A semantic frame contains various components, either compulsory or superfluous, that further entrench the intended referent. Each frame can be described in terms of a relationship between the profile and base (Shead, 2011:51). For *qōl*, we can use as an example a common frame from Genesis 27.8: Rebecca, the speaker, says to her son, "Listen to me", where *me* is literally "my voice". The text has the added collocation of referencing the verb *to command* (*ṣwh*), but regardless, the stable grammatical structure indicates a clear obedience frame as Chapter 5 Section 5.5.3 will show. Here, *my voice* (the base) presupposes the concept of *obedience* (the profile). Logically, frames closer to the conceptual prototype would be more commonly occurring. Also, their grammatical structure would be more stable. Thus, prominence and stability are two important characteristics for defining the nature of individual frames. However, one should take seriously the common criticism of frame theory that it is a complex and seemingly subjective task to decide what is and is not part of a frame (Cienki, 2007:183).

Thirdly, cognitive linguistics understands sense extensions as the result of, primarily, the mechanisms of **metaphor** and **metonymy**. Such semantic extension has been described as a dynamic process with the almost undetectable influences of numberless

communicative decisions (Grondelaers, Geeraerts and Speelman, 2007:996). Words and expressions will always develop new senses (or lose existing senses) to communicate new conceptual experiences (Grondelaers, Geeraerts and Speelman, 2007:999). In analysing the identified frames for *qōl*, the next step would be to explore the development of individual senses, which occur through actual language use, in terms of the mental processes of metaphor and metonymy.

4.4. Methodology

Operationalising the above working-hypothesis comprises the following steps:

1. Identify and group occurrences according to syntactic patterns and the broader context of use, both of which function as frame elements.
2. Categorise uses from most concrete to least concrete (or most abstract). Sense individuation generally occurs from more concrete (literal) lexical meanings.
3. Note the trends that accompany usage in terms of frequency and distribution of senses. This provides evidence for the prototypicality of senses.
4. Analyse the consistency of frames based on the status of frame elements as either necessary or optional for the functionality of a frame.
5. Identify the plausible mechanism of extension that underlies sense individuation.

4.5. Conclusion

The working-hypothesis of this study begins with the assertion that language is a dynamic system of contextual construal. Lexical meaning is the product of conceptual knowledge processed and communicated through linguistic systems. For an adequate lexicological analysis of Biblical Hebrew, a corpus-based procedure is a methodology that takes seriously the available evidence of native speaker intuition. It is hypothesised that a better understanding of *qōl* can be achieved through an analysis of the lexical frames, our access to the speakers' conceptual world; the construal of a hierarchical and radial model of senses based on prototype theory; and a postulation of sense relationships that exist by way of metaphoric and metonymic inferences.

Chapter 5: Recategorising the senses of *qōl*

5.1. Introduction

Based on the working-hypothesis established in Chapter 4, we now move on to consider the data for this study. The aim of this chapter is to detail the senses of the lexeme *qōl* in terms of the theoretical insights drawn from cognitive semantics in Chapter 3 and the practical manner for doing so laid out in Chapter 4, and so chart the lexeme's semantic potential. The discussion in this chapter will provide examples to substantiate the individual senses identified and the broad groupings. This then acts as an answer to the question laid out in Chapter 2 regarding how best to describe the lexeme's semantic potential given the inadequate formulations and categorisations of available lexicons and theological dictionaries. Although most of the accumulated knowledge of the senses of *qōl* (about which there is consensus) is acknowledged as being the foundation of this study, the present study is not merely reconfiguring existing source material. Rather, an empirical analysis has been undertaken to aid the assessment of our existing knowledge and improve on identified weaknesses. As such, the analysis offered here is an independent study of the corpus that hopes to add to the ongoing discussion of Biblical Hebrew semantics. Lastly, where a lack of data (i.e. an inadequate number of occurrences) impedes sense categorisation, the options will be provided along with supporting rationale. Throughout this chapter, the NRSV translation is used, unless otherwise stated. Example texts will thus note the book, chapter, and verse (e.g. Gen. 1.1), but where any translation other than the NRSV has been used, this is further noted in parentheses (e.g. Gen. 1.1 [NIV]). Furthermore, where applicable, my own translations will be given according to the direct translation method explored in, among other papers, "How 'direct' can a direct translation be? Some perspectives from the realities of a new type of church Bible"[26] (Van der Merwe, 2016).

[26] The goal of a direct translation would be to recreate in "good idiomatic" language "all the communicative clues of the source text in the contexts construed for the *source text* audience" (Van der Merwe, 2016:1 [emphasis in original]).

This chapter is arranged according to six broad categories that comprise the semantic potential of *qōl* as extrapolated from the corpus with the help of the cognitive linguistics toolkit laid out in Chapters 3 and 4. We begin with the most basic category, the use of *qōl* to refer to perceived acoustic phenomena. Second, we consider the debated function of *qōl* to function interjectionally. Third, we discuss the adverbial functionality of *qōl* as "audibility" (or, characterising an action or phenomenon as being "loud" or happening "aloud") an extension of the concept of the more basic level concept of "sound". Fourth, we address several uncommon expressions that build on from the adverbial function (these are discussed as plausible dual verb constructions). Fifth, we move from the realm of basic "sound" and "audibility" to the place of *qōl* in the world of speech and vocal communication. Sixth, our discussion of speech and communication is continued but in the context of divine or supernatural beings. This is separated from Section 5 because of the important interaction and intermingling of *voice* and *thunder* in terms of the divine *qōl* of Yahweh. Seventh, and last, we address a minor category of senses where *qōl* refers to "reported speech" as an extension of the concept of "voice" (i.e. what was said by a "voice"). It is hypothesized that this categorisation captures the semantic potential of *qōl* in its development from the basic level sense of "sound" to the ever-increasingly complex world of speech and communication.

5.2. Acoustic phenomena as objects

The Biblical Hebrew lexeme *qōl* together with the Biblical Aramaic cognate *qāl* occur 512 times: the former, due to the nature of the corpus represents the vast majority with 505 occurrences, while 7 occurrences of the latter form can be found in the late book of Daniel. The most basic, most commonly occurring, and therefore most prototypical use of the lexeme[27] (with 250 occurrences, or 48.8% of the joint Biblical Hebrew and Biblical Aramaic corpus) involves a reference to the *qōl* of a person, an animal, created by various types of activity (human and non-human), and a plethora of phenomena

[27] Due to the minority status of the Aramaic cognate, and its functional similarity to the Biblical Hebrew form, references to "the lexeme" concern *qōl*, unless explicitly stated otherwise. There are several specific senses of *qōl* discussed in this chapter that cannot be extended to *qāl* because of its underrepresentation in the corpus.

originating in the natural environment. Acoustic phenomena are experienced as arguably tangible objects that are interacted with physically (this is captured succinctly through the commonly found relationship between *qōl* and the ear, e.g. Job 9.16 "Even if I summoned him and he responded, I do not believe he would give me a hearing [NIV], where literally the second clause uses the verb *'zn* [to listen, or perceive, through the ear]). We can thus postulate some form of conceptual metaphor such as ACOUSTIC PHENOMENA ARE OBJECTS.

With the expansive range of *qōl* in the construct state expressing the source of acoustic phenomena, one could argue that a first language speaker would have been able to use this syntactic construction to identify or point out any sound. For example, imagine two English speakers in dialogue where Speaker A suggests they have heard a noise. Speaker B then asks after what exactly Speaker A heard, with Speaker A answering, "It was the sound of X," where X can be any comparable sound (e.g. music, birdsong, voices, etc.). Of these 250 occurrences, 143 occur within the broader syntactic frame *šm' qōl* (or, *l^{e}qōl, b^{e}qōl*) that is discussed in Section 5.5.

The syntactic construction of the first frame (the remaining 107 occurrences) involves *qōl* in an absolute state or *qōl* in the construct state. There is little semantic difference between the two frames[28]. The two examples of #1 and #2 can be compared to illustrate the lexeme's fluidity. Whereas *qōl* is used twice in #1 to identify a specific speaker's voice, #2 contains several occurrences of *qōl* to remark upon and identify the nature of a complex environmental soundscape. When hearing the collective din of the people,

[28] Any decision by a lexicographer to translate uses of *qōl* with *voice* or *sound* based on their relation to human or non-human animals is subjective. Available lexicons and theological dictionaries indicate this subjectivity in their varied considerations of *voice* and *sound* as translation values: while Gesenius (2013), BDB (2000/1906), Labuschagne (1997), and Clines (2010) treat *voice* and *sound* as separate products of both humans and non-human animals, Koehler and Baumgartner (1994-2000) and Kedar-Kopfstein (2003) speak of *voice* only in relation to human beings who are then also capable of producing *sound* through numerous physical acts. The corpus conveys an obvious increase in linguistic complexity when dealing with human communication or the anthropomorphised speech of divine beings, but it is unclear how native speakers conceptualised the relationship between the *qōl* of humans and non-human animals.

Joshua hears "the sound of the people" and states that he hears the sound of *war*. Moses, answering him, pinpoints the acoustic phenomenon through three constructions involving *qōl*.

1	וַיִּגַּשׁ יַעֲקֹב אֶל־יִצְחָק אָבִיו וַיְמֻשֵּׁהוּ וַיֹּאמֶר הַקֹּל קוֹל יַעֲקֹב וְהַיָּדַיִם יְדֵי עֵשָׂו׃	So Jacob went up to his father Isaac, who felt him and said, "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau." (Gen. 27.22)
2	וַיִּשְׁמַע יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אֶת־קוֹל הָעָם בְּרֵעֹה וַיֹּאמֶר אֶל־מֹשֶׁה קוֹל מִלְחָמָה בַּמַּחֲנֶה׃ וַיֹּאמֶר אֵין קוֹל עַנּוֹת גְּבוּרָה וְאֵין קוֹל עַנּוֹת חֲלוּשָׁה קוֹל עַנּוֹת אָנֹכִי שֹׁמֵעַ׃	When Joshua heard the noise of the people as they shouted, he said to Moses, "There is a noise of war in the camp." But he said, "It is not the sound made by victors, or the sound made by losers; it is the sound of revelers that I hear." (Ex. 32.17–18)

Kedar-Kopfstein (2003/1993:578) states that *qōl* extends "from the rumbling of a storm (Ps. 77.18[17]) and the chaotic ocean (Ps. 93.4) to the softest rustling of a single leaf (Leviticus 26.36)". In this basic sense, *qōl* can also be qualified or described in a variety of ways: there is the faintest whisper of a sound (1 Kings 19.12); a voice majestic or filled with grandeur, as with Yahweh's speech (Is. 30:30); a voice pleasing to the ear (Ezek. 33.32); anguished, as when Darius approached Daniel in the lion's den (Dan. 6:20); and sounds described through comparison, such as the beating of angelic wings or the awe-inspiring voice of Yahweh, both described as the sound of rushing waters (Ezek. 1.24, 43.2), and again the voice an angelic being described as the roaring sound of a crowd (Dan. 10.6). More specifically related to speech content, *qōl* can be used in constructions such as "the voice [speech] of a fool" (Ecc. 5.2) – something to be scorned.

A few further examples should suffice in illustrating the generic acoustic world native speakers would have experienced:

3	וַיֹּאמֶר שְׁמוּאֵל וּמֶה קוֹל־הַצֹּאן הַזֶּה בְּאָזְנָי וְקוֹל הַבָּקָר אֲשֶׁר אָנֹכִי שֹׁמֵעַ:	But Samuel said, "What then is this bleating of sheep in my ears, and the lowing of cattle that I hear?" (1 Sam. 15.14)[29]
4	עַד־מָתַי אֶרְאֶה־נֵּס אֶשְׁמְעָה קוֹל שׁוֹפָר: ס	How long must I see the standard, and hear the sound of the trumpet? (Jer. 4.21)
5	וָאֶשְׁמַע אֶת־קוֹל כַּנְפֵיהֶם כְּקוֹל מַיִם רַבִּים כְּקוֹל־שַׁדַּי בְּלֶכְתָּם קוֹל הֲמֻלָּה כְּקוֹל מַחֲנֶה בְּעָמְדָם תְּרַפֶּינָה כַנְפֵיהֶן:	When they moved, I heard the sound of their wings like the sound of mighty waters, like the thunder of the Almighty, a sound of tumult like the sound of an army; when they stopped, they let down their wings. (Ezek. 1.24)
6	עֲלֵיהֶם עוֹף־הַשָּׁמַיִם יִשְׁכֹּון מִבֵּין עֳפָאיִם יִתְּנוּ־קוֹל:	By the streams the birds of the air have their habitation; they sing among the branches. (Ps. 104.12)
7	אַנְתָּה ׀ מַלְכָּא שָׂמְתָּ טְעֵם דִּי כָל־אֱנָשׁ דִּי־יִשְׁמַע קָל קַרְנָא מַשְׁרֹקִיתָא קִיתָרֹס ׀ שַׂבְּכָא פְּסַנְתֵּרִין וְסִיפֹנְיָה ׀ וְכָל זְנֵי זְמָרָא יִפֹּל וְיִסְגֻּד לְצֶלֶם דַּהֲבָא:	You, O king, have made a decree, that everyone who hears the sound of the horn, pipe, lyre, trigon, harp, drum, and entire musical ensemble, shall fall down and worship the golden statue, (Dan. 3.10)

[29] While a literal translation does read "the sound of sheep" and "the sound of cattle", it is reasonable to suggest that these expressions function similar to the onomatopoeic *moo* and *baa* that English speakers would connect with cows and sheep, respectively. As such, the native speaker of Biblical Hebrew would have registered different conceptual referents for the two expressions in #3. The requirement in Biblical Hebrew to state the origin or owner of the *qōl* does not mean that this formulation triggers one generic conceptualization, such as "the sound of cattle" and "the sound of sheep" would imply.

The basic syntactic frame *qōl* in the construct state is as such generic enough that it is used to specify any and all acoustic phenomena encountered.

5.2.1. Basic metonymic inference for speaker and/or speech content

A construct state use of *qōl* in relation to human beings regularly and consistently conveys a form of metonymy[30]. In 77 occurrences[31] *qōl* is as a contiguous placeholder for either 1) the person uttering the speech content or 2) the speech content conveyed, whereby the voice acts as a container for what is said (Radden and Dirven, 2007:12-13).

Such a sense extension via metonymy is a key example of the lexeme's polysemous nature (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2007:148). Here we can understand references to *the speaker* as metonymic expansion (or, source-in-target metonymy) and references to *speech content* as metonymic reduction (or, target-in-source metonymy). However, the boundary between speaker and speech content is oftentimes ambiguous; we will focus on those exemplars where the distinction is obvious and noteworthy.

5.2.1.1. Source-in-target metonymy

8	קוֹלִי אֶל־יְהוָה אֶקְרָא וַיַּעֲנֵנִי מֵהַר קָדְשׁוֹ סֶלָה׃	I cry aloud to the LORD, and he answers me from his holy hill. (Ps. 3.5 [NRSV 3.4])

[30] Often these are called *part-for-whole* and *whole-for-part* metonymies, but following Ruiz de Mendoza (2014), this chapter will continue to use the terms *source-in-target* and *target-in-source* due to its indebtedness to the work of De Mendoza's (2014).

[31] **Gen.** 3.17, 4.23, 16.2, 21.12, 27.8, 27.13, 27.43, 30.6; **Ex.** 4.1, 4.9, 18.19, 18.24; **Num.** 20.16, 21.3, **Deut.** 1.45, Deut. 21.18a, 21.18a, 21.20, 33.7; **Josh.** 6.10, 10.14, 22.2; **Judg.** 18.25, 20.13; **1 Sam.** 2.25, 8.7, 8.9, 8.19, 8.22, 12.1, 15.24, 19.6, 28.21, 28.22, 28.23; **2 Sam.** 12.18, 13.14, 22.7; **1 Kgs.** 14.6, 17.22, 20.25; **2 Kgs.** 6.32, 10.6; **Is.** 10.30, 28.32, 42.2, 50.10, 58.4; **Jer.** 4.31, 35.8; **Ezek.** 27.30; **Jonah** 2.3; **Micah** 6.1; **Nahum** 2.14; **Ps.** 3.5, 5.4, 18.7, 19.3, 27.7, 55.18, 58.6, 64.2, 77.2 [x2], 81.12, 116.1, 119.149, 130.2a, 141.1, 142.2 [x2]; **Prov.** 5.13, 8.4; **Job** 3.18; **Lam.** 3.56; **2 Chron.** 30.27.

9	קוֹלִי אֶל־אֱלֹהִים וְאֶצְעָקָה קוֹלִי אֶל־אֱלֹהִים וְהַאֲזִין אֵלָי׃	I cry out to God—I cry for help; I cry out to God, and he will hear me. (Ps 3.5 [Own translation])

Metonymic expansion is commonly found in the Psalms and other poetic texts. There is a noticeable trend to use *qōl* with a pronominal suffix (often the first-person singular) with cries for help or absolution. While pronominal suffixes are often attached to *qōl* (as with any noun), in poetic texts this form often stands in for the first-person subject. A literal translation of #8 reads "My voice cries out to Yahweh" – a good English translation could also be "I cry out to Yahweh". The more complex question with regard to the poetic nature of this text is ascertaining which translation captures the spirit, so to speak, of the psalm.

In #9, one clear example of metonymic expansion is present in v.2a while a parallel in v.2b can be interpreted similarly on the basis of the verbal ellipsis. Both clauses contain the metonymic expression "My voice is to God". A similar case without the verbal ellipsis can be found in Ps. 142.2. Clearly *qōlî* in this expression is used metonymically, and the text should be examined for the poetry it is. But I suggest that there is some overlap between the use of *qōlî* as a stand-in for the speaker and the adverbial capacity of *qōl*, which will be discussed in Section 5.3. Thus, the poet explicitly uses the image of their voice being directed at God (one could even say directed upwards to God, according to the threefold worldview of the Ancient Near East[32]) and so emphasises the urgency or audibility of their cry.

Metonymic expansion can also accompany an instruction to be silent such as in #10 and #11. While this syntactic frame – *lō* or *'al šm'* (in the Hiphil [causative] stem) and *qōl* – occurs infrequently, the basic use of *qōl* is comparable with #8 and #9. In #10 and

[32] Rochberg (2005:317) notes the inseparable Sumerian linguistic pair of An and Ki – heaven and earth. The third cosmological realm, which negates to an extent An and Ki, is the netherworld or the abyss. For example, the sun travels between these realms and, as such, provides order to the functioning of the world: "In the lower regions you take charge of the netherworld gods, the demons, the Anunna-gods, in the upper regions you administer all the inhabited world" (Foster quoted in Rochberg, 2005:320).

#11, *qōl* with a pronominal suffix acts as the source domain through which the target domain is experienced.

10	וְאֶת־הָעָם֙ צִוָּ֣ה יְהוֹשֻׁ֔עַ לֵאמֹ֖ר לֹ֣א תָרִ֑יעוּ וְלֹא־תַשְׁמִ֤יעוּ אֶת־קוֹלְכֶם֙ וְלֹא־יֵצֵ֣א מִפִּיכֶ֔ם דָּבָ֖ר עַ֣ד ׀ י֣וֹם אָמְרִ֣י אֲלֵיכֶ֗ם הָרִ֙יעוּ֙ וַהֲרִיעֹתֶ֔ם׃	To the people Joshua gave this command: "You shall not shout or let your voice be heard, nor shall you utter a word, until the day I tell you to shout. Then you shall shout." (Josh. 6.10)
11	וַיֹּאמְרוּ֩ אֵלָ֨יו בְּנֵי־דָ֜ן אַל־תַּשְׁמַ֤ע קוֹלְךָ֙ עִמָּ֔נוּ פֶּן־יִפְגְּעוּ֙ בָּכֶ֔ם אֲנָשִׁ֖ים מָרֵ֣י נֶ֑פֶשׁ וְאָסַפְתָּ֞ה נַפְשְׁךָ֧ וְנֶ֛פֶשׁ בֵּיתֶ֖ךָ׃	And the Danites said to him, "You had better not let your voice be heard among us or else hot-tempered fellows will attack you, and you will lose your life and the lives of your household." (Judg. 18.25)

The difference is in the negation used by #10 and #11. In #10, the speaker uses a basic negative command, prohibiting speech "until the day I say to you, 'Shout!'" In #11, on the other hand, the use of *'al* is antagonistic on the part of the speaker, not desiring to hear the speech of the addressee. This frame only occurs once, so it is debatable whether the use of *'al* here is unique or represents some common phrase unrepresented in the corpus.

Lastly, a possible example of metonymic expansion can be seen in 2 Kgs. 6.32 (as well as 1 Kgs. 14.6, but a single example will suffice):

12	הֲלוֹא֙ קוֹל֙ רַגְלֵ֣י אֲדֹנָ֔יו אַחֲרָ֖יו׃	Is not the sound of his master's feet behind him?" (2 Kgs. 6.32)

Both of these texts make reference to the *qōl* of an approaching person's feet or footsteps. The approaching subject is associated with the sound of their footsteps and, therefore, the sound being made (the foremost sensory information available) is a reduction of the person approaching. It could be argued that this is highly irregular phrasing that should be treated literally.

5.2.1.2. Target-in-source metonymy

It is common for *qōl* to be used in the context of speech. The majority of occurrences work to construct a broader semantic frame[33] involving the verbal root *šm'* (to hear). Frame elements include the aforementioned verb along with an optional but common prepositional prefix. With the correct frame elements, *qōl* triggers a conceptualisation of listening not only to the *sound* of another's voice but to the *content* of their speech[34].

For example, *because you listened to the* qōl *of your wife* (Gen. 3.17) or *Yahweh would not heed your* qōl (Deut. 1.45) can be translated as *because you listened to your wife* and *Yahweh would not listen to you*, respectively. The whole (the speaker) is experienced in terms of one part (the speaker's *qōl*). Example #13 provides the standardised syntax used by this semantic frame:

13	וַיֹּ֤אמֶר לֶ֙מֶךְ֙ לְנָשָׁ֣יו עָדָ֔ה וְצִלָּ֖ה שְׁמַ֣עַן קוֹלִ֑י נְשֵׁ֥י לֶ֙מֶךְ֙ הַאְזֵ֣נָּה אִמְרָתִ֔י כִּ֣י אִ֤ישׁ הָרַ֙גְתִּי֙ לְפִצְעִ֔י וְיֶ֖לֶד לְחַבֻּרָתִֽי׃	Lamech said to his wives: "Adah and Zillah, hear my voice; you wives of Lamech, listen to what I say: I have killed a man for wounding me, a young man for striking me. (Gen. 4.23)

The speaker, Lamech, makes use of parallel constructions: "hear my voice" corresponds with "give ear to what I say". Lamech's voice and what he has to say are one and the same. Therefore, this is an example of reduction: the target domain (the speech content, or in this case the content of Lamech's request) is experienced as a part of the source domain (the voice).

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[33] The broader semantic frame will be discussed in depth in Section 5.4.

[34] In Leviticus 5.1 *qōl* is used –irregularly, occurring only this once – to describe something as having occurred in a public manner. The construct state expression *qōl 'alah* (the sound of an oath) is taken to mean "a public oath". But the metonymic inference is the same, since the text addresses the person who hears the *content* of someone's oath.

5.3. The interjectional sense

Any list of the interjectional sense of *qōl* has to be considered debatable; each lexicon and theological dictionary contains its own list (see Chapter 2). For the purposes of this study, the Masoretic accentuation has been deemed an invaluable guide for consistency of interpretation. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind the nonexistence of any interjectional interpretation within the LXX and Targums (Labuschagne, 1997:1134). The interjectional sense is treated as the second sense category for two reasons: first, because it is syntactically comparable to the prototypical sense discussed in Section 5.2, and second, because it semantically deals with "sound" on a very basic level (i.e. while the interjectional sense is complex, it functions simplistically as the pointing out or drawing of attention to a sound).

Instances of the interjectional sense are difficult to classify because syntactically they occur as *qōl* in either the absolute or construct state, depending on how the clause is interpreted. This section starts with a discussion of deixis as the basis of certain interjections (such as this sense of *qōl*). It then considers a list of plausible interjectional occurrences according to identified criteria and ends with a short analysis of certain rejected cases.

5.3.3. Deixis and interjections

As discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.3.1, according to Labuschagne (1997:1134) *qōl* can be understood as a deictic interjection in certain instances. Deixis, simply put, involves a contextual reference to something. It is a foundational communication skill, common also to monkeys and apes: pointing at a tree is deictic, while a person pointing at a tree and using the deictic word "that" in reference to the tree is verbalised deixis (Moulin-Frier et al., 2011:199). The referents of deictic words shift constantly, but their meaning never changes (e.g. the word "here" possesses a fixed meaning, but its referent depends on contextual use).

Important for the interjectional sense of *qōl* is understanding discourse deixis: the use of deictic expressions for discourse active elements. Deictic terms activate conceptual structures (mental spaces generated by idealised cognitive models [ICMs]). For example, with Lakoff's "pointing-out ICM of *there-constructions*" it is implied that a

referent exists within the conceptual world of Person A but might be unknown or forgotten for Person B – Person A informing Person B regarding the referent, "*There* it is", thus activates the referent for Person B (Yang, 2011:129).

Deictic expressions exhibit graded prototypicality (Yang, 2011:132). Words such as *there* and *you* can be considered highly deictic when used relative to a speaker (e.g. driving to a specific destination, a passenger says, "When *we* get *there*…" where *we* refers to the group in the car and *there* refers to the destination). However, *you*, for example, can sometimes lose its deictic quality when used in generalised expressions (e.g. in the English proverb "Don't bite off more than *you* can chew"). The lexeme *qōl* is often deictic, but it is not innately so.

Interjections are "internally complex and heterogenous" and therefore difficult to define (Andrason and Dlali, 2010:164-165). Ameka (1992:106-107) states that interjections are "relatively conventionalised vocal gestures" which "encode speaker attitudes and communicative intentions" and, as such, are innately pragmatic. Furthermore, interjections are culturally-bound; general conventions can be deduced, but individual examples arise out of contextual use (Wierzbicka, 1992:160). In lieu of a definition, Andrason and Dlali (2020:164-166) offer a prototype of a primary interjection demarcated by "functional (semantic and pragmatic) and formal (phonological, morphological, and syntactic)" criteria. Their discussion is comprehensive and presents a wide-ranging survey of contemporary scholarship on the interjection category. The lexeme *qōl*, however, cannot be defined as a primary interjection, which means a restating of Andrason and Dlali's (2020) argument would fail to tell us anything exact about *qōl*. Rather, through use *qōl* has gathered certain grammatical and pragmatic similarities to interjections and can thus be classified as a secondary interjection (Ameka, 1992:111). *Qōl* is a non-interjectional construction that – through interjectional usage – has adopted certain grammatical and lexical qualities of interjections (Andrason and Dlali, 2020:170). It is, as most secondary interjections are, underdeveloped in terms of interjectionalisation, meaning that the interjectional function accompanies more established and widely used senses (Andrason and Hutchison, 2020:7).

According to the three classes of interjections offered by Ameka (1992:113-114), *qōl* functions as conative. These interjections are "directed" at a listener so as to ask for

their attention or a relevant response (Ameka, 1992:113). This, furthermore, aligns with the prototypical non-referential characteristic of interjections: They function performatively as used by the speaker (Andrason and Hutchison, 2020:4-5, 30). Lastly, as an interjection, *qōl* is separated from the rest of the clause as noted by the Masoretic accentuation. This clausal separation is consistent with how interjections are used generally (Ameka, 1992:108).

5.3.2. Consulting the corpus

An important quality of interjections is their dual nature as lexemes and utterances (Wilkins, 1992:127-128). *Qōl*, when used as a secondary interjection, does not occur often. The interjectional sense of *qōl* can potentially be distinguished based on its syntactic isolation according to the Masoretic accentuation. The 10 occurrences judged as plausibly interjectional possess two important characteristics: 1) all are accompanied by disjunctive accentuation, and 2) all are fronted within their respective clauses[35].

14	קוֹל דְּמֵי אָחִיךָ צֹעֲקִים אֵלַי מִן־הָאֲדָמָה׃	Listen; your brother's blood is crying out to me from the ground! (Gen. 4.10)[36]
15	קוֹל שְׁאוֹן מַמְלָכוֹת גּוֹיִם נֶאֱסָפִים	Listen! An uproar of kingdoms, of nations coming together. (Is. 13.4b [CEB])
16	קוֹל שָׁאוֹן מֵעִיר	Listen, an uproar from the city! (Is. 66.6)

[35] **Ex.** 15.26 is an example where a disjunctive accent is present, but syntactically the interjectional sense would be ill-fitting because *qōl* is not fronted in the clause, and the lexeme is identified as belonging to a separate syntactic frame.

[36] The interjectional reading here is not adopted by all translations, but it is syntactically reasonable and illustrates the prototypical frame elements of the interjectional "scene": A speaker [Yahweh] gains control over a listener's [Cain's] attention by the sudden interruption of "A sound!" for something the listener either previously did not take note of or which the listener needs to reaffirm notice of (Cassuto, 1989:217-218; Arnold, 2009:75).

17	קוֹל שְׁמוּעָה הִנֵּה בָאָה וְרַעַשׁ גָּדוֹל מֵאֶרֶץ צָפוֹן	Hear, a noise! Listen, it is coming— a great commotion from the land of the north (Jer. 10.22)[37]
18	קוֹל צַעֲקַת הָרֹעִים וִילֶלֶת אַדִּירֵי הַצֹּאן	Hark! the cry of the shepherds, and the wail of the lords of the flock! (Jer. 25.36)[38]
19	קוֹל יְהוָה לָעִיר יִקְרָא	Listen! The LORD is calling to the city (Micah 6.9 [NIV])[39]
20	קוֹל יוֹם יְהוָה מַר צוֹרֵחַ שָׁם גִּבּוֹר׃	Listen, the day of the LORD! In it the warrior cries out bitterly. (Zeph. 1.14 [NASB])[40]
21	קוֹל יְלֶלַת הָרֹעִים כִּי שֻׁדְּדָה אַדַּרְתָּם	Listen, the wail of the shepherds, for their glory is despoiled! (Zech. 11.3a)

[37] The compounded anticipation created by the interjectional *qōl* and the particle *hinneh* can be noted in several translations: "A voice, a rumor! Behold, it comes!—" (ESV), "Listen! News is coming even now." (NET Bible), and "Behold, the noise of the bruit is come". Common to prophetic announcements, *hinneh* here points out something the speaker considers newsworthy (Van der Merwe, Naudé and Kroeze, 2017:410-411). The participle in #17 *ba'ah* (is coming) that follows *hinneh* is common to this function of *hinneh*.

[38] Lundbom (2004:279) translates here "The sound of a scream of the shepherds", taking this to be a "triple construct chain". He notes the possibility of the interjectional use here, but chooses against it in favour of the parallelism created by the triple construct chain in 48.3 and 51.54.

[39] Waltke (1993:737) notes that there is some support for the interjectional use here from Joüon's *A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew* (1991) and Gesenius' *Hebrew Grammar* (1813), but he concludes that it is not enough to "overturn the normative grammar".

[40] Motyer (1998:920, 922) argues that *qōl* here interjectionally functions as a "dramatic opening" to link the first oracle of Chapter 1 with 1.14b-18. This interpretation, however, is taken by the NASB, the 2004 Dutch Nieuwe Bijbelvertaling, and Die Bybel 2020-vertaling in Afrikaans, but is rejected by the majority of modern translations.

22	קוֹל שַׁאֲגַת כְּפִירִים כִּי שֻׁדַּד גְּאוֹן הַיַּרְדֵּן׃ ס	Listen, the roar of the lions, for the thickets of the Jordan are destroyed! (Zech 11.3b)
23	קוֹל	דוֹדִי דוֹפֵק	Listen! my beloved is knocking. (Song. 5.2)

When we take *qōl* to express itself as an interjection ("Listen!" as a metonymic extension of the literal "a sound!"), it becomes syntactically disjoined from what follows. This requires a deictic interpretation: the acoustic referent is being selectively identified by the speaker for the sake of the audience. It is valuable to note the contextual elements of the above examples. Firstly, all occur within direct speech and, secondly, provide a description of the referent. Consider the two occurrences in Zech. 11.3 (with the translation of the ESV on the left, and the interjectional interpretation on the right.

Construct state expression	**Interjectional formulation**
The sound of the wail of the shepherds, for their glory is ruined!	Listen, Shepherds wail, for their glory is ruined.
The sound of the roar of the lions, for the thicket of the Jordan is ruined!	Listen, Lions roar, for the thicket of Jordan is ruined!

It could be argued that the divergent translations have a similar pragmatic effect in calling attention to the specific sound; however, the rhetorical effect is perhaps more emphatic when taking the two disjunctive *qōl* clauses as secondary interjections. This

applies to the other examples as well: the speaker is introduced as being singularly aware of the deictic referent and proceeds to bring the audience to its attention.[41]

5.3.3. Rejected possibilities

In addition to the examples where a clear reliance on disjunctive accentuation is evident, there are 11 texts[42] offered by lexicons and theological dictionaries as arguably interjectional. Interpretation can be weighed according to individual grammatical, syntactical, and semantic contexts; however, the majority share a common conjunctive accentuation. There are, nevertheless, examples where the disjunctive accentuation is not enough to distinguish an interjectional interpretation. Two rejected examples, for example, are Jer. 3.21 and 8.19[43]. In Jer. 3.21, a reason for discounting its status as an interjection is *qōl* functioning as a fronted constituent (i.e. "A voice on the barren heights was heard, [a voice of] weeping…") and not an independent unit within the clause (i.e. "A voice! On the barren heights weeping is heard…"). Jer. 8.19, on the other hand, links *qōl* with the discourse marker *hinneh*.

Lastly, Labuschagne (1997:1134) mentions Ps. 3.5 as a possible example.

24 קוֹלִי אֶל־יְהוָה אֶקְרָא I cry aloud to the LORD (PS. 3.5)

However, it clearly utilises the type of poetic source-in-target metonymy explored in Section 5.1. It would, as such, be the only example of *qōlî* to express an interjectional sense. Furthermore, the lexeme is marked by a conjunctive accent.

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[41] **Gen.** 4.10 occurs within direct speech (for a conceptual parallel, see **Job** 16:18), and so does **1 Kgs.** 18.12. **Song.** 5.2 is the only example where the speaker responds to a phenomenon, but there is still some relationship between the speaker's words and the reader or audience's experience of the text. Lastly, the other 11 examples all occur within prophetic texts, which are commonly written addressing the audience directly.

[42] **Song.** 2.8; **Is**. 13.4a, 40.3, 52.8; **Jer**. 3.21, 4.15, 8.19, 31.15, 48.3, 50.28, 51.54.

[43] See also **Is.** 40.6; **Micah** 6.9; **Zeph.** 2.14; **Ps.** 118:15 (although Motyer, 1998:920) argues for Zeph. 2.14 as interjectional).

5.3.4. Conclusion

In the introduction to this sense category, it was noted that the interjectional sense is syntactically simplistic and differs from the uses discussed in Section 5.2, to an extent, on the basis of whether one identifies an occurrence as a absolute or construct state. The injectional sense takes on a form of metonymy whereby the presence of a sound (i.e. merely noting, "A sound!") stands in for the command or request to listen. The interjectional function, while uncommon and not easily identified, extended from the prototypical sense for the pragmatic purpose of pointing out something audible for another person. The prototypical sense is thus the acoustic phenomena as an object in the world, and the interjectional sense brings this prototype into the realm of dialogue. In other words, not only is one person hearing acoustic phenomena as objects (which concerns the prototype), but this person is doing so for the sake of another (the interjectional sense).

The interjectional interpretation is typically correlated with disjunctive accentuation and a fronted position of *qōl* in the clause. However, this alone is not enough to discern a concrete pattern of use. Furthermore, translations both modern and ancient consistently disagree on interpretations of this usage. It is plausible to interpret *qōl* in this light, but only where the text does not naturally call for an alternative reading. Unfortunately, this often becomes a matter of subjectivity.

5.4. Adverbial audibility

From Sections 1 and 2, we can so far summarise the use of *qōl*, firstly, as referring to acoustic phenomena (*voices* and *sounds*) as objects that exist as part of the world. Secondly, what we called the interjectional use, are cases where *qol* has a conative function – in other words, an acoustic phenomenon is referred to in an attempt to draw another's attention to it. Both of these uses involve referents that exist as sound (in the broad sense, which includes *voices*). It is a characteristic of sound that it can be further qualified as *loud*, *soft*, and so on – descriptions that have to do with audibility. The third

sense category, now, concerns uses of *qōl* where the referent *sound* is placed into the context of *adverbial audibility*[44], to describe an action occurring *aloud* or *loudly*.

5.4.1. Audible speech acts

Firstly, *qōl* can occur within an adverbial phrase modifying a verb so that the action is characterised as occurring loudly or aloud. Two basic frame elements are used in tandem to convey the adverbial use. First, an instrumental *beth* is prefixed to *qōl* (i.e. "with sound/voice"), and second, *qōl* is frequently modified by the adjective *gadol* but with or without the original prefixed *beth*[45]. The first element, (*b*^{e}*)qōl*, functions as a type of derived adverbial adjunct, where the combination of a preposition and noun is used adverbially (Van der Merwe, Naudé and Kroeze, 2017:381).

As such, the frame for this sense often looks as such: (*b*^{e}*)qōl gadol* ("with a great/large voice"), as can be seen in #25. This frame follows an obvious conceptual metaphor that can be termed AUDIBILITY IS QUANTITY.

25	וַתֵּ֣רֶא הָאִשָּׁה֮ אֶת־שְׁמוּאֵל֒ וַתִּזְעַ֣ק בְּקֹ֣ול גָּדֹ֔ול וַתֹּ֤אמֶר הָאִשָּׁה֙ אֶל־שָׁא֣וּל לֵאמֹ֔ר* לָ֥מָּה רִמִּיתָ֖נִי וְאַתָּ֥ה שָׁא֖וּל׃	When the woman saw Samuel, she cried out with a loud voice; and the woman said to Saul, "Why have you deceived me? You are Saul!" (1 Sam. 28.12)

Usually, this syntactic frame is supplemented with further description of the speech act. In #25, the speaker cried out (*z'q*) aloud. It is the supplementary material that contextualises the more basic frame, but there is no divergence in meaning. The adverbial qualification of audibility is consistent. The phrase (*b*^{e}*)qōl gadol* is regularly

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[44] Van der Merwe, Naudé, and Kroeze (2017:379) state that Biblical Hebrew contains "members of other categories" that function like adverbs but exist as a "less homogenous" group.

[45] Neither the instrumental *beth* with *qōl gadol* nor *qōl gadol* alone represents a fixed pattern, and either form can be found in a variety of similar and dissimilar contexts with the same verb referent. See #26 to #29 for variations on these two syntactic frames.

used with the verbs *qr'* (to call)[46] and *z'q* (to cry out)[47], as well as infrequently with *bkh* (to weep)[48], *brk* (to bless)[49], *dbr* (to speak)[50], *šb'* (to take an oath)[51], *'mr* (to say)[52], *hll* (to praise)[53], and *r'm* (to thunder)[54].

26	וְהַמֶּלֶךְ לָאַט אֶת־פָּנָיו וַיִּזְעַק הַמֶּלֶךְ קוֹל גָּדוֹל בְּנִי אַבְשָׁלוֹם אַבְשָׁלוֹם בְּנִי בְנִי׃ ס	The king covered his face, and the king cried with a loud voice, "O my son Absalom, O Absalom, my son, my son!" (1 Sam. 19.5 [19.4 NRSV)
27	מְבָרֵךְ רֵעֵהוּ בְקוֹל גָּדוֹל בַּבֹּקֶר הַשְׁכֵּים קְלָלָה תֵּחָשֶׁב לוֹ׃	Whoever blesses a neighbor with a loud voice, rising early in the morning, will be counted as cursing. (Prov. 27.14)
28	וַיַּעֲנוּ כָל־הַקָּהָל וַיֹּאמְרוּ קוֹל גָּדוֹל כֵּן כִּדְבָרֶיךָ ק עָלֵינוּ לַעֲשׂוֹת׃	Then all the assembly answered with a loud voice, "It is so; we must do as you have said. (Ezra 10.12)
29	וַיָּקֻמוּ הַלְוִיִּם מִן־בְּנֵי הַקְּהָתִים וּמִן־בְּנֵי הַקָּרְחִים לְהַלֵּל לַיהוָה אֱלֹהֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל בְּקוֹל גָּדוֹל לְמָעְלָה׃	And the Levites, of the Kohathites and the Korahites, stood up to praise the LORD, the God of Israel, with a very loud voice. (2 Chron. 20.19)

A similar syntactic frame combines *qōl* (often with a prominal suffix, e.g. "your voice") with certain verbs to achieve a similar effect as the derived adverbial adjunct frame

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[46] **Gen.** 39.14; **1 Kgs.** 18.27, 18.28; **2 Kgs.** 18.22; **Is.** 36.13; **Ezek.** 8.18, 9.1; **2 Chron.** 32.18.

[47] **1 Sam.** 28.12; **2 Sam.** 19.5; **Ezek.** 11.13; **Neh.** 9.4.

[48] **2 Sam.** 15.23; **Ez.** 3.12.

[49] **1 Kgs.** 8.55; **Prov.** 27.14.

[50] **Deut.** 5.22.

[51] **2 Chron.** 15.14.

[52] **Ez.** 10.12.

[53] **2 Chron.** 20.19.

[54] **1 Sam.** 7.10.

above. These uses all rest on the AUDIBILITY IS QUANTITY conceptual metaphor that is informed by the raising of the horn as an input for the conceptual blend. This occurs, in descending order of frequency, with the verbs *rwm*, *ntn*, *nś'*, and *ṣhl*. These verbs often mimic conceptualisations such as the roaring of a lion, for example.

30	עַל הַר־נִשְׂפָּה שְׂאוּ־נֵס הָרִימוּ קוֹל לָהֶם הָנִיפוּ יָד וְיָבֹאוּ פִּתְחֵי נְדִיבִים׃	On a bare hill raise a signal, cry aloud to them; wave the hand for them to enter the gates of the nobles. (Is. 13.2)
31	קְרָא בְגָרוֹן אַל־תַּחְשֹׂךְ כַּשּׁוֹפָר הָרֵם קוֹלֶךָ	Shout out, do not hold back! Lift up your voice like a trumpet! (Is. 58.1)

With *rwm*, there is some correlation between raising one's voice and the image of the raised horn: 1 Chron. 15.16 and 2 Chron. 5.13 add to this image of *rwm* in the context of musical instruments. However, Ezr. 3.12 employs it in a context of weeping and joyful shouting (weeping is a common contextual frame as will be discussed in Section 5.4.2.). Also, Ezek. 21.27 calls for the raising of a "battle-cry". As noted with *ntn qōl* below in #32, there is no fixed emotion or context of use for this expression. It deals with, rather, loudness of one's voice to fulfil a function dependent on context.

32	עָלָיו יִשְׁאֲגוּ כְּפִרִים נָתְנוּ* קוֹלָם וַיָּשִׁיתוּ אַרְצוֹ לְשַׁמָּה עָרָיו נִצְּתָה ק מִבְּלִי* יוֹשֵׁב׃	The lions have roared against him, they have roared loudly. They have made his land a waste; his cities are in ruins, without inhabitant. (Jer. 2.15)

As will be discussed in Section 5.6, *ntn* has a strong correlation with the image of a lion's roar (it is only the roaring lion image, and no other animal, that accompanies the sense of loudness). The "giving" of the voice idiomatically infers making a loud noise. The formulation in #32 is iconic of the leonine roar that can also be seen in Jer. 12.8 and Amos 3.4. However, *ntn qōl* does carry the meaning of shouting, crying out, roaring in a variety of contexts. Prov. 1.20, 2.3, and 8.1 make use of this expression in the context of "giving" one's voice, not aggressively as the image of the lion can suggest. Furthermore, while Hab. 3.10 uses this expression in a violent image concerning the primordial deep making its voice heard, Ps. 104.12 speaks of birdsong filling the air.

As such, the expression is not foundationally coupled with negativity or aggression, and rather only expresses a strong raising of one's voice or calling out.

Unlike *rwm* and *ntn*, which occur frequently, *nś'* and *ṣhl* only occur once each. The use of *nś'* in #33 is unproblematic, because the verb is a common collocation for adverbial expressions, as will be discussed in Section 3.2. The verb is also arguably similar in semantic potential to *rwm*, which is the more frequent collocation. The conceptual blend occurring here broadly is a link formed between using one's voice loudly (i.e. audibility) and the physical act of raising the trumpet or shofar (i.e. ram's horn). In #34, *ṣhl* functions as a unique image; the verb usually functions in a positive sense, according to BDB (2000/1906). Here it is negative: The various towns mentioned in Isaiah 10 all fall to the Assyrian forces, and in #34 Gallim gives a shrill cry aloud at the impending doom.

33	נָשְׂאוּ נְהָרוֹת	The floods have lifted up, O
	יְהוָה נָשְׂאוּ נְהָרוֹת קוֹלָם יִשְׂאוּ	LORD, the floods have lifted up
	נְהָרוֹת דָּכְיָם׃	their voice; the floods lift up their
		roaring. (Ps. 93.3)
34	צַהֲלִי קוֹלֵךְ בַּת־גַּלִּים הַקְשִׁיבִי לַיְשָׁה	Cry aloud, O daughter Gallim!
	עֲנִיָּה עֲנָתוֹת׃	Listen, O Laishah! Answer her,
		O Anathoth! (Is. 10.30)

5.4.2. Serial verbs

In a 1995 article titled "Ingressive *qwm* in Biblical Hebrew", Dobbs-Allsopp discusses *qwm* as an ingressive aspect verb which is used to convey the sense of the initiation or beginning of a complex verbal event. What he discusses is one form of a serial verb construction (SVC), which can be defined as a monoclausal sequence of verbs that conceptualise a singular event through shared qualities of tense, aspect, and mood (Haspelmath, 2016:292; Aikhenvald, 2018:1). Importantly, an SVC can only be interpreted as a singular event, even if the individual components of a given SVC can occur independently in one form or another (Aikhenvald, 2018:1). SVCs, in general, describe actions; a stative verb is more likely to become adverbial instead of occurring in a canonical SVC (Aikhenvald, 2006:49-50).

According to these characteristics, the only canonical SVC involving *qōl* occurs in #35 where the two imperatives *qwm* and *šm'* together express mono-eventhood (Andrason, 2019:113).

35	נָשִׁים שַׁאֲנַנּוֹת קֹמְנָה שְׁמַעְנָה קוֹלִי בָּנוֹת בְּטֻחוֹת הַאְזֵנָּה אִמְרָתִי׃	Rise up, you women who are at ease, hear my voice; you complacent daughters, listen to my speech. (Is. 32.9)

The SVC is ignored by the majority of translations who opt for a translation similar to the NRSV. It is easy to find within the verse the parallelised imperative for the women addressed to ready themselves for the judgment they are about to receive. But translating the SVC requires capturing the singular nature of the event: "You contented women, *ready yourselves and listen* to me". This might not always be possible or even desirable in English; nonetheless, *qwm* here has to be understood as operating in tandem with *šm'* as it "introduces a single activity or situation" (Andrason, 2019:113). This SVC is notable among those involving *qōl* because it is an established construction that does not centre on the lexeme *qōl* itself.

In contrast, there are 19 occurrences of a construction[55] that is, at best, an underdeveloped, non-canonical (non-prototypical) SVC[56]. Based on all of the evidence, it is arguable that this construction is not an SVC but rather shows similarities in its grammatical consistency. The basic construction – V_1 *qōl* V_2 – is V_1 conveying upward motion (i.e. to lift, to raise) with *qōl* as its object followed by V_2 conveying a speech

[55] **Gen.** 21.16, 27.38, 29.11, 39.15, 39.18; **Num.** 14.1; **Judg.** 2.4, 9.7, 21.2; **1 Sam.** 11.4, 24.17, 30.4; **2 Sam.** 3.32, 13.36; **Is.** 24.14, 52.8; **Job** 2.12; **Ruth** 1.9, 1.14

[56] It is possible that the constructions discussed in this section represent double verb constructions (DVCs), which can be understood as "lexical idioms" that have the potential to become fully entrenched SVCs (Aikhenvald, 2006:46). DVCs are also characterised by a lack of a fixed structure in use. For example, Aikhenvald (2006:46) illustrates that the phrase "*go get your jumper*" can have the verb pair interrupted, as with "*go and get your jumper*" (emphasis in original). At the moment, there is insufficient use of the constructions to arrive at a firm conclusion as to their use, but there is enough alignment with what is known regarding SVCs to hypothesise this connection here.

act. Productive SVCs feature a varied functionality depending on their level of entrenchment within a language. However, while bi-verbal, the basic construction features the other qualifying characteristics of SVCs – mono-clausality, mono-predicativity, mono-eventhood[57] – to different degrees. Specifically, all occurrences feature a subordinated clause with V_2 that completes the idea present in V_1 + *qōl* (the majority occurrences feature *wayyiqtol* verbs, and as such, the *waw*-conjunction can be "semi-overt"), arguably all are bi-event, and none are strongly mono-predicative (Andrason, 2019:106). According to the Masoretic accentuation, 16 occurrences feature the conjunctive *mercha* falling on V_1 and the disjunctive *tifcha* falling on *qōl*. The relevant V_2 then completes the clause with a strong disjunctive such as the s*of pasuk*. Contrasting with this pattern, Judges 21.2, Ruth 1.14, and 2 Samuel 3.32 all feature a *munach* falling on V_1 – or the subject of V_1 – and either a *zaqef qatan* (Judges 21.2 and Ruth 1.14) or *revia* (2 Samuel 3.32) on the *qōl*. The prevalence of disjunctive accentuation supports a discontinuity between the actions referred to in these expressions, in other words, bi-eventhood. Furthermore, V_1 is dependent on V_2 in order for the verbal idea to be resolved (i.e. V_2 is subordinate to V_1 + *qōl*). This subordination, along with the bi-eventhood of the two *wayyiqtol* verbs, all point to a non-canonical SVC reading.

We have four different frames with only one occurring more than twice. As such, the constructions present are infrequently used. There are too few occurrences to identify any pattern of verbs used, but it is noteworthy that all relay some sense of "to raise" or "to elevate", which further strengthens the idiomatic connection between loudness and the physical act of raising a trumpet or shofar. Our four frames are as follows: 1) *nś' qōl bkh* as in #36, 2) *nś' qōl rnn* in #37, 3) *nś' qōl qr'* in #38, and 4) *rwm qōl qr'* in #39. The first three frames rely on the consistency of *nś'* as V_1 while the fourth uses *rwm*, which is semantically related to *nś'*. This internal consistency points to a burgeoning asymmetrical SVC.

[57] See Andrason and Koo (2020:6).

36	וַיָּבֹאוּ הַמַּלְאָכִים גִּבְעַת שָׁאוּל וַיְדַבְּרוּ הַדְּבָרִים בְּאָזְנֵי הָעָם וַיִּשְׂאוּ כָל־הָעָם אֶת־קוֹלָם וַיִּבְכּוּ׃	When the messengers came to Gibeah of Saul, they reported the matter in the hearing of the people; and all the people wept aloud. (1 Sam. 11.4)
37	הֵמָּה יִשְׂאוּ קוֹלָם יְרֹנּוּ בִּגְאוֹן יְהוָה צָהֲלוּ מִיָּם׃	They lift up their voices, they sing for joy; they shout from the west over the majesty of the LORD. (Is. 24.14)
38	וַיַּגִּדוּ לְיוֹתָם וַיֵּלֶךְ וַיַּעֲמֹד בְּרֹאשׁ הַר־גְּרִזִים וַיִּשָּׂא קוֹלוֹ וַיִּקְרָא וַיֹּאמֶר לָהֶם שִׁמְעוּ אֵלַי בַּעֲלֵי שְׁכֶם וְיִשְׁמַע אֲלֵיכֶם אֱלֹהִים׃	When it was told to Jotham, he went and stood on the top of Mount Gerizim, and cried aloud and said to them, "Listen to me, you lords of Shechem, so that God may listen to you. (Judg. 9.7)
39	וַיְהִי כְשָׁמְעוֹ כִּי־הֲרִימֹתִי קוֹלִי וָאֶקְרָא וַיַּעֲזֹב בִּגְדוֹ אֶצְלִי וַיָּנָס וַיֵּצֵא הַחוּצָה׃	and when he heard me raise my voice and cry out, he left his garment beside me, and fled outside." (Gen. 39.15)

Let us first summarise the similarities of the frames before looking at individual differences. Firstly, each construction can be expressed through the formula V_1 *qōl* V_2 – similar to SVCs, the second verb is an "outgrowth" of the action initiated by the first, but it functions together with the first verb to express a single action, a single event (Aikhenvald, 2006:10-12). Secondly, *qōl* is the object to a V_1 that necessarily conveys the act of "raising up". As discussed throughout Section 5.4., several expressions treat *qōl* as something that can adverbially become raised (i.e. loud, where "loudness" is communicated by way of the "upwards motion"). There is enough conceptual overlap, as such, to suggest that V_1 functions adverbially upon *qōl* in the context V_2 denotes. The verb *nś'* is most frequently used in the V_1 position, but it is somewhat interchangeable with *rwm* and *ntn*.

Furthermore, the majority, 14 occurrences, feature verbs with compatible tense, aspect, and mood (TAM) markers – to be specific, in every occurrence V_1 and V_2 are Qal *wayyiqtol* verbs with shared person, gender, and number. This TAM consistency is characteristic of SVCs (Andrason, 2019:113). Regarding instances where TAM markers diverge, in Numbers 14.1 the verbs do not share the same lexically specified subject. Following the Masoretic accentuation, the *waw*-conjunction separating the clauses is overt. Regardless, the construction – or a verbal connotation that strongly resembles the construction despite the clausal separation – can still be seen in the verbal parallelism. The divergent subjects – the "congregation" and the "people – can also be seen as representing variants of the same concept, the former being more selective than the latter. Next, 1 Samuel 30.4 is easily understood: The verbs differ in number, V_1 being adjacent to a singular subject while V_2 is plural because its subject has been expanded to include "less salient participants", as Andrason (2020:117) suggests is common among Biblical Hebrew SVCs. The "apparent" gender disparity in Isaiah 52.8 is logical because V_1 is third-person *qatal* while V_2 is third-person *yiqtol* (the common gender of the *qatal* is thus inclusive of both masculine and feminine subjects). Then, while V_1 is Qal, *rnn* as V_2 occurs in the Piel formation in both Isaiah 24.14 and 52.8. The Piel V_2 only stresses the bi-eventhood of the construction, as here the formation denotes "an entire series of cries of jubilation" (Koehler and Baumgartner, 1994-2000:1284). Lastly, the similar constructions of Genesis 39.15 and 39.18 differ only that V_1 is Hiphil while V_2 is Qal. These two examples are the only ones that feature rwm as V_1, so it is normative for this to be in the Hiphil formation and, as with Isaiah 52.8, it further confirms the fact that this is a bi-event.

We can now discuss the four frames in turn. The first frame, with 15 occurrences[58], vocalises grief. Loud, public weeping is a common element of the grieving process throughout the ancient near east (Pham, 1999:23, 28). The verb *nś'* is a common collocation for the adverbial function; it forms an understandable partnership with *bkh* to convey the emotive act of grieving. As such, in 1 Samuel 11.4 (#36) we can understand the singular event as, "the people wept loudly".

[58] **Gen.** 21.16, 27.38, 29.11, 45.2; **Num.** 14.1; **Judg.** 2.4, 21.2; **1 Sam.** 11.4, 24.17, 20.4; **2 Sam.** 3.32, 13.36; **Job** 2.12; **Ruth** 1.9, 1.14.

Worth mentioning is the similar syntactical frame of #40: the construction combines *ntn* with *bkh*, but the verse opens with a separate verb (*nś'*) similar to #36.

40	וַתִּשָּׂא כָל־הָעֵדָה וַיִּתְּנוּ אֶת־קוֹלָם וַיִּבְכּוּ הָעָם בַּלַּיְלָה הַהוּא׃	Then all the congregation raised a loud cry, and the people wept that night. (Num. 14.1)

Both *ntn* and *nś'* commonly express an adverbial function as explored in Section 5.3.1. Both verbs share tense, aspect, and mood with *bkh*; however, *nś'* and *ntn* are governed by separate yet synonymous actors (with different grammatical genders and numbers). The phrasing in #40 is clearly an instance of bi-eventhood: The semi-SVC *ntn qōl bkh* is governed by the *nś'* introductory clause. The three verbs are completed by the same actors, but the action unfolds in stages of subordination. The congregation raises its voice (supposedly, as this object is left unsaid and should be derived from the context of the entire verse), and then the people precede to give their voice in mourning throughout the night, as the verse explicitly provides this temporal context.

Next are three "different" frames that are all highly uncommon asymmetrical SVCs. The use of *rnn* as V_2 occurs twice in the poetic text of Isaiah, both in conjunction with *nś'* as V_1. Isaiah 52.8 inserts an adverb between V_1 and V_2. Andrason (2019:114) states that adverbs usually govern the entire SVC, and so with V_2 here further removed from the action of V_1 by an adverb of manner, the expression is non-canonical.

A single occurrence of *nś' qōl qr'* (Judg. 9.7) can be explored together with the two occurrences of *rwm qōl qr'* (Gen. 39.15 and 39.18), considering that the two V_1 examples are semantically comparable. Contextually, the one central difference is that, with the former, the action precedes speech whereas, with the latter, the action occurs in response to a threat and not as the prelude to a speech act. It is plausible to understand the Hiphil rwm as a near-synonym of the Qal nś', which would close the gap between these infrequently used expressions.

To conclude, apart from Isaiah 32.9 where *qōl* happens to appear in a more established SVC, the constructions explored in this section can only be said to share similarities with SVCs. They are undeveloped, lacking the defining characteristics of SVCs. While

the construction is used sparingly, the *grief* frame is used the most consistently, albeit still a non-canonical SVC at best.

5.5. Speech and communication

Throughout the biblical corpus, *qōl* has the capability to convey 1) intentional yet non-linguistic acts of communication and 2) intentional linguistic speech acts. In either case, *qōl* is often profiled as an object to be received by a listener. Because we can differentiate between volitional and non-volitional sounds, the listener can also be said to register automatically whether or not the source of *qōl* is an agent with communicational intent[59]. This section deals with *qōl* in the context of intentional linguistic speech acts, and primarily in relation to the verb *šm'*.

5.5.1. To hear

The most typical syntactic frame – *šm' qōl* – is one that is also quite polysemous, with *šm'* occurring in three stem formations, the Qal, Niphal, and Hiphil, which are each predisposed to differing senses. The frequency of use favours the Qal with 73 occurrences[60], the Niphal with 17 occurrences[61], and 13 occurrences with the Hiphil[62].

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[59] This is a complex matter as its roots go deep into the conceptual world of the native speakers. As we shall see with the (existent or non-existent) communicative agency of thunder, the divergence between the conceptual world of Biblical Hebrew and that of Modern Hebrew can explain the shift to a normative use of *r'm* for thunder, since *qōlōt* implies a mythologised sentiment found in the Hebrew Bible and not carried over into modernity.

[60] **Gen.** 3.8, 3.10, 4.23, 21.17 [x2], 39.15; **Ex.** 32.17, 32.18; **Lev.** 5.1; **Num.** 7.89, 20.16; **Deut.** 1.34, 4.12, 4.33, 5.23, 5.24, 5.25, 5.26, 5.28 [x2], 18.16, 26.7; **Josh.** 6.5, 6.20; **Judg.** 33.7; **1 Sam.** 4.6, 4.14, 15.14; **2 Sam.** 5.24, 15.10, 22.7; **1 Kgs.** 1.41, 1.45, 14.6; **2 Kgs.** 11.13; **Is.** 6.8, 28.23, 32.9; **Jer.** 4.19, 4.21 4.31, 9.9, 30.5, 42.14; **Ezek.** 1.24, 1.28, 3.12, 33.4, 33.5; **Jonah** 2.3; **Micah** 6.1; **Ps.** 5.4, 6.9, 18.7, 27.7, 28.2, 28.6, 31.23 55.18, 64.2, 116.1, 119.149; **Job** 3.18, 4.16, 33.8, 37.2; **Lam.** 3.56; **Dan.** 8.16, 10.9 [x2]; **Neh.** 4.14; **1 Chron.** 14.15; **2 Chron.** 23.12

[61] **Ex.** 28.35; **1 Sam.** 1.13; **Is.** 15.4, 65.19 [x2]; **Jer.** 8.16, 9.18, 31.15, 49.21; **Ezek.** 10.5, 19.9, 26.13; **Nah.** 2.14; **Ps.** 19.4; **Job** 37.4; **Song.** 2.12; **Ezra** 3.13

[62] **Deut.** 4.36; **Josh.** 6.10; **Judg.** 18.25; **2 Kgs.** 7.6 [x3]; **Is.** 30.30, 42.2, 58.4; **Ezek.** 27.30; **Ps.** 66.8; **Song.** 2.14; **2 Chron**. 5.13

Within the Aramaic portions of Daniel, this frame occurs several times in the Peal[63] mirroring the Hebrew Qal senses.

The presence of each stem formation corresponds with their prototypical functions. In other words, the Qal expresses an active sense, the Niphal a passive formulation, and the Hiphil a causative. No deviation from this can be identified which implies a highly structured relationship between morphosyntactic framing and semantic potential. Furthermore, the Qal also expresses itself through every conjugation (though not varying greatly in semantic potential), while the Niphal and Hiphil are more limited in this regard, but showing greater nuance in the range of their use.

The following table outlines the semantic potential of this first sense for ease of reference:

[63] **Dan.** 3.5, 3.7, 3.10, 3.15

	Qal	Niphal	Hiphil
Qatal	Auditory perception	Passive audibility without agency	Causative active to make something audible
Yiqtol	Auditory perception	Passive description of inaudibility	Directive to be silent
Imperative	Plea to be heard		Causative command to make something audible
Infinitive Construct	Expressing context of auditory perception (e.g. temporality)		Purpose
Infinitive Absolute	Adverbial[64]		
Participle	Auditory perception	Passive description of inaudibility	

5.5.1.1. Qal

As an object of *šm′* in the Qal conjugation, *qōl* is treated as a perceivable acoustic phenomenon. Sound is sensory information and can be caused by movement #41; speech #42; and emotive yet non-linguistic communicative acts, such as the varying

[64] This occurs only once, in Job 37.2, and functions adverbially to describe the mode in which the imperative should be followed: "Listen well to the roar of his voice".

connotations in #43 and #44. The frame employs no prefix or performative, except for the general object marker, in order to convey the basic act of hearing[65].

41	וַיֹּ֣אמֶר אֶת־קֹלְךָ֩ שָׁמַ֨עְתִּי בַגָּ֜ן וָאִירָ֣א כִּֽי־עֵירֹ֣ם אָנֹכִ֗י וָאֵחָבֵֽא׃	He said, "I heard the sound of you in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself." (Gen. 3.10)
42	וּבְבֹא֩ מֹשֶׁ֨ה אֶֽל־אֹ֜הֶל מוֹעֵ֗ד לְדַבֵּ֤ר אִתּוֹ֙ וַיִּשְׁמַ֣ע אֶת־הַקּ֔וֹל מִדַּבֵּ֥ר אֵלָ֖יו מֵעַ֣ל הַכַּפֹּ֑רֶת אֲשֶׁ֥ר עַל־אֲרֹ֖ן הָעֵדֻ֣ת מִבֵּ֣ין שְׁנֵ֣י הַכְּרֻבִ֔ים וַיְדַבֵּ֥ר אֵלָ֖יו׃ פ	When Moses went into the tent of meeting to speak with the LORD, he would hear the voice speaking to him from above the mercy seat that was on the ark of the covenant from between the two cherubim; thus it spoke to him. (Num. 7.89)
43	שְׁמַע־יְהוָ֥ה קוֹלִ֗י אֶקְרָ֑א וְחָנֵּ֖נִי וַעֲנֵֽנִי׃	Hear, O LORD, when I cry aloud, be gracious to me and answer me! (Ps. 27.7)
44	וַיְהִ֗י כְּשָׁמְעוֹ֙ כִּֽי־הֲרִימֹ֣תִי קוֹלִ֔י וָאֶקְרָ֖א וַיַּעֲזֹ֣ב בִּגְדוֹ֮ אֶצְלִי֒ וַיָּ֣נָס וַיֵּצֵ֔א הַחוּצָֽה׃	and when he heard me raise my voice and cry out, he left his garment beside me, and fled outside." (Gen. 39.15)

5.5.1.2. Niphal

As is expected, the Niphal conjugation has fewer occurrences than the generalised Qal, but it has an explicit function: the passive quality of an object or action having an (in)audible nature. As in #45 and #46, the act of hearing is passive in that the acoustic phenomena merely exists in its contextual space and affects a general and unspecified audience. This is quite strikingly expressed in #47 where the conjugation is used so as

[65] The preposition *'l* in **Gen.** 21.17 is almost certainly a scribal error, as its presence in the Samaritan Pentateuch and Targum Pseudo-Jonathan is replaced with the expected object marker (Wenham, 1987:78).

to express the general absence of sound[66]. But again, this is the description of non-existence. There is no agency behind the silence. The participle form of the Niphal occurs once in #47 and expresses an absence of sound.

45	וְקוֹל כַּנְפֵי הַכְּרוּבִים נִשְׁמַע עַד־הֶחָצֵר הַחִיצֹנָה כְּקוֹל אֵל־שַׁדַּי בְּדַבְּרוֹ׃	The sound of the wings of the cherubim was heard as far as the outer court, like the voice of God Almighty when he speaks. (Ezek. 10.5)
46	אַחֲרָיו יִשְׁאַג־קוֹל יַרְעֵם בְּקוֹל גְּאוֹנוֹ וְלֹא יְעַקְּבֵם כִּי־יִשָּׁמַע קוֹלוֹ׃	After it his voice roars; he thunders with his majestic voice and he does not restrain the lightnings when his voice is heard. (Job 37.4)
47	אֵין־אֹמֶר וְאֵין דְּבָרִים בְּלִי נִשְׁמָע קוֹלָם׃	There is no speech, nor are there words; their voice is not heard; (Ps. 19.4 [NRSV 19.3])

5.5.1.3. Hiphil

In contrast to constructions with the Niphal, with occurrences of the Hiphil the communicating agents are explicitly mentioned. Depending on the conjugation used, the use of the Hiphil can entail letting oneself be heard #48, commanding verbal silence #49, and even yearning for something to be heard #50.

48	וְהִשְׁמִיעַ יְהוָה אֶת־הוֹד קוֹלוֹ וְנַחַת זְרוֹעוֹ יַרְאֶה בְּזַעַף אַף וְלַהַב אֵשׁ אוֹכֵלָה נֶפֶץ וְזֶרֶם וְאֶבֶן בָּרָד׃	And the LORD will cause his majestic voice to be heard and the descending blow of his arm to be seen, in furious anger and a flame of devouring fire, with a cloudburst and tempest and hailstones. (Is. 30.30)

[66] This text can be compared with the more poetically phrased **Job** 29.10.

49	וְאֶת־הָעָם֙ צִוָּ֣ה יְהוֹשֻׁ֔עַ לֵאמֹ֖ר לֹ֣א תָרִ֑יעוּ וְלֹֽא־תַשְׁמִ֤יעוּ אֶת־קוֹלְכֶם֙ וְלֹא־יֵצֵ֣א מִפִּיכֶ֔ם דָּבָ֖ר עַ֣ד ׀ י֣וֹם אָמְרִ֣י אֲלֵיכֶ֗ם הָרִ֙יעוּ֙ וַהֲרִיעֻתֶֽם׃	To the people Joshua gave this command: “You shall not shout or let your voice be heard, nor shall you utter a word, until the day I tell you to shout. Then you shall shout.” (Josh. 6.10)
50	יוֹנָתִ֞י בְּחַגְוֵ֣י הַסֶּ֗לַע בְּסֵ֙תֶר֙ הַמַּדְרֵגָ֔ה הַרְאִינִי֙ אֶת־מַרְאַ֣יִךְ הַשְׁמִיעֵ֔נִי אֶת־קוֹלֵ֖ךְ כִּי־קוֹלֵ֣ךְ עָרֵ֑ב וּמַרְאֵ֖יךְ נָאוֶ֥ה׃ ס	O my dove, in the clefts of the rock, in the covert of the cliff, let me see your face, let me hear your voice; for your voice is sweet, and your face is lovely. (Song. 2.14)

As such, the Hiphil denotes a desire to be heard or the intent to be heard, whereas the Niphal often occurs where audibility is not explicitly intentional or merely exists as the by-product of an action. Compare the similar contexts of #46 and #48: The former merely notes that the voice of Yahweh is heard whereas the latter emphasises the agency Yahweh displays in making his voice heard. As such, the use of conjugation often says something about the context in which the action of *šm'* takes place or the experience of they who are doing the hearing.

5.5.2. To hear with *l*^{e}

Varying syntactically from Section 5.4.1 by the presence of the preposition *l*^{e} before each occurrence of *qōl*, this second sense, firstly, exhibits an ambiguous semantic potential and, secondly, has few occurrences in comparison to the senses in Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.3. There are only 16 examples[67], all in the Qal stem formation and present in every conjugation except for the infinitive construct (Ex. 15.26 presenting both the yiqtol and infinitive absolute).

The preposition *l*^{e} conveys an unspecialised and vague relationship with the object that is heard (Joüon and Muroaka, 1993:488; Van der Merwe, Naudé and Kroeze,

[67] **Gen.** 3.17, 16.2; **Ex.** 3.18, 4.8, 4.9, 15.26, 18.24; **Judg.** 2.20; **1 Sam.** 2.25, 15.1, 28.23; **1 Kgs.** 20.25; **2 Kgs.** 10.6; **Ps.** 58.6, 81.12; **Jer.** 18.19.

2017:348). In each scenario, the object to be heard (and, therefore, the content of *qōl*) is a contextually bounded request, such as in both #51 and #52; speech in the most general sense, as in #53; and the voice as something that charms or leads astray, as in #54.

51	וּלְאָדָם אָמַר כִּי־שָׁמַעְתָּ֙ לְקֹ֣ול אִשְׁתֶּ֔ךָ וַתֹּ֣אכַל מִן־הָעֵ֔ץ אֲשֶׁ֥ר צִוִּיתִ֖יךָ לֵאמֹ֣ר לֹ֣א תֹאכַ֑ל מִמֶּ֥נּוּ	And to the man he said, "Because you have listened to the voice of your wife, and have eaten of the tree about which I commanded you, 'You shall not eat of it,' (Gen. 3.17)
52	וַיִּשְׁמַ֥ע לְקֹלָ֖ם וַיַּ֣עַשׂ כֵּ֑ן׃ פ	He heeded their voice, and did so. (1 Kgs. 20.25)
53	הַקְשִׁ֣יבָה יְהוָ֔ה אֵלַ֖י וּשְׁמַ֥ע לְקֹ֖ול יְרִיבָֽי׃	Give heed to me, O LORD, and listen to what my adversaries say! (Jer. 18.19)
54	אֲשֶׁ֤ר לֹא־יִשְׁמַע֙ לְקֹ֣ול מְלַחֲשִׁ֔ים חוֹבֵ֖ר חֲבָרִ֑ים מְחֻכָּֽם׃	so that it does not hear the voice of charmers or of the cunning enchanter. (Ps. 58.6 [NRSV 58.5])

Yet, there are several texts where the use of *l*^{e}*qōl* implies obedience in a similar vein to the syntactic frames involving *b*^{e} explored in Section 5.5.3. Taking the broader textual context into account, it is done in reference to a specific request. In #55 and #56 below, there is a clear referential link between the act of obedience and a specific command. Example #55 recalls v.2 of the same chapter where the command is to make no covenant with the Canaanites. In a similar fashion, #56 calls for obedience to the statute in v.10 to worship no foreign gods. The psalm states that it is a specific statute (the use of the singular *ḥōq* in v.5) and furthermore contextualises the statute within a narrative (v.6).

55	וַיֹּ֣אמֶר יַעַן֮ אֲשֶׁ֣ר עָבְרוּ֒ הַגֹּוי הַזֶּ֗ה אֶת־בְּרִיתִי֙ אֲשֶׁ֣ר צִוִּ֣יתִי אֶת־אֲבוֹתָ֔ם וְלֹ֥א שָׁמְע֖וּ לְקֹולִֽי׃	"Because this people have transgressed my covenant that I commanded their ancestors, and

have not obeyed my voice, (Judg. 2.20)

56 וְלֹא־שָׁמַע עַמִּי לְקוֹלִי וְיִשְׂרָאֵל לֹא־אָבָה לִי׃ "But my people did not listen to my voice; Israel would not submit to me. (Ps. 81.12 [NRSV 81.11])

However, there is an exception: Ex. 15.26. Here, in #57, one would expect *b*^{e}*qōl* because of the generality of what it to be obeyed and the regular occurrence of such language connecting *b*^{e} with religious obedience to "the law of Moses". Yet, the speaker uses *l*^{e}*qōl* expecting obedience *to all commandments and statutes* in a tone representative of the covenantal core of the book of Exodus.

57 וַיֹּאמֶר אִם־שָׁמוֹעַ תִּשְׁמַע לְקוֹל יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ וְהַיָּשָׁר בְּעֵינָיו תַּעֲשֶׂה וְהַאֲזַנְתָּ לְמִצְוֹתָיו וְשָׁמַרְתָּ כָּל־חֻקָּיו כָּל־הַמַּחֲלָה אֲשֶׁר־שַׂמְתִּי בְמִצְרַיִם לֹא־אָשִׂים עָלֶיךָ כִּי אֲנִי יְהוָה רֹפְאֶךָ׃ ס He said, "If you will listen carefully to the voice of the LORD your God, and do what is right in his sight, and give heed to his commandments and keep all his statutes, I will not bring upon you any of the diseases that I brought upon the Egyptians; for I am the LORD who heals you." (Ex. 15.26)

Nevertheless, the *Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia* does note a variant reading in a Cairo Geniza fragment with *b*^{e}*qōl*. There is not enough evidence to clarify this exception, but *l*^{e}*qōl* clearly functions identical to *b*^{e}*qōl* in this verse. Given the irregularity of this occurrence and the variant reading, hypothetically this could be merely a scribal error, but this is an unsatisfying conclusion.

5.5.3. To hear with *b^{e}*

There are 99[68] occurrences of the syntactical construction *šm' b^{e}qōl*, the preposition consistently linked to an obedience frame[69]. The prototypical use features a direct compulsion towards obedience where the speaker communicates with a socially inferior person (four times an infinitive absolute of *šm'* intensifies the call for obedience within the context of direct adherence to the will of Yahweh). With 19 examples the speaker *is* a stereotypical social inferior, but as we shall see there are possible constraints within each example motivating the disregard of social mores.

Obedience to the higher law given by Yahweh through Moses, prototypical of the Deuteronomist and the prophetic message of Jeremiah, can be seen in #58 and #59 below. There is a clear correlation between use of *b^{e}qōl* and the Deuteronomist, or covenantal, frame.

58	בַּצַּר לְךָ֔ וּמְצָא֣וּךָ כֹּ֔ל הַדְּבָרִ֖ים הָאֵ֑לֶּה בְּאַחֲרִ֣ית הַיָּמִ֗ים וְשַׁבְתָּ֙ עַד־יְהוָ֣ה אֱלֹהֶ֔יךָ וְשָׁמַעְתָּ֖ בְּקֹלֽוֹ׃	In your distress, when all these things have happened to you in time to come, you will return to the LORD your God and heed him. (Deut. 4.30)
59	דִּבַּ֥רְתִּי אֵלַ֖יִךְ בְּשַׁלְוֹתַ֑יִךְ אָמַ֕רְתְּ לֹ֥א אֶשְׁמָ֖ע זֶ֣ה דַרְכֵּ֔ךְ מִנְּעוּרַ֖יִךְ כִּ֥י לֹא־שָׁמַ֖עַתְּ בְּקוֹלִֽי׃	I spoke to you in your prosperity, but you said, "I will not listen." This has been your way from your youth, for

[68] **Gen.** 21.12, 22.18, 26.5, 27.8, 27.13, 27.43, 30.6; **Ex.** 4.1, 5.2, 18.19, 19.5, 23.21, 23.22; **Num.** 14.22, 21.3; **Deut.** 1.45, 4.30, 8.20, 9.23, 13.5, 13.19, 15.5, 21.18 [x2], 21.20, 26.14, 26.17, 27.10, 28.1, 28.2, 28.15, 28.45, 28.62, 30.2, 30.8, 30.10, 30.20; **Josh.** 5.6, 10.14, 22.2, 24.24; **Judg.** 2.2, 6.10, 13.9, 20.13; **1 Sam.** 8.7, 8.9, 8.19, 8.22, 12.1, 12.14, 12.15, 15.19, 15.20, 15.22, 15.24, 19.6, 25.35, 28.18, 28.21, 28.22; **2 Sam.** 12.18, 13.14; **1 Kgs.** 17.22, 20.36; **2 Kgs.** 18.12; **Is.** 50.10; **Jer.** 3.13, 3.25, 7.23, 7.28, 9.12, 11.4, 11.7, 18.10, 22.21, 26.13, 32.23, 35.8, 38.20, 40.3, 42.6a, 42.6b, 42.13, 42.21, 43.4, 43.7, 44.23; **Zeph.** 3.2; **Hag.** 1.12; **Zech.** 6.15; **Ps.** 95.7, 103.20, 106.25, 130.2; **Prov.** 5.13; **Dan.** 9.10, 9.11, 9.14.

[69] Running contrary to the syntactic frame of *b^{e}qōl*, 2 Samuel 19.36 uses the preposition in its more general sense to imply contact with an object of perception (Van der Merwe, Naudé, and Kroeze, 2017:338-339). This is thus not an example of the *šm' b^{e}qōl* obedience frame.

you have not obeyed my voice. (Jer. 22.21)

We can find a similarity to the covenantal language of obedience in more socially mundane contexts: parental authority in #60 and wisdom traditions as in #61.

60	וְעַתָּה בְנִי שְׁמַע בְּקֹלִי לַאֲשֶׁר אֲנִי מְצַוֶּה אֹתָךְ׃	Now therefore, my son, obey my word as I command you. (Gen. 27.8)
61	וְלֹא־שָׁמַעְתִּי בְּקוֹל מוֹרַי וְלַמְלַמְּדַי לֹא־הִטֵּיתִי אָזְנִי׃	I did not listen to the voice of my teachers or incline my ear to my instructors. (Prov. 5.13)

With the obedience frame, *qōl* contains the instruction or wisdom conveyed. One could, therefore, translate Proverbs 5.13 as, "I did not listen to my teachers; I turned my ear away from my instructors". The NRSV can be said to over-translate here, as I argue that keeping "the sound of" or "the voice of" for the vast majority of instances is unnecessary. Doing so translates literally what, as a fixed communicative clue, is arguably a dead metaphor.

In contrast to the occurrences dealt with above where obedience is the clear conceptualisation, 19 variants[70] feature the same syntactical frame elements but in an atypical fashion where social hierarchy is disregarded. Nevertheless, in each text we can pinpoint certain factors to explain the use of the linguistic expression.

Firstly, from #62, we can presume that *b^{e}qōl* does not imply subservience to the speaker based on the syntactical construction alone. Important for the interpretation of #62 is the belief that never before has divine authority bent to the will of a human being.

[70] **Gen.** 21.12, 30.6; **Ex.** 4.1; **Num.** 21.3; **Deut.** 1.45; **Josh.** 10.14; **Judg.** 13.9; **1 Sam.** 8.7, 8.9, 8.22, 12.1, 15.24, 19.6, 25.35 28.22; **2 Sam.** 12.18, 13.14; **1 Kgs.** 17.22; **Ps.** 130.2.

62 וְלֹא הָיָה כַּיּוֹם הַהוּא לְפָנָיו וְאַחֲרָיו לִשְׁמֹעַ יְהוָה בְּקוֹל אִישׁ כִּי יְהוָה נִלְחָם לְיִשְׂרָאֵל: פ

There has been no day like it before or since, when the LORD heeded a human voice; for the LORD fought for Israel. (Josh. 10.14)

The uniqueness of this event, and its upending of natural order, is further emphasised by the imperative *dwm* (be still) in Josh. 10.12, which gives the speaker authority. However, Dozeman (2015:433) states that "this authority is not unique to Joshua". He goes on to list as evidence Num. 21.3 and 1 Kgs. 17.22. While both make use of the *šm' b^{e}qōl* syntactical frame, the context clarifies the difference: Whereas Josh. 10.12 conveys a set of commands, Num. 21.3 features Yahweh answering a plea for help made by the Israelites founded on a vow that further cements the rule of Yahweh. Similarly, 1 Kgs. 17.22 has Elijah pray for assistance while maintaining a submissive tone through the use of *nāh* and the jussive.

Secondly, as with #62 but to a noticeably lesser degree, *šm' b^{e}qōl* can be used where the command either represents or coincides with the will of some higher authority regardless of the explicitly stated speaker[71]. Below, #63 and #64 represent an indirect realisation of the typical social hierarchy. In Genesis 21.12, Abraham listens to his wife because Yahweh has commanded him to do so. As such, Abraham listening to his wife does not upend the social hierarchy but upholds it.

63 וַיֹּאמֶר אֱלֹהִים אֶל־אַבְרָהָם אַל־יֵרַע בְּעֵינֶיךָ עַל־הַנַּעַר וְעַל־אֲמָתֶךָ כֹּל אֲשֶׁר תֹּאמַר אֵלֶיךָ שָׂרָה שְׁמַע בְּקֹלָהּ כִּי בְיִצְחָק יִקָּרֵא לְךָ זָרַע:

But God said to Abraham, "Do not be distressed because of the boy and because of your slave woman; whatever Sarah says to you, do as she tells you, for it is through Isaac that offspring shall be named for you. (Gen. 21.12)

In #64, Saul is considered disobedient for the manner in which he disregards the social hierarchy: the will of his subjects is valued more than the will of Yahweh.

[71] **Ex.** 4.1; **Num.** 21.3; **Judg.** 13.9; **1 Sam.** 8.7, 8.9, 8.22, 12.1, 15.24.

64	וַיֹּ֤אמֶר שָׁאוּל֙ אֶל־שְׁמוּאֵ֔ל חָטָ֕אתִי כִּֽי־ עָבַ֖רְתִּי אֶת־פִּי־יְהוָ֑ה וְאֶת־דְּבָרֶ֣יךָ כִּֽי יָרֵ֔אתִי אֶת־הָעָ֖ם וָאֶשְׁמַ֥ע בְּקוֹלָֽם׃	Saul said to Samuel, "I have sinned; for I have transgressed the commandment of the LORD and your words, because I feared the people and obeyed their voice. (1 Sam. 15.24)

Lastly, some occurrences of this frame feature a stereotypical figure of authority heeding the voice of a lesser[72]. It is possible to see some contextual rationale for each occurrence. The reversed hierarchy of listening in both #65 and #66 is countered by the use of pragmatic markers for politeness: In #65, Saul's servant clearly states her status as a servant and employs the particle *n'* for polite requests, and in #66 Yahweh responds to the repeated requests of Elijah which employ the jussive to align Elijah's request with the will of Yahweh.

65	וְעַתָּ֞ה שְׁמַע־נָ֣א גַם־אַתְּ֗ה בְּקוֹל֙ שִׁפְחָתֶ֔ךָ וְאָשִׂ֥ימָה לְפָנֶ֖יךָ פַּת־לֶ֑חֶם וְאֻכֹ֣ל וִיהִ֤י בְךָ֙ כֹּ֔חַ כִּ֥י תֵלֵ֖ךְ בַּדָּרֶ֥ךְ׃	Now therefore, you also listen to your servant; let me set a morsel of bread before you. Eat, that you may have strength when you go on your way." (1 Sam. 28.22)
66	וַיִּשְׁמַ֤ע יְהוָה֙ בְּקוֹל֙ אֵלִיָּ֔הוּ וַתָּ֥שָׁב נֶֽפֶשׁ־הַיֶּ֖לֶד עַל־קִרְבּ֑וֹ וַיֶּֽחִי׃	The LORD listened to the voice of Elijah; the life of the child came into him again, and he revived. (1 Kgs. 17.22)

In #67, Yahweh ignores the general pleading and weeping of the Israelites. The use of *b^{e}qol* for the act of listening in general (in contrast to *l^{e}*) is emphasised through the parallel equivalent of Yahweh not giving their weeping his ear.

[72] See also **Gen.** 30.6; **1 Sam.** 19.6, 25.35; **2 Sam.** 12.18, 13.14.

67 וַתָּשֻׁבוּ וַתִּבְכּוּ לִפְנֵי יְהוָה וְלֹא־שָׁמַע יְהוָה בְּקֹלְכֶם וְלֹא הֶאֱזִין אֲלֵיכֶם׃

When you returned and wept before the LORD, the LORD would neither heed your voice nor pay you any attention. (Deut. 1.45)

5.6. Thunder and speech

One of the most striking attributes of the lexeme *qōl* is the wide range of senses that are attributed to it that are expressed through individual lexemes (i.e. lexicalized) in many other languages. The same lexeme is used to describe a variety of acoustic phenomena within the biblical corpus. The only exception is the uncommon feminine plural form, *qōlōt*, with a total of 11 occurrences. This form is used exclusively for the sound of, or voices manifesting as, thunder. In addition to this specialised form, divine beings possess their own individuated *qōl* similar to human beings. The Hebrew Bible is replete with anthropomorphic imaginings of gods, and like humans they are pictured as talking, instructing, and desiring obedience. However, there are certain qualities of divine speech and its relation to the phenomenon of thunder that require special attention.

In our corpus, Yahweh and Ba'al are the only specific gods given *qōl* (in the case of the latter, it might be more true to say Ba'al *fails* to communicate, but this is in obvious recognition of the ideological leanings of the Hebrew Bible). We shall begin with an overview of the majority regular uses of *qōl* referencing divine speech before addressing 34 uncommon occurrences of frames where *qōl* or *qōlōt* are used in various conceptual blends.

5.6.1. The voices of divine beings

In 81 occurrences, the *qōl* of a divine being is the object of the verb *šm'* and follows the same interpretative cues as those discussed in Section 5.4. Both #68 and #69 reference speech without any implication of obedience, or any other condition placed upon the hearer. In #69 has Eliphaz heard the speech of a "spirit" (Job 4.15), one of the few cases where a supernatural or divine being besides Yahweh is heard speaking (another example would be Is. 6.4, which mentions the speech of the seraphim).

68	וְעַתָּה לָמָּה נָמוּת כִּי תֹאכְלֵנוּ הָאֵשׁ הַגְּדֹלָה הַזֹּאת אִם־יֹסְפִים	אֲנַחְנוּ לִשְׁמֹעַ אֶת־קוֹל יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ עוֹד וָמָתְנוּ:	So now why should we die? For this great fire will consume us; if we hear the voice of the LORD our God any longer, we shall die. (Deut. 5.25)
69	יַעֲמֹד	וְלֹא־אַכִּיר מַרְאֵהוּ תְּמוּנָה לְנֶגֶד עֵינָי דְּמָמָה וָקוֹל אֶשְׁמָע:	It stood still, but I could not discern its appearance. A form was before my eyes; there was silence, then I heard a voice: (Job 4.16)

Lastly, #70 illustrates the common *šm' b^{e}qōl* (62 occurrences) variant, where obedience is absolute. This syntactic frame is primarily used hierarchically (such as with a parental figure), but the majority of cases are context-bound to Yahweh. It might be that the religious or ritual form of obedience is merely of greater prominence due to the nature of the Hebrew Bible. Regardless, there is a special relationship between this syntactic frame and the commands given by Yahweh.

Apart from those instances where obedience is connected to the divine *qōl* alone, common collocations of obedience include commandments (*mitzvah*)[73], statutes (*hōq*)[74], and the law (t*ōrah*) or more specifically "this book of the law"[75]. Several collocations that hold the same conceptual value occur only once or twice: judgments (*mišpāt*) in Deuteronomy 26.17, covenant (*b^{e}rit*) in Exodus 19.5 and 2 Kings 18.12, testimony (*'dt*) in Jeremiah 44.23, "the words of the prophet Haggai" in Haggai 1.12, and "the sound of his spoken word" in Psalm 103.20.

70	וְכָל־יִשְׂרָאֵל עָבְרוּ אֶת־תּוֹרָתְךָ וְסוֹר לְבִלְתִּי שְׁמֹעַ בְּקֹלֶךָ וַתִּתַּךְ עָלֵינוּ הָאָלָה וְהַשְּׁבֻעָה	"All Israel has transgressed your law and turned aside, refusing to obey your voice. So the curse and the oath written in the law of Moses, the servant of God, have been poured

[73] **Gen.** 26.5; **Deut.** 13.5, 13.19, 15.5, 26.17, 27.10, 28.1, 28.15, 28.45, 30.8, 30.10.

[74] **Gen.** 26.5; **Deut.** 26.17, 27.10, 28.15, 28.45, 30.10; **Jer.** 44.23.

[75] **Gen.** 26.5; **Deut.** 30.10; **Jer.** 9.12, 32.23, 44.23; **Dan.** 9.10, 9.11.

אֲשֶׁר הִפִּיצוּ בָּנוּ כִּי חָטָאנוּ לוֹ׃

out upon us, because we have sinned against you. (Dan. 9.11)

Additionally, 19 occurrences make general reference to the *qōl* of divine figures. In 1 Kings 18, Ba'al is differentiated from Yahweh precisely because, upon praying fervently, the priests of Ba'al receive no answer; they are met with *ein-qōl* – no answer. With astute rhetoric, both 18.26 and 18.29 make use of the phrase *ein-qōl* to suggest by way of metonymic inference that no one is present: Ba'al is mute, powerless, or even non-existent.

71 וַיְהִי כַּעֲבֹר הַצָּהֳרַיִם וַיִּתְנַבְּאוּ עַד לַעֲלוֹת הַמִּנְחָה וְאֵין־קוֹל וְאֵין־עֹנֶה וְאֵין קָשֶׁב׃

As midday passed, they raved on until the time of the offering of the oblation, but there was no voice, no answer, and no response. (1 Kgs. 18.29)

Apart from speech, the divine *qōl* is to a large extent treated with the same capabilities or characteristics as a human voice, as shown in #72 and discussed in Section 5.3.

72 אֶת־הַדְּבָרִים הָאֵלֶּה דִּבֶּר יְהוָה אֶל־כָּל־קְהַלְכֶם בָּהָר מִתּוֹךְ הָאֵשׁ הֶעָנָן וְהָעֲרָפֶל קוֹל גָּדוֹל וְלֹא יָסָף

These words the LORD spoke with a loud voice to your whole assembly at the mountain, out of the fire, the cloud, and the thick darkness and he added no more. (Deut. 5.22)

Importantly, the *qōl* of Yahweh is of significant revelatory weight. It is a singular presence as in #73 where Elijah hears the divine voice out of the faintest remnant of sound, #74 where the voice comes forth from the temple, and #75 where a voice speaks from heaven, itself prefiguring the concept of the "daughter of the voice" (Kedar-Kopfstein, 2003:587). Jewish tradition holds that the full manifestation of God's voice

occurred during the giving of the Torah[76] (Schwartz, 2004:31). Late texts such as Daniel 4.28 express only indirect interaction with the divine (Rothkoff, 2007:213).

73	וַיְהִי֙ כִּשְׁמֹ֣עַ אֵלִיָּ֔הוּ וַיָּ֥לֶט פָּנָ֖יו בְּאַדַּרְתּ֑וֹ וַיֵּצֵ֗א וַיַּעֲמֹ֙ד פֶּ֣תַח הַמְּעָרָ֔ה וְהִנֵּ֥ה אֵלָ֖יו קֹ֑ול וַיֹּ֥אמֶר מַה־לְּךָ֖ פֹּ֥ה אֵלִיָּֽהוּ׃	When Elijah heard it, he wrapped his face in his mantle and went out and stood at the entrance of the cave. Then there came a voice to him that said, "What are you doing here, Elijah?" (1 Kgs. 19.13)
74	קֹ֚ול שָׁאֹ֣ון מֵעִ֔יר קֹ֖ול מֵהֵיכָ֑ל קֹ֣ול יְהוָ֔ה מְשַׁלֵּ֥ם גְּמ֖וּל לְאֹיְבָֽיו׃	Listen, an uproar from the city! A voice from the temple! The voice of the LORD, dealing retribution to his enemies! (Is. 66.6)
75	עֹ֣ודֶ מִלְּתָ֗א בְּפֻם֙ מַלְכָּ֣א קָ֔ל מִן־שְׁמַיָּ֖א נְפֵ֣ל לָ֑ךְ אֱמְרִ֣ין נְבוּכַדְנֶצַּ֗ר מַלְכָּ֤א מַלְכוּתָה֙ עֲדָ֣ת מְנָ֔ךְ׃	While the words were still in the king's mouth, a voice came from heaven: "O King Nebuchadnezzar, to you it is declared: The kingdom has departed from you! (Dan. 4.28 [NRSV 4.31])

5.6.2. *The qōl* and *qōlōt* of Yahweh

Biblical conceptualisations of the divine *qōl* cannot be clearly divided between images of the thundering storm theophany, on the one hand, and clearly audible speech, on the other. There is too much conflation. For example, in #70 Yahweh is visually imagined as appearing in and through a storm (Beuken, 2001:182). Using the Hiphil, Yahweh is the agent of his auditory manifestation: he causes his voice to resound in storm and flame while he takes the striking pose reminiscent of Ba'al.

[76] For example, **Deut.** 4.12 and 5.22.

76 וְהִשְׁמִ֣יעַ יְהוָ֔ה אֶת־הֹ֖וד קוֹלֹ֑ו וְנַ֤חַת זְרוֹעֹו֙
יַרְאָ֔ה בְּזַ֥עַף אַ֖ף וְלַהַ֣ב אֵ֣שׁ אוֹכֵלָ֑ה נֶ֥פֶץ
וְזֶ֖רֶם וְאֶ֥בֶן בָּרָֽד׃

And the LORD will cause his majestic voice to be heard and the descending blow of his arm to be seen, in furious anger and a flame of devouring fire, with a cloudburst and tempest and hailstones. (Is. 30.30)

Similarly, we can also consider the entirety of Psalm 29 – which Green (2003:262) calls "an adaptation of a Canaanite hymn" – as an excursus on the nature of Yahweh's *qōl*. In seven rapid expressions, the reader is presented with Yahweh the storm god, indistinct to some degree from Canaanite and Ugaritic conceptualisations of Ba'al (Green, 2003:262). The psalm is archaic, dated to the 12th century BCE. There is, furthermore, a structural parallel in the text between the seven manifestations of Yahweh's *qōl* and the seven thunders and lightning of Ba'al, as well as more broadly the seven winds of Iškur and Marduk (Green, 2003:261-263).

Yet, none of this presumes the two gods are merely interchangeable. In v.8, there is made a clear invocation of the Sinai theophany, while v.11, quoting John Day, "is more Yahwistic than Baalistic" (Brueggemann and Bellinger, 2014:147). In v.3 there is mentioned victory over chaos in the form of Yam but most probably read in terms of the Egyptian exodus, while in v.7 the gleam of lightning is his weapon, which is indebted to the common striking pose of storm gods (Green, 2003:265, 271-272). As such, the psalm contains an intermingling of traditions, a Yahwistic revision, that makes it truly unique. We can, thus, conclude that conceptually the use and description of Yahweh's *qōl* in Psalm 29 clearly references his rule as a storm god but within the mythopoeic narrative of the Torah.

The above exploration of Is. 30.30 and Ps.29 introduces our exploration of the use of the divine *qōl* and the specific form *qōlōt* in the Biblical Hebrew corpus. First, we look at the more uncommon *qōlōt*. In eight texts[77], the form *qōlōt* is used in what can be called a relatively naturalistic description of thunder and storm imagery (in the sense that there is no explicit mention of *qōlōt* as a product of Yahweh such as with his voice).

[77] **Ex.** 9.28, 9.29, 9.33, 9.34, 19.16, 20.18; **Job** 28.26, 38.25.

In the book of Exodus, where the majority of cases are to be found, each follows a similar pattern, *qōlōt* collocating with some combination of *brd* (hail), *mtr* (rain), *lppd* (torch; lightning), or *brk* (lightning) that makes clear the naturalistic or environmental context within which *qōlōt* is used. The cases of Exodus can be understood by looking at #77 for this standard formula. The surrounding description of naturalistic elements suggests that thunder (*qōlōt*) belongs to the "created" world and, thus, cannot be said to exist solely as a direct expression of the divine voice. Such an interpretation relies too much on demythologisation and naturalism.

77	וַיַּרְא פַּרְעֹה כִּי־חָדַל הַמָּטָר וְהַבָּרָד וְהַקֹּלֹת וַיֹּסֶף לַחֲטֹא וַיַּכְבֵּד לִבּוֹ הוּא וַעֲבָדָיו׃	But when Pharaoh saw that the rain and the hail and the thunder had ceased, he sinned once more and hardened his heart, he and his officials. (Ex. 9.34)

However, a phrase can be found in the book of Job with an unusual collocation. In #78and Job 38.25, you find the only two occurrences of *ḥzz* (thunderbolt) apart from one other occurrence in Zechariah. The Aramaic cognate can be found in the Aramaic Targum to Song. 2:16 alluding to the Exodus narrative, where Yahweh is said to have "rode on a swift thunder-cloud" – an image that can be found repeatedly as a major point of similarity between Yahweh and Ba'al (Sefaria, n.d.)

78	בַּעֲשֹׂתוֹ לַמָּטָר חֹק וְדֶרֶךְ לַחֲזִיז קֹלוֹת׃	when he made a decree for the rain, and a way for the thunderbolt (Job 28.26)

The line between *qōlōt* as thunder and *qōl* as voice does blur in #79, even if there is some consensus among English translations regarding the use of *b^{e}qōl* here implying and not "with a voice" and not "in/with thunder". The tendency to translate here with "thunder" is driven by the broader context of the storm theophany in Exodus 19.

79	וַיְהִי קוֹל הַשֹּׁופָר הוֹלֵךְ* וְחָזֵק מְאֹד מֹשֶׁה יְדַבֵּר וְהָאֱלֹהִים יַעֲנֶנּוּ בְקוֹל׃	As the blast of the trumpet grew louder and louder, Moses would

speak and God would answer
him in thunder. (Ex. 19.19)

Example #79 states that Yahweh answers Moses *b^{e}qōl*, the phrase occurring independently. This could be understood as Yahweh answering Moses "in/with a voice". The verse should also, however, be read within the broader context of the storm theophany of Exodus 19. Furthermore, most modern translations opt for thunder, except notably for the NIV, which notes the variant reading in a footnote. Targum Pseudo-Jonathan offers the text as "with a gracious and majestic voice, and with pleasant and gracious words" (Etheridge, 1862). Regardless, the NJPS 1985 translation has "God answered him in thunder."

Oswald (2014:188-189) describes the verse as a post-priestly insertion, translating with "God would answer him in a voice". Oswald (2014:188) reasons that "Different from the basic narrative and from the deuteronomistic composition, God does not address the people; rather, he speaks to Moses as in the priestly composition […] Crucial are the distinctive positions of 19:9a [where Yahweh explicitly states that the people are to hear him *speak*] and 19:19b in the course of the narrative and their iterative force that may lead the reader to interpret the whole scene in the way these late authors wanted it to be read". Meyers (2005:155), however, provides a nuanced summary of the cultural and textual traditions that could be used to support a reading of *b^{e}qōl* as "in/with thunder": "But most important is the fact that the intense noise and movement, along with visual extremes of lightning and dark clouds and smoke, are stereotypical features of theophany in ancient Semitic poetry, especially Ugaritic texts depicting storms or the convulsing of nature as a signal of divine presence."

Upon further examination, seemingly naturalistic language of thunder, however, only complements a more complex conceptualisation of thunder where Yahweh's agency is either that of a specialised storm god or an aspect of his role as creator and preserver of the natural world. In three occurrences[78], Yahweh is directly responsible for the giving (*ntn*) of thunder and – as a vital collocation – rain. As in #80, *ntn* is the most common verb to describe Yahweh's providence in this regard.

[78] **Ex.** 9.23; **1 Sam.** 12.17, 12.18.

80	וַיִּקְרָ֣א שְׁמוּאֵל֮ אֶל־יְהוָה֒ וַיִּתֵּ֨ן יְהוָ֜ה קֹלֹ֤ת וּמָטָר֙ בַּיּ֣וֹם הַה֔וּא וַיִּירָ֣א כָל־הָעָ֔ם מְאֹ֖ד אֶת־יְהוָ֑ה וְאֶת־שְׁמוּאֵֽל׃	So Samuel called upon the LORD, and the LORD sent thunder and rain that day; and all the people greatly feared the LORD and Samuel. (1 Sam. 12.18)

The text does not explicitly conflate his *voice* with thunder. The three occurrences of *qōlōt* in the *ntn* frame bridge the divide between the preceding use of *qōlōt* and a movement to using *qōl* regardless of the naturalistic interpretation of "thunder" or the theophanic interpretation of "voice". Indeed, going forward, the question becomes, is there a line that separates these phenomena in the conceptual worldview of native speakers of Biblical Hebrew?

5.6.2.1. Yahweh as storm god

Even with the availability of *qōlōt* to specify thunder, 12 other occurrences of the *ntn* frame[79] instead take *qōl* as the direct object, which can be seen as a conceptual blend of Yahweh's voice and thunder. The language is innately poetic, but we should not resist the idea that it represents a consistent and affective worldview. In this sense, even 1 Sam.12.18 may have been received by its intended audience as acknowledging Yahweh's role as a storm god.

These 12 texts cover complex and multifaceted conceptualisations of the divine: Some texts convey a strong conceptual relationship between *qōl* and thunder[80] by invoking language similarly used of Ba'al, and yet others supplant the basic conceptualisation of the storm god, and view Yahweh as creator and king[81].

As in #81, Yahweh gives forth (*ntn*) his *qōl* in a manner reminiscent of Ba'al. This act is situated within a martial context, and in Ps. 18.15, he sends forth his "arrows" – a poetic description of lightning, as well as a common collocation of the storm theophany,

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[79] **2 Sam.** 22.14; **Jer.** 10.13, 25.30, 51.16; **Joel** 2.11, 4.16; **Amos** 1.2; **Ps.** 18.14, 46.7, 68.34 [x2], 77.18

[80] **2 Sam.** 22.14, **Joel** 2.11, **Ps.** 18.14, 68.34 [x2], 77.18

[81] **Jer.** 10.13; 51.16; **Ps.** 46.7

such as in 2 Sam. 22.14.[82] Throughout the Ras Shamra texts Ba'al is given the epithet "the Rider of the Clouds" – a second indication of Yahweh's nature as a storm god, considering Ps. 68.34 and 77.18 (Green, 2003:195). As such, we have a clear indication that Yahweh is pictured similarly to Ba'al.

81	וַיַּרְעֵם בַּשָּׁמַיִם	יְהוָה וְעֶלְיוֹן יִתֵּן קֹלוֹ בָּרָד וְגַחֲלֵי־אֵשׁ:	The LORD also thundered in the heavens, and the Most High uttered his voice. (Ps. 18.14 [NRSV 18.13])[83]

Yet, as in #82, the *ntn* frame sometimes moves beyond the basic storm god conceptual image by imaging Yahweh as the cosmic creator and ruler. The *giving* of the voice in #82 causes catastrophic upheaval and overturns the world's nations, resulting in their subservience before Yahweh as the rightful king.

82	הָמְּוּ גוֹיִם מָטוּ מַמְלָכוֹת נָתַן בְּקוֹלוֹ תָּמוֹג אֶרֶץ:	The nations are in an uproar, the kingdoms totter; he utters his voice, the earth melts. (Ps. 46.7 [NRSV 46.6])[84]

In #83, there is still a prototypical storm god conceptualisation (repeated in 51.16), but it also melds into Yahweh as sole creator – all other gods are idols, dead, and without breath (10.10–16).

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[82] An ambiguous Ugaritic text potentially identifies Ba'al as the "Lord of the arrow", but this is an unlikely reading and the archer image is more prototypical of Rešef, Canaanite god of pestilence (Del Olmo Lete and Sanmartin, 2015:206, 378).

[83] The NRSV chooses not to translate the final part of **Ps**. 18.14 (unlike, for example, the CEB and ESV), but in a footnote adds that the Hebrew reads "hailstones and coals of fire".

[84] One uncommon frame element of #82, and again in Ps. 68:34, is the preposition *b*^{e} preceding *qōl*. One plausible interpretation is that this is an irregular use of the instrumental *beth* (i.e. "he gives forth with his voice").

83	לְקוֹל תִּתּוֹ הֲמוֹן מַיִם בַּשָּׁמָיִם	When he utters his voice, there is a tumult of waters in the heavens (Jer. 10.13)

Similar to the collocation involving *ntn* to describe the use of the divine *qōl*, several texts use the verb *r'm* (to thunder) in presenting the *qōl* of Yahweh[85] literally as part of a storm theophany. Unlike with *ntn*, *qōlōt* never occurs as the object of the verbal root of *r'm*. The thundering storm god has martial skill (1 Sam. 7.10) and is led into combat armed with the chaotic waters as in #84 where Yahweh is armed with the sound of his thunder (*qōl ra'amka*). In #85, the voice of Yahweh is further described through the use of *gadol* (great, large), a common adverbial frame element for the expression of loudness or audibility, as discussed in Section 5.4. Furthermore, the fact that Yahweh's loud thundering throws the Philistines "into such confusion" is more sensible if *qōl* here is treated as the overwhelming *sound* of thunder. This could have been understood as Yahweh's "voice", but translations should attempt to convey the contextual implications of a text, and "voice" here conflicts with the broader narrative thrust.

84	מִן־גַּעֲרָתְךָ יְנוּסוּן מִן־קוֹל רַעַמְךָ יֵחָפֵזוּן׃	At your rebuke they flee; at the sound of your thunder they take to flight. (Ps. 104.7)
85	וַיְהִי שְׁמוּאֵל מַעֲלֶה הָעוֹלָה וּפְלִשְׁתִּים נִגְּשׁוּ לַמִּלְחָמָה בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל וַיַּרְעֵם יְהוָה | בְּקוֹל־גָּדוֹל בַּיּוֹם הַהוּא עַל־פְּלִשְׁתִּים וַיְהֻמֵּם וַיִּנָּגְפוּ לִפְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל׃	While Samuel was sacrificing the burnt offering, the Philistines drew near to engage Israel in battle. But that day the LORD thundered with loud thunder against the Philistines and threw them into such a panic that they were routed before the Israelites. (1 Sam. 7.10 [NIV])

[85] **1 Sam.** 7.10; **Ps.** 77.19, 104.7; **Job** 37.4, 37.5, 40.9.

From the storm theophany of #86, Yahweh challenges Job by asking him about the strength of his arm and the power of his voice: two important traits of a storm god (Green, 2003:55, 161, 258).

86	וְאִם־זְרוֹעַ כָּאֵל ׀ לָךְ וּבְקוֹל כָּמֹהוּ תַרְעֵם׃	Have you an arm like God, and can you thunder with a voice like his? (Job 40.9)

5.6.2.2. Yahweh as a roaring lion

Moving away from the role of storm god, Yahweh can be portrayed directly as a roaring lion with the use of *š'g* and *hgh*[86]. The uniqueness of Yahweh, and his opposition to other gods such as Ba'al, is a recurring theme in the Hebrew Bible. In Mesopotamian religious thought, both the bull and the lion are sources of conceptual imagery for storm gods, while Anatolian traditions relate only the bull to a typological storm god (Green, 2003:13, 105). However, leonine imagery of Yahweh is important because it has no relation to traditions surrounding Ba'al (Strawn, 2005:251). Thus, we see Yahwistic language diverging from some normative conceptualisations associated with the Canaanite storm god. Yet, while we can take this to be a divergence from Ba'al language, it is also not Yahwistic in origin. Precedents include the syncretic god Ba'al-Seth, who is symbolised by the lion (Strawn, 2005:193, 255-256).

Yahweh, who is often imaged as a storm god, gradually rose to the top of the Canaanite pantheon, displacing El and Ba'al, who are often compared to bulls (Green, 2003:203-204). The relationship between Yahweh and the image of the bull is thus a complex matter (especially in light of texts such as Exodus 32). It is likely that the evolution of Yahwistic theology had a predominant influence on the bull and lion comparisons that are located throughout the Hebrew Bible. Strawn (2005:264) also argues that the adoption of leonine characteristics from Athirat, the consort El or Ba'al (depending on the tradition), parallels the adoption of storm god characteristics from Ba'al. For

[86] **Is.** 31.4; **Ezek.** 19.7; **Job** 37.4 (The texts of **Jer.** 25.30, **Joel** 4.16, and **Amos** 1.2 are here only indirectly of interest, since the lion imagery parallels the more common *ntn* frame element).

Othmar Keel, this piecemeal theology is termed “cumulative monotheism” (Strawn, 2005:264).

Returning to the texts, the leonine image is most often threatening and violent – in Amos 1.2 Yahweh threatens his own people, whereas in Joel 4.16 his roar is aimed outward at the nations (Strawn, 2005:60-61). The martial savagery of the lion, an important quality in Mesopotamian sources, is attributed to Yahweh (Strawn, 2005:206-207). In #87, although the use of *qōl* here concerns normal human voices, one finds an extended comparison between Yahweh and a lion.

87 כִּי כֹה אָמַר־יְהוָה | אֵלַי כַּאֲשֶׁר יֶהְגֶּה׀ הָאַרְיֵה וְהַכְּפִיר עַל־טַרְפּוֹ אֲשֶׁר יִקָּרֵא עָלָיו מְלֹא רֹעִים מִקּוֹלָם לֹא יֵחָת וּמֵהֲמוֹנָם לֹא יַעֲנֶה כֵּן יֵרַד יְהוָה צְבָאוֹת לִצְבֹּא עַל־הַר־צִיּוֹן וְעַל־גִּבְעָתָהּ׃

For thus the LORD said to me, As a lion or a young lion growls over its prey, and—when a band of shepherds is called out against it— is not terrified by their shouting or daunted at their noise, so the LORD of hosts will come down to fight upon Mount Zion and upon its hill. (Is. 31.4)

Leonine imagery can be seen in #88 as a parallel to the more common *ntn* + *qōl* frame. Only Jer. 25.30 and Amos 1.2 present similar parallelisms, however.

88 וַיהוָה מִצִּיּוֹן יִשְׁאָג וּמִירוּשָׁלַ͏ִם יִתֵּן קוֹלוֹ וְרָעֲשׁוּ שָׁמַיִם וָאָרֶץ

The LORD roars from Zion, and utters his voice from Jerusalem, and the heavens and the earth shake. (Joel 4.16 [NRSV 3.16])

The verb *š’g* can be used interchangeable with *ntn* + *qōl*, which further cements the leonine image in relation to the divine *qōl*. This is a more fully realised form of the

conceptual metaphor GOD IS A LION and gives credence to the notion that Yahweh was commonly attributed to be leonine[87].

89 וַיֵּדַע אַלְמְנוֹתָיו וְעָרֵיהֶם הֶחֱרִיב וַתֵּשַׁם אֶרֶץ וּמְלֹאָהּ מִקּוֹל שַׁאֲגָתוֹ׃

And he ravaged their strongholds, and laid waste their towns; the land was appalled, and all in it, at the sound of his roaring. (Ezek. 19.7)

To conclude, leonine language of Yahweh occurs often enough in parallel with that of the traditional storm theophany to understand the two as interrelated, although not interchangeable (Green, 2005:59). The development of generic storm god language and more uncommon leonine imagery form part of the same complex history of Yahwistic theology. Furthermore, both expand our understanding of the (often threatening) nature of the divine *qōl* in the Hebrew Bible.

5.7. Lexicalised references to reported speech

Extending from the senses categorised under Section 4, there is a pattern in the corpus for *qōl* to reference not only the voice (of a speaker), but explicitly the speech content as an object (what was communicated or what message was conveyed). This occurs through uncommon yet consistent syntactical frames, with the sense becoming more formally used as a fixed expression in Late Biblical Hebrew.

First, we have several uses[88] of *qōl* in the absolute or construct state where the meaning of *qōl* as "voice" (such as in #90) goes beyond that literal interpretation to represent some essence of "message".

[87] Following Strawn (2005:250), the book of Amos can be seen as an extended metaphor of the leonine Yahweh.

[88] **Gen.** 45.16; **Ex.** 4.8 (x2), 36.6; **Ps.** 44.17; **Ecc.** 5.2, 5.5, 10.20.

90	גַּם בְּמַדָּעֲךָ֣ מֶ֔לֶךְ אַל־תְּקַלֵּ֑ל וּבְחַדְרֵ֣י מִשְׁכָּבְךָ֗ אַל־תְּקַלֵּ֙ל עָשִׁ֔יר כִּ֚י עוֹף֙ הַשָּׁמַ֔יִם יוֹלִ֖יךְ אֶת־הַקּ֑וֹל וּבַ֣עַל הַכְּנָפַ֔יִם יַגִּ֖יד דָּבָֽר׃	Do not curse the king, even in your thoughts, or curse the rich, even in your bedroom; for a bird of the air may carry your voice, or some winged creature tell the matter. (Ecc. 10.20)
91	וְהָיָ֗ה אִם־לֹ֤א יַאֲמִינוּ֙ לָ֔ךְ וְלֹ֥א יִשְׁמְע֖וּ לְקֹ֣ל הָאֹ֣ת הָרִאשׁ֑וֹן וְהֶֽאֱמִ֣ינוּ לְקֹ֔ל הָאֹ֖ת הָאַחֲרֽוֹן׃	"If they will not believe you or heed the first sign, they may believe the second sign. (Ex. 4.8)
92	וַיְצַ֣ו מֹשֶׁ֔ה וַיַּעֲבִ֥ירוּ קֹ֛ול בַּמַּחֲנֶ֖ה לֵאמֹ֑ר אִ֣ישׁ וְאִשָּׁ֗ה אַל־יַעֲשׂ֤וּ־עֹוד֙ מְלָאכָ֔ה לִתְרוּמַ֖ת הַקֹּ֑דֶשׁ וַיִּכָּלֵ֥א הָעָ֖ם מֵהָבִֽיא׃	So Moses gave command, and word was proclaimed throughout the camp: "No man or woman is to make anything else as an offering for the sanctuary." So the people were restrained from bringing; (Ex. 36.6)

In each of these texts, *qōl* in terms of target-in-source metonymy refers to a message, which can also be formulated as a conceptual metaphor VOICE IS COMMUNICATION (which similarly informs the obedience contextual frame discussed in Section 5.5.3.). However, the difference here is the more formal detachment of the message from the voice with which it may be said to originate. Hence, *qōl* while still translated as "voice" in these instances actually carries the sense of "speech" or "words" (i.e. literally "what you have said") as in #90 or "message" as in #91 and #92. Notably, #92 is translated by the NRSV as "word was proclaimed", which is completely understandable in English due to the overlap between *word* and *message* (e.g. as in the phrase "send word").

I would argue that the same conceptualisation occurs in #93, but it is equally probable that the use there is a basic construct state as discussed in Section 5.5.1. The NRSV (among others) translates "a fool's voice", but the NIV is given below for its alignment with my argument.

93	כִּי בָּא הַחֲלוֹם בְּרֹב עִנְיָן וְקוֹל כְּסִיל בְּרֹב דְּבָרִים׃	A dream comes when there are many cares, and many words mark the speech of a fool. (Ecc. 5.2 [NIV 5.3])[89]

A next syntactic frame is marked by the construct state *qōl dbrym* / *mlh* (the latter also in Aramaic)[90]. Literally, someone is said to hear "the sound of words", which the NRSV more often than not keeps word-for-word. The NIV, as given in #95 and #96, often translates with "words […] speaking" or merely "speaking", which would be a more direct translation of this sense. Regardless, #97 is one example where the literal phrase "the sound of words" is kept in various translations. This can be to emphasise the revelatory nuance of the text or merely the importance of how precise it was that only "the sound" of Yahweh's speech was heard. One exception is the Common English Bible, which has "You could hear him and understand what he was saying, but you couldn't see him."

94	בָּרֲכוּ יְהוָה מַלְאָכָיו גִּבֹּרֵי כֹחַ עֹשֵׂי דְבָרוֹ לִשְׁמֹעַ בְּקוֹל דְּבָרוֹ׃	Bless the LORD, O you his angels, you mighty ones who do his bidding, obedient to his spoken word. (Ps. 103.20)
95	חָזֵה הֲוֵית בֵּאדַיִן מִן־קָל מִלַּיָּא רַבְרְבָתָּא דִּי קַרְנָא מְמַלֶּלָה	Then I continued to watch because of the boastful words the horn was speaking. (Dan. 7.11 [NIV])

[89] One can also look to Die Bybel 2020-vertaling: "Ja, 'n droom kom deur baie sorge, 'n dwase gepraat deur baie woorde".

[90] **Deut.** 1.34, 4.12, 5.28 (x2); **1 Sam.** 7.12; **Ps.** 103.20; **Job** 33.8, 34.16; **Dan.** 7.11, 10.6, 10.9 (x2).

96 וָאֶשְׁמַע אֶת־קוֹל דְּבָרָיו וּכְשָׁמְעִי אֶת־קוֹל דְּבָרָיו וַאֲנִי הָיֵיתִי נִרְדָּם עַל־פָּנַי וּפָנַי אַרְצָה׃

Then I heard him speaking, and as I listened to him, I fell into a deep sleep, my face to the ground. (Dan. 10.9 [NIV])

97 וַיְדַבֵּר יְהוָה אֲלֵיכֶם מִתּוֹךְ הָאֵשׁ קוֹל דְּבָרִים אַתֶּם שֹׁמְעִים וּתְמוּנָה אֵינְכֶם רֹאִים זוּלָתִי קוֹל׃

Then the LORD spoke to you out of the fire. You heard the sound of words but saw no form; there was only a voice. (Deut. 4.12)

Lastly, *qōl* as *speech content* becomes a fixed expression in Late Biblical Hebrew where occurrences of the absolute state explicitly refer to a formal (or independent) conveyance of speech content in the form of a "report" or "proclamation"[91]. A variation of this concept can already be seen in #98 below. As in several other translations, the NRSV captures this sense with "report", but the informality of the context is more precisely captured by the NIV with "news".

98 וְהַקֹּל נִשְׁמַע בֵּית פַּרְעֹה לֵאמֹר* בָּאוּ אֲחֵי יוֹסֵף וַיִּיטַב בְּעֵינֵי פַרְעֹה וּבְעֵינֵי עֲבָדָיו׃

When the news reached Pharaoh's palace that Joseph's brothers had come, Pharaoh and all his officials were pleased. (Gen. 45.16 [NIV])

Apart from #98, all occurrences belong to the post-exilic texts of Ezra, Nehemiah, and 2 Chronicles, and feature a uniform referent: a formal or administrative decree spread either across the Persian empire #99 or localised to "Judah and Jerusalem" #100, "in their towns and in Jerusalem" #101, and "all Israel, from Beer-sheba to Dan" #102. Each of these expressions contains the same formula of the verb *'br* (to pass over)[92] with *qōl*, apart from 2 Chron. 24.9 where the verb is *ntn* (to give).

[91] **Gen.** 45.16; **Ezra** 1.1, 10.7; **Neh.** 8.15; **2 Chron.** 24.9, 30.5, 26.22.

[92] The syntactic frame element *'br* can already be noted in #91.

99	וּבִשְׁנַת אַחַת לְכֹורֶשׁ מֶלֶךְ פָּרַס לִכְלוֹת דְּבַר־ יְהוָה מִפִּי יִרְמְיָה הֵעִיר יְהוָה אֶת־רוּחַ כֹּרֶשׁ מֶלֶךְ־פָּרַס וַיַּעֲבֶר־קוֹל בְּכָל־מַלְכוּתֹו וְגַם־ בְּמִכְתָּב לֵאמֹר׃	In the first year of King Cyrus of Persia, in order that the word of the LORD by the mouth of Jeremiah might be accomplished, the LORD stirred up the spirit of King Cyrus of Persia so that he sent a herald throughout all his kingdom, and also in a written edict declared (Ezra 1.1)
100	וַיַּעֲבִירוּ קֹול בִּיהוּדָה וִירוּשָׁלַם לְכָל־ בְּנֵי הַגּוֹלָה לְהִקָּבֵץ יְרוּשָׁלָם׃	They made a proclamation throughout Judah and Jerusalem to all the returned exiles that they should assemble at Jerusalem (Ezra 10.7)
101	וַאֲשֶׁר יַשְׁמִיעוּ וְיַעֲבִירוּ קֹול בְּכָל־עָרֵיהֶם־ וּבִירוּשָׁלַם לֵאמֹר צְאוּ הָהָר וְהָבִיאוּ עֲלֵי־זַיִת וַעֲלֵי־עֵץ שֶׁמֶן וַעֲלֵי הֲדַס וַעֲלֵי תְמָרִים וַעֲלֵי עֵץ עָבֹת לַעֲשֹׂת סֻכֹּת כַּכָּתוּב׃ פ	and that they should publish and proclaim in all their towns and in Jerusalem as follows, “Go out to the hills and bring branches of olive, wild olive, myrtle, palm, and other leafy trees to make booths, as it is written.” (Neh. 8.15)
102	וַיַּעֲמִידוּ דָּבָר לְהַעֲבִיר קֹול בְּכָל־ יִשְׂרָאֵל מִבְּאֵר־שֶׁבַע וְעַד־דָּן	So they decreed to make a proclamation throughout all Israel, from Beer-sheba to Dan (2 Chron. 30.5)

Unsurprisingly, when addressed locally to what was the Persian province of Yehud, the subject matter regularly concerns local as opposed to imperial affairs. In particular, the local affairs are explicitly religious, concerning the cult of Yahweh centralised in Jerusalem. For example, 2 Chronicles 24.9 concerns the reinstatement of a tax to

maintain the Jerusalem temple, while #102 concerns the celebration of Pesach – also in Jerusalem.

Throughout this chapter, it has been noted that *qōl* can express through target-in-source metonymy someone's reported speech, the essence of what they have said or are saying. For example, while "a voice" can be heard purely as an object (as discussed in Section 5.5.1.), listening to someone's "voice" can also mean adhering to what has been conveyed through that voice (as discussed in Sections 5.5.2. and 5.5.3.). As such, the connection between *qōl* and speech content is a consistent theme of this chapter, and here in Section 5.7. we can see something of a final version of this semantic extension where the lexeme itself is used to refer to reported speech as a specified message, such as a proclamation.

5.8. Conclusion

As stated previously, the problem identified in currently available lexicons and theological dictionaries is a lack of coherence in differentiating between the senses of *qōl* and providing a rational categorisation of the senses. This chapter has aimed to provide a new categorisation consisting of six main categories that then contain various inflections of the broader category. The categorisation begins with the most prototypical, or most concrete, sense of acoustic phenomena. While mostly connected with occurrences of "sound", this concrete sense entails almost an equal engagement with "voice". The interjectional sense is offered as an extension of this concrete sense, but a lack of data makes its presence a matter of speculation. Building on the idea of *qōl* as "sound", the third sense relates to the concept of "audibility", where *qōl* is a frame element within adverbial expressions. The fourth sense introduces *qōl* as something heard in terms of communication. Concerning human (and anthropomorphic) communication, the syntactic frames of *qōl* here become more complex, such as with the interaction between the particle *'et* and prepositions l^e and b^e, *qōl* and the verb *šm'*. Following on from this, the sixth sense category explored the divine *qōl*, which while functioning similar to the frames governing human communication also shares a conceptual blend with the phenomenon of thunder. This is predominantly due to the history of Yahweh as a storm god, but several variations on the characteristics of the divine *qōl* were discussed, including the idea of a leonine

Yahweh. Lastly, indirect speech as the referent of *qōl* lexicalises in the Late Biblical Hebrew connection with formal communicative devices such as reports or proclamations.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

6.1 Summary

Returning one last time to our research question, how can the application of a cognitive linguistics approach to categorisation and sense mapping help one to better construe the senses of *qōl* as well as the relationships between them in a principled manner? This thesis set out to improve upon the lack of coherent categorisation visible in our extant body of knowledge regarding the lexeme *qōl*. It was repeatedly noted that syntactic and semantic generalities of the lexeme are well known from available lexicons and theological dictionaries, with some disagreement. Nevertheless, the true problem is that available lexicons and dictionaries lack a well-founded approach to sense categorisation. There is also almost no attempt (apart from Labuschagne, 1997) to understand the sense extensions that provide the impetus for individual senses.

It was hypothesised that certain notable tools from cognitive linguistics, an increasingly complex and nuanced research framework for general linguistic study, is of practical use for Biblical Hebrew semantics regardless of its status as an ancient language with no available native speakers (apart from those "voices" that comprise the texts of the Hebrew Bible itself). Prototype theory, it was noted, offers the researcher an account of how the lexeme comprises individual, sometimes contradictory, senses on the basis of a conceptual prototype and graded membership, both of which are linked to a speaker's encyclopaedic knowledge for language use; frame theory accounts for the way in which a particular sense becomes activated in terms of its syntactic expression and contextual use by a speaker, thus bridging the gap between the mental encyclopaedic knowledge that supports semantics and the contextual communicative clues that allow for language users to communicate and share understanding; and, lastly, conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual blending help in understanding the way in which language use and sense extension are products of generalised cognitive processes, thus also adding to our understanding of language as a dynamic and complex system and meaning as a matter of contextual construal based on both the nature of human embodiment (i.e. language arising from an embodied perspective) and the socio-cultural specificity that each language in its own creative diversity.

In summarising the findings of this study, the following radial map can be understood as a provisional illustration[93] of both the various senses laid out in Chapter 5 as well as their interrelationships by way of sense extensions.



Figure 1: A radial map of the semantic potential of *qōl*.

[93] This map is considered as provisional since there is no diachronic evidence for these extensions.

Figure 1 represents the six main sense categories identified by this study based on syntactical and contextual frames. The basic level sense *acoustic phenomenon*, which exists as a prototypical referent, is easiest understood as the division between sound and voice, which here is illustrated by way of two circles numbered as "1". Arrowed lines represent sense extensions while dotted lines represent relationships that develop dynamically, such as Yahweh's "voice" blending with the "sound" of thunder or the relationship between a human voice and the performance of certain non-speech vocal acts, which are often described via adverbial expressions. Plain black lines represent senses of the broader sense categories (e.g. the various verbal expressions that accompany *qōl* in the context of a voice being heard or obeyed).

6.2. Final remarks

A weakness of this study, which may be identified as a challenge for all cognitive linguistics-based research for ancient languages, is the complexity posed by cognitive linguistics itself. It is a broad framework for research and is continuously engaging with fields such as psycholinguistics and neuroscience. The speed at which such research yields ever-increasingly complex results regarding how the brain works and language as a cognitive product is a challenge for anyone, let alone someone seeking to "translate" some of the more practical insights for the study of ancient languages. Nevertheless, this should not be accepted as reason enough to discount the efficacy of cognitive linguistics for Biblical Hebrew semantics, as illustrated by the productive methodologies already existing with Van Wolde (2009, specifically), Shead (2011), Burton (2017), and Thompson and Lyle (2019). Furthermore, Van der Merwe's extensive dialogue with cognitive linguistics has informed his work, for example, with the latest Afrikaans translation, *Die Bybel 2020-vertaling*. This is but one example of how the complex theoretical work can trickle down into more practical, but no less complex, work such as bible translation.

Furthermore, the future of lexicography and the functionality of dictionaries requires semanticists of ancient languages such as Biblical Hebrew to reflect on the potential for improving upon the current linearity of lexicons. Internet-based lexicons with hypertext functionality, which more correctly relates to the encyclopaedic way in which linguistic information is stored, can be the future of lexicography. This would naturally be of an

exponentially higher level of complexity; however, as cognitive linguistics research continues to demonstrate, the complexity of language use and cognition can only be matched by equally complex (or, realistic) understandings of language use. Perhaps the question to ask is how such complex tools could be made accessible so as to bridge the reality of complexity with the coherence that one seeks in a dictionary.

Lastly, as dictionaries are a constant form of revision, so this study has attempted to illustrate the potential of adding to what is already semantically known regarding a specific lexeme: insights from the innovative, developing field of cognitive linguistics. Others have successfully done so before this study, even so as to produce complex models of semantics research, some of which are listed above. However, just as any language is a universe of its own, with an infinitude of interrelated pieces, this study has attempted to further illuminate one more piece of the Biblical Hebrew universe, the lexeme *qōl*.

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